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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Sub Saharan African countries have faced a general problem of 
stabilizing and restructuring their economies since the mid 1960s. In some 
countries stabilization and structural adjustment programs (SAPs) have been 
successfully implemented. These African economies have been experiencing 
internal dynamic processes of macro and microeconomic reforms. They have 
promoted agriculture for smallholders and applied a pricing system in favor 
of export crops to generate foreign exchange. Some efforts have been made 
in the mining sector for the same purposes. They also have promoted 
exports by using export compensation schemes, devaluing their national 
currencies or gradually adjusting exchange rates. Most have adopted import 
substitution as a policy to induce private investment in activities to 
replace imports. 
In other African countries like Zaire, results have been 
disappointing. Implementation of SAPs has been so ineffective that both 
institutions and Western banks suspended their interventions in 1990. In 
spite of massive investments by Western banks and private foreign 
investors in late 1960 and in early 1970s, and financial aid from the 
governments of the US, Japan, France, Germany, Italy and Belgium, the 
Zairian economic growth (GNP per capita) and investment growth have been 
declining since 1975 (with the exception of some slight improvement in 
1983-84). 
Research Question 
In order to understand the Zairian crisis and hypothesize a solution 
in this study, the following policy questions will be answered. Why have 
both the government of Zaire and the two international institutions (IMF 
and World Bank) been concerned with the restructuring of the Zairian 
economy? Policy distortions that have constrained growth will be addressed 
to answer this question . Internal policies and external shocks may justify 
implementation of stabilization and structural adjustment programs. 
Sectoral dualism characterizes the Zairian economy in the traditional 
sector on one hand, and in the modern or industrial sector on the other 
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hand. Which sectors should receive available scarce resources? Whichever 
sector receives allocations, would economic growth come from private or 
state-owned companies? Micro reforms are perhaps the cornerstone of 
economic growth because they aim to improve efficiency in production. The 
more national innovative entrepreneurs participate in strategic sectors of 
the economy, the more can be expected in terms of increased efficiency in 
production . 
Resource allocation between sectors has been the main concern of 
structuralist economists involved in stabilization and structural programs. 
Resources may be reallocated by a central authority or by market forces . 
The Zairian government may use monetary and fiscal policies; likewise, the 
Central Bank of Zaire and the Department of Finance may use financial 
technique s to stimulate savings , investment and growth. What are the 
sources of funds needed to finance these sectors? What roles have The 
World Bank and the IMF played in the provision of foreign resources needed 
by the Zairian economy? If market forces can efficiently reallocate scarce 
resources between sectors, isn't it right to believe that like licensed 
exporters, peasant diamond producer should directly get access to foreign 
exchange instead of selling their diamonds in a national currency that 
depreciates continuously? Macro policies which do not permit such 
opportunities to diamond miners would constitute the most important po l icy 
distortion . 
In the process of stabilization and structural adjustment of the 
Zairian economy, policy makers have chosen some key sectors or industries 
of the economy to be promoted. Did they emphasize export sectors, or import 
substitution industries? Or did they emphasize the mining sector more than 
the agricultural sector? And, whatever the choice, what are the backward 
and forward linkages of the chosen leading industries or sectors? 
To address the issue of policy distortions, what macroeconomic 
policies were undertaken under stabilization and structural adjustment 
programs from 1967 to 1991, and what may be said about their performance? 
In order to achieve their objectives, policy variable instruments which 
were chosen should act on other exogenous variables pushing the system 
toward desired targets . Why did macroeconomic policies partially or 
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completely fail to achieve their objectives? Possibly because of 
inappropriate macroeconomic policies, external debt has reached alarmi ng 
levels, such that the Zairian government could no longer service it. This 
situation has undoubtedly affected socioeconomic indicators. The standard 
of living of the Zairian people may have been seriously affected. In 1991, 
under pressure of the IMF and the World Bank, the international corrununity 
halted its financial support to Zaire. Has the situatio n been worsening or 
not since the suspension of financial support by IMF , World Bank and 
USAID? Can this country solve its economic crisis by itself or, as it is 
believed, must Zaire rely continuously on external financial support from 
the international corrununity in order to find a means for continuing its 
development? 
Under these considerations, what are the best alternatives for 
macroeconomic policies? If investment is the main source of growth, what 
are investment determinants in the leading industries or sectors? 
In this study a new structure of a macroeconomic model is visualized to 
see how inefficiency in domestic savings mobilization have affected 
investment and economic growth. In the revised model either former 
variables are excluded or new variables are introduced. Is there any 
significant impact of new variables on targets after controlling for other 
variables? 
Assuming that microeconomic reforms are necessary to improve 
efficiency in production, it is important to identify the types of policy 
measures which best fit the Zairian case. To do this, it will be useful to 
determine the structure of the microeconomic model in the leading industry 
or sector. 
A leading industry or sector may have backward and forward linkages. 
What are they in the case of the diamond industry? One would think, as 
the IMF and the World Bank do, that the agricultural sector should be the 
focus of attention because it has been essentially neglected in food crop 
production . Di d capital dualism provide excess c redits to the modern 
sector? Some financial support has been given to smallholders but for what 
farm size and for which crops ? 
Most African countries have seen irrigation as a mean towards food 
self-sufficiency, or a source of fore i gn exchange earn ings from export 
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crops. In which areas and under what conditions would it be economically 
feasible to promote irrigated agriculture in Zaire? 
For investment to be undertaken there are some requirements. With 
respect to savings, after the collapse of the official banking system, 
what could be the role of a new financial development enterprise in the 
process of savings mobiliztion? The key question this study intends to 
answer what will determine the best savings mobilization process that can 
shift upward the Zairian private investment schedule and promote 
socioeconomic growth? 
Before proceeding in the direction of these difficult issues where 
the Zairian government and the international institutions have together 
failed to find appropriate solutions to the Zairian crisis, one must be 
reminded that Zaire, as a developing country, is well endowed with 
unskilled people, natural agricultural and mineral resources, and with 
existing extracting and manufacturing industries, most built during the 
colonial era. Given these endowments, along with an increasing number of 
well educated people who have graduated from national and western 
undergraduate and graduate colleges and universities, and finally the 
financial help from the international community, Zaire should have achieved 
a good performance rather than a display of poor results. This study 
points to policies and institutional reforms that could improve the 
country's economy. 
Geographic Situation and Climate 
Zaire, located in the Central African region, is the second largest 
sub-Saharan country and the largest Central African country in geographic 
area . It lies across the Equator, with coastal access, and is bounded by 
the Congo, the Central African Republic, Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, 
Tanzania, Zambia, and Angola. The country consists of the vast Congo Basin. 
The river now renamed the Zaire, drains water from the Ubangi River in the 
North, the Uele and Aruwimi in the East, and the Lualaba and Kasai in the 
South. Above the basin, the land levels into the Kwilu-Kwango plateau, the 
Kasai plateau (altitude between 500 and 1,000 m), the Shaba plateau, 
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altitude between 1,000 and 1,500 m) and the Zaire Nile ridge (altitude > 
1,500 m) (Hodd, 1991, p. 342). 
The climate is equatorial in the Center and West with hot and humid 
conditions and temperatures reaching average 26° C. The East and South are 
cooler and drier with temperatures in the mountains averaging 28° C. 
Rainfall is plentiful in the North all year round, especially in September 
and October. In the western part of Zaire, it is heaviest from October to 
March, with some areas in the Bas Zaire province only receiving 80 cm per 
annum. Since the country straddles the Equator, the North has a drier 
Winter from November to February, while the South is drier in the months of 
May to August (in the Bas Zaire , the Bandundu, the Kasai Occidental, the 
Kasai Oriental provinces, and the northern area of the Shaba province). 
From the Kahemba area in the southern province of Bandundu to the South of 
the Shaba province the drier season goes from May through October. Dry 
seasons last from one month in the Isiro area in the Haut Zaire province, 
to six months in the Shaba province in the south. In the Tshikapa area, the 
dry season lasts from May to August. Diamond activities are well carried 
out during dry seasons than in wet seasons. Natural vegetation consists of 
a dense evergreen rainforest in the North and a tropical forest with 
grassland and shrub Savannah in the South which covers half the total land 
area. 
Transportation Infrastruc t u re 
Zaire's transportation network is made up of a series of regional 
road networks connected by a combination of navigable rivers and railways 
that form the country's major transport arteries, extending from the port 
of Matadi , through Kinshasa and then to the North, East, and South. In 
colonial days, the transport system was mainly set up to facilitate import 
and export, not to promote regional integration . Thus, the North-South 
transport systems are poorly developed. 
The Zaire and Kasai Rivers are navigable for 14,000 kilometers and 
are important national waterways although they are not navigable as far as 
the coast because of rapids and waterfalls (INGA on the Zaire River, 
between Matadi and Kinshasa). Goods have to be transshipped overland to the 
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port of Matadi, by road or by railway . Matadi is the most important 
national port of Zaire for export of minerals from the Shaba province. 
Ilebo, located on the Kasai River, is an import port because goods hauled 
by trains from the South have to be transshipped by boats from Ilebo to 
Kinshasa. In Kinshasa, goods have to change transportation means again from 
boat to trains and trucks, to proceed to the port of Matadi. In the East, 
goods must cross Lake Tanganyka at the port of Kalemie . From Udjiji in 
Tanzania, exports are hauled by trucks and trains up to Dar Es Salam. Thus, 
the main ports for import and export of goods are Ilebo, on the Kasai 
River, Kalemie on Lake Tanganyka Lake, Kinshasa and Matadi on the Zaire 
River, and Boma and Banana on the Atlantic Ocean. The biggest 
hydroelectric-electric power plant is located at Inga on the Zaire River 
between Matadi and Kinshasa. 
The national railway linking the Shaba Province to Ilebo in the Kasai 
Occidental Province is about 1,800 km long. Kalemie, on Lake Tanganyika, is 
another national port for export of minerals from the South . In Tanzania, 
minerals are hauled by trucks or trains up to Mombasa. Unlike the longest 
railroad route from the Shaba province to the South African port of Durban, 
the railway from Dilolo in the Shaba province to the port of Labita in 
Angola is the cheapest route for imports and exports from or to the Shaba 
province. However, since the Angolan Civilian War, the cheapest route has 
been closed forcing Zaire to export its products through the costly route 
within Zaire and through Zambia, Zibambwe, Botswana and the Republic of 
South Africa to Durban. In general, the infrastructure is crumbling . About 
85 percent of the 85,000 miles of roads that existed at independence in 
1960 have reverted to bush (Darton, 1993, p . 1). 
Agriculture and Mineral Resources 
Mineral resources include copper, cobalt, diamonds, gold, oil, 
manganese, silver, tungsten, uranium and zinc. Zaire is the world's top 
producer of industrial diamonds, annually producing about 14 million carats 
of which 2 million are gem stones, and cobalt (15,000 metric tons). It is 
the world's sixth producer of copper (470 ,000 metric tons in 1986). The 
general trend has been characterized by stagnation, or more, a decline in 
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the production of the mining sector. The economy has been relying 
excessively on copper as its single major export product. 
Agricultural production in Zaire is carried out by two very distinct 
sub-sectors: the traditional sector, consis ting of millions small family 
farms, practicing slash and burn agriculture on cultivated areas averaging 
1.5 hectares (ha) or less; and the modern sector, which includes perhaps 
nine hundred larger plantations (averaging 300 ha in size) and other 
agribusiness enterprises using modern production techniques down from 1,200 
in the 1970s. Broadly speaking, the traditional sector is predominantly 
oriented toward production of food crops (maize, manioc, beans, rice, 
banana, groundnuts, wheat, sweet potato, and potatoes), although 
smallholder coffee and cotton production are significant in certain areas 
of the country. The modern sector is oriented principally toward the 
production of industrial and export crops (coffee, tea , cocoa, rubber, 
cotton, palm oil, tobacco , sugar, quinine, timber) . It also includes 
commercial maize production in the Shaba province. During the past decade 
or so there has been increasing involvement of smallholders in production 
of industrial and export crops. 
Population and Standard of Living 
The map of Zaire shows us its administrative subdivisions by 
provinces which are: Bas Zaire, Bandundu, Kasai Occidental, Kasai Oriental, 
Shaba, Kivu, Haut Zaire, and the Equateur province (see Figure 1). In 1990 , 
the Kivu province was broken down into three provinces: Nord Kivu, Sud Kivu 
and the Manieama province . 
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scale: 1/12.000.000 
Figure 1. Map of Provinces of Zaire 
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Zaire is among the 10 largest African countries. Estimates for 1994 
suggest a population of 40 million inhabitants. With an area of 2 .3 million 
square kilometers, the population density is 17 persons per square 
kilometer, and varies from 100 per square kilometer in the Bas Zaire 
province to between 1 and 3 per square kilometer in the South . Urbanization 
wa s about 38 percent in 1987 . The rate of popu l ation growth was 3 . 1 percent 
over the period from 1980-87, above the average African rate. 
In 1987, while the large African country group had the lowest GDP per 
head of US $213 , Zaire had the lowest standard of living in the central 
African region with a GNP per capita of only US $150, one of the lowest in 
Africa. However, with a GDP of US $5.770 billion in 1987, Zaire was among 
the nine African countries with GDP above US $5 billion. It was the second 
largest economy in the Central African region, after Cameroon. Its 
agricultural sector is proportionately smaller than most other countries in 
Central Africa , generating a GDP only 32% . Its industrial sector accounted 
for 33%, while the service sector generated 35% (below the regional average 
of 43%) . 
In the same year, Zaire was among 34 low-income countries, with a GDP 
per head under US $480 . Private consumption was 73% of GDP, with government 
consumption of 17%. The level of investment, low compared with the rest of 
Africa, was 13% of which 10% , was contributed by domestic saving. Exports 
were equal to 33% of GDP with imports of 36%. The main exports were copper 
(42%), coffee (13%) and diamonds (9%), while main imports were machinery 
40%, food 29%, and fuel 24% (Hodd, 1991, p . 344). 
With respect to its economic stability, in 1987 Zaire was considered 
to be one of the nine fairly stable countries . It was said that President 
Mobutu had been able to create a strong security network which had, 
together with frequent government reshuffles , prevented the growth of 
opposition within the country and pre-empted any coup attempts. However, 
since 1990, central authority has been dissolving, and opposition is open 
and well established within Zaire. The Shaba Province of Zaire was invaded 
in 1976 and 1978, by Zairian rebels based in Angola, organized in a so-
called FNC (National Force of Liberation of Congo). Their objective were to 
create political instability in copper and cobalt production such that the 
government would suffer from critical foreign exchange shortages . 
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Nevertheless, what rebels and other opponents were looking happened from 
1988 to 1993. Some copper mines collapsed reducing productions and exports 
from about 470,000 tons metric of copper in 1987 to less than 60,000 tons 
metric in 1993. In addition, frequent riots since 1991 and violence ethnic 
conflicts between Zairian originated from the Kasai Provinces and those 
originated from the Shaba Province have created an uncontrollable situation 
such that the investment climate is no longer attractive to foreign 
investors, especially in the Shaba Province. 
Poor Economic Performance 
Stabilization and structural adjustment programs in Zaire had been 
implemented in four periods: (1967-75, 1976-82, 1983-86, and 1987-90). 
Internal and external shocks have justified implementation of these 
programs. The performance of the economy, even after implementation of the 
structural adjustment measures, was disappointing in several respects. In 
early 1990-91 , both the IMF and the World Bank suspended disbursement of 
their principal operations in Zaire and the adjustment effort ceased 
completely. The economy continued to deteriorate and inflation was 
estimated to run as high as 3,000 percent in 1992, and about 7000 percent 
in 1993. 
Carton (1993) found that after four years of turmoil, government 
authority is simply dissolving, leaving the cities and the countryside to 
pillaging soldiers and roaming gangs of thugs and bandits. For more than 
three decades, Zaire's 40 million people have seen their living standard 
drop every year. The economy is in shambles, with an external debt of more 
than US 10 billion dollars. Prices rise many hundredfold yearly and there 
is virtually no new investment, namely the construction of paved roads and 
plants. 
Lack of Foreign Exchange 
In sum, one of the major constraints for restoring macroeconomic 
balances and restructuring the Zairian economy is the availability of 
foreign exchange and its wise use in infrastructure, productive, and human 
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development projects. In order words, the lack of private savings and 
mobilization of foreign exchange is a major constraint for economic growth 
in Zaire. 
Instruments for Domestic Savings Mobilization 
Zaire has rarely experienced a positive current account balance. 
Likewise domestic savings has hardly ever matched investment demand. Credit 
expansion that has deepened the government budget deficit has aggravated 
Zairian twin deficits. The study will analyze both government, the IMF and 
World Bank instruments for domestic savings mobilization and analyze the 
reasons why Mobutu plans could not fully be implemented. The 1969 
Investment Code is another instrument to attract direct foreign investments 
but did not achieve its goals. 
Development Grants and Humanitarian Programs 
Western government grants and humanitarian programs are other 
financial supports received by Zaire . However, given the low level of 
amounts made available, and also given their nonutilization by targeted 
groups,( e.g., peasants), Western donors have limited their inter ventions 
to such as displaced people from the Shaba Province due to ethnic violence . 
Public and private investment demand could not be satisfied by humanitarian 
grants. 
Marketing of Precious Stones 
In 1991, the government of Zaire enacted a law allowing the sale of 
precious stones in foreign currencies within Zaire. Instead of only 
allowing licensed exporters to earn foreign exchange, peasant diamond and 
gold producers can earn their revenues in the US dollars for example. The 
study will analyze the impact of such measures on other macroeconomic 
variables and on the productivity of diamond miners. 
12 
Tshikapa, a Study Area 
Three maps of Zaire show where diamonds are extracted (Figure 2, 3, 
and 4). The diamond shape shows diamond producing areas in the Kasai 
Occidental, Kasai Oriental and the Bandundu provinces. We have chosen the 
Tshikapa area because of its historical importance in the production of gem 
diamonds. Another reason is the fact that in spite of being a major 
producer of gem diamonds, the city of Tshikapa suffers from a lack of paved 
roads, electricity, and improved drinking water services, a lack of 
telecommunication systems. The cost of living is the highest in Tshikapa 
and in Mbuji Mayi as well where is located the state-owned diamond mining 
company. 
Eric Bruton (1978, p. 93) reported that when diamonds were found in 
Belgium Congo (now Zaire), in 1910, in the shorebeds of the Kiminina River 
near the Mayi Munene in Western Province of Kasai, few suspected that this 
small cache would lead to the discovery of the world's largest source of 
diamonds. The estimated size of the field which includes many ancient river 
beds, is 150,000 square miles (approximately 384,000 sq. km). Up to the 
1980s , there were two centers of organized mining: around Tshikapa in the 
Western province of Kasai, and Mbuji Mayi in the Eastern province of Kasai. 
The first center, including 37 separate diamond areas, has been mined by 
licensed individual diggers who sell gem diamonds to buying offices in 
Tshikapa or in Kinshasa. The other center and by far the richest, in the 
Mbuji Mayi area, has been mined by the Societe Hiniere de Bak.wanga (MIBA), 
of which 80 percent is owned by the government . 
Until 1982, private diamond digging was prohibited in the Mbuji Mayi 
area. The 1982 diamond and gold digging liberalization led MIBA to reduce 
the area of its concession in favor of individual miners. Prohibition of 
diamond digging had led to smuggling of production to other countries such 
as Congo and Burundi. Nzongala (1987, p. 150-151) reported that diamond 
smugglers and clandestine producers pillaged the diamond beds in Kasai . By 
the end of 1961 , trade was organized in stages to Brazzaville in Congo, and 
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in the Central African Republic which expanded in 1962. The figures on 
export of diamonds from Congo, a country which itself has no diamonds, 
indicate the quantity of diamonds smuggled out of Zaire - in November-
December 1961, 89,500 carats, valued at 209,003,000 Congolese francs. At 
the exchange rate of 130 C.F. for B.F 100 (Belgium francs), this 
represented 160.77 million Belgium francs. In January-April 1962, 642,016 
carats, valued at 252,381,000 Congolese francs, equivalent to 194.14 
million Belgium francs. In 1979, 5.5 million carats of diamonds were 
exported from Brazzaville (in Congo) and Bujumbura (in Burundi) while the 
official exports only were 8.06 million carats, representing US $59 
million. Most of these diamonds had been produced in the Tshikapa area. 
In 1994, (USAID/Zaire, p. 39), reported that the Kasai provinc es 
became a focus for international attention in late 1992, when political 
elements in Shaba (Katanga) province provoked the native Katangese to 
violently attack resident Kasai populations. Hundreds of lives were lost 
and an estimated 400,000 people have fled into East and West Kasai since 
August 1992. Since independence, the Kasai provinces have been 
systematically neglected and isolated by the central government in an 
effort to retard development. Paradoxically, the region also contains the 
richest diamond mines in Zaire. The major centers are very localized and 
only a fraction of the population benefits from mining activities. Almost 
none of the revenue is re-invested into the region and prof its are exported 
discretely. The diamond trade is extraordinarily profitable and is 
estimated to generate well over o ne million dollars per day in Mbuji Mayi 
alone. More than half of the activity is outside the control of MIBA, the 
state-owned diamond extracting company, and official diamond buyers. Mbuji 
Mayi, the capital of the Kasai Oriental province is the city where is 
located the state-owned diamond mining company. Though the ownership of 
this company belongs to the Zairian state, the control over its production 
has been discussed many times because of illegal interventions of the 
ruling elite. The Parliament used to ask the government to justify the 
reasons why revenues from diamonds had not been in the government receipts. 
The report does not say anything about gem diamonds produced in the 
Tshikapa areas and whose average price for one carat is about US $1,000, 
and average annual production of gem diamonds is over 5 million carats. 
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This would represent US $5 billion per year of gross revenues. In 1994, the 
outstanding external debt of Zaire is over US $ 10 billion. Even if 
Tshikapa would produce from 1 to less than 5 million carats of Gem 
diamonds, yet a US $ 1 to 5 billion may be expected to be earned. This is 
one reason for choosing Tshikapa as a study area. Due to the region's 
physical isolation and the absence of a viable transportation 
infrastructure, most goods are flown into the region from Kinshasa, 
Lubumbashi and North Kivu. Thus, the price of basic commodities are 
exorbitantly high by any standard. In urban areas, where much of the 
population is concentrated, most people survive on the prolific commerce 
and trading that feeds the diamond industry, and they are dependent on food 
inflows from the rural areas for their survival. 
There is little economic activity beyond subsistence farming in rural 
areas. Consequently, the Kasai provinces traditionally are net importers of 
grain, bringing in an average of 140,000 metric tons per year . Areas of 
western and southern Kasai produce some local surpluses of maize, soya and 
manioc, but a dilapidated transportation infrastructure limits market 
access and distribution of surpluses within the region. In areas directly 
surrounding the towns of Mbuji Mayi and Mwene Ditu, where most displaced 
people are concentrated, the soil is infertile and, without applications of 
fertilizer or use of improved seed varieties, yield only 300-500 kg per 
hectare. This figure is similar to the situation in the Tshikapa and the 
Kahemba diamond producing areas in the Bandundu province . 
When Shapiro and Tollens (1992, p. 154) asked the question where is 
economic growth going to come from in Zaire , they reported that, 
traditionally, the view has been that rapid economic growth will have to 
come from the extractive sector for which Zaire is well-endowed. But the 
market for raw materials of interest to Zaire such as copper, diamonds, 
cobalt , or any of the other extractive products in which Zaire is so 
abundant has been depressed for over a decade in spite of a marked upturn 
of the world economy in the second half of the 1980s. Overcapacity of 
copper extraction on a world scale, recycling and substitution induced by 
technological advances such as the replacement of copper wire by fiber 
optics all indicate that there are limited possibilities to increase either 
production, market share, or world prices of these raw materials. In 
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addition, severe damage was done in October 1991 to the mines in Shaba and 
particularly to the new infrastructure at the Fungurume mine. Hence, the 
large investments required and the long lead times needed to restore and 
eventually expand extractive capacity, further reduce the scope for the 
extractive sector to become an engine of growth in the 1990s. 
According to Shapiro and Tollens (1992, p. 155), the only major area 
that has good short and medium term prospects of accelerated economic 
growth with improved equity is agriculture. They have ignored USAID/Zaire 
(1994, p. 39) findings that, in Mbuji Mayi only private diamond activities 
generate per day about one us million dollars, and that diamond trade is 
extraordinarily profitable. The findings of this study may also convince 
readers . In addition, overall investments in agricultural sector may 
involve more than one billion US dollars which is hard to get from Western 
Banks and private foreign investors, who traditionally are not interested 
in food crop production. Investing in export crops would meet the same 
deterioration of trade problem faced by mineral exports. Luckily, Zaire has 
the largest market share in the diamond world market and is, in effect, the 
top producer of industrial diamonds as well. 
In addition, 20 percent of the diamond world market is not controlled 
by De Beers (Bruton, 1978, p. 170). With a minimum US $2 ,500 selling price 
per carat in New York, one can say that US $1,000 per carat in Tshikapa is 
sufficient enough to make profitable any investment project in diamonds 
provided that the expected production is maximized with respect to input 
costs and the probability of finding diamonds. According to geologists, 0.9 
to 5 carats may be found per cubic meter in the Kasai diamond producing 
areas (Vingt ans du MPR, 1987, p. 203). 
Therefore , under such circumstances, this study suggests that the 
inception of a policy investment model could be a mechanism which will 
mobilize earnings from sales of diamonds and gold in foreign exchange 
within the Zaire, to finance social, infrastructure, and productive social 
investments projects. 
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Hypothesis 
The domestic investment demand is a function of domestic private and 
public savings, external savings, domestic credit, and foreign loans and 
direct foreign investment. 
I = SP + SG + SX + DP + DG + FP + FG + FD 
where I is investment, SP is domestic private savings, SG is domestic 
government savings, SX is external savings, DP is domestic private 
borrowing from the banking system, DG is domestic government borrowing from 
the banking system, FP is foreign private loans, FG is foreign government 
loans and grants, and FD stands for foreign direct investments . 
GDP growth is a function of savings, assuming that savings equals 
investment. 
s 
g=~-
ICOR 
where g stands for GDP growth rate, s for savings, and ICOR is the 
incremental capital output ratio. 
Our null and alternative hypotheses are expressed as follows: 
HO: government of Zaire, IMF, and World Bank instruments could 
mobilize savings in the context of the Zairian socioeconomic 
and political environment. 
HA: These instruments cannot mobilize savings with efficacy; 
Instead, new variables included in the extended model can do 
better. 
Objectives of the Study 
Economic growth depends on factors such as managerial skill, 
investment growth, and productivity growth. In addition, managerial skill 
and productivity growth depend on investment in human development and in 
technology and innovations, while investment will also depend on managerial 
skill and productivity growth. A country needs money (foreign exchange and 
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local currency) to finance investment projects (in infrastructure, 
productive and social sectors). At the same time, this country needs 
innovative entrepreneurs (skilled people, managers and workers) to make 
appropriate investment decisions and realize actions. Practical and applied 
skills are more productive than exclusively theoretical ones. In addition, 
a stable political environment inducing investments is a necessary 
condition for economic growth. 
Therefore, the three major objectives of this research are (l) the 
inception of macroeconomic models of the Zairian economy; (2) the analysis 
of microeconomic conditions of prof it maximization of investment projects 
in diamonds and (3) an institutional reform to mobilize savings and 
increase investment levels. 
Macroeconomic Objectives 
The study aims to utilize a macroeconomic policy model of the Zairian 
economy in order to determine the value of policy variable instruments 
which may push the economy toward specific targeted levels of GDP with 
balance of payments Regression analysis will determine all parameters of 
the model framework. 
The model seeks to increase foreign exchange within Zaire through the 
sale of diamonds. With adequate financial development, the model will be 
used to define savings incentives that can help economic agents involved in 
diamond activities to make bank deposits. In addition to its role of 
collecting savings and organizing loans, the institution will collect taxes 
and rights to pollute and damage the environment to be paid by diamond 
miners and diamond dealers. Finally, this institution will solve the 
problem of public goods in diamond producing areas. In order t o increase 
consumption levels of diamond producers and dealers, the model will define 
consumption incentives, diamonds and agricultural marketing innovations. 
In order to make investment again a function of interest rate, a 
decreasein the nominal interest rate is another objective of the model. In 
order to attract direct foreign investments, financial development will 
lead to the unification of official and parallel exchange markets , and to 
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an appreciation of the exchange rate of the Zairian currency, in order to 
attract direct foreign investments. 
Microeconomic Objectives 
This part intends to determine conditions of profit maximization in 
the diamond industry. Increase in productivity implies the use of new 
technologies and their appropriation by peasant diamond producers. 
Institutional Reform 
In order to solve macroeconomic imbalances and microeconomic 
inefficiency in production, the study will show the importance to micro-
enterprise of a financial development institution. 
Organization of The Study 
Chapter one, the study has introduced the reader to the research 
questions and the objectives of the research. The empirical study of 
investment models is based on time-series data presenting the trend of 
economic indicators (regressors). Chapter two will concentrate on the 
analysis of macroeconomic indicators in Zaire and the economic performance 
from 1967 to 1993, depending on availability of data. The analysis of macro 
and micro economic reforms under the International and the World Bank will 
take place in chapter three. In other words, an analysis of the IMF and the 
World Bank model in the process of stabilizing and restructuring the 
Zairian economy will be undertaken. Then a revised macroeconomic model 
including new regressors will be suggested. In chapter four, the study will 
focus on microeconomic reform dealing with investment in diamond 
production. Finally, in chapter five, a n examination of a financial 
development institution will be developed . A brief discussion will lead to 
a conclusion and suggest some recommendations. 
2 2 
Me thodo l o gy o f the Research 
The researcher has been thinking about an economic model for rural 
development in Zaire since 1985 when he was working for the Governor of the 
province of Bandundu as economic adviser . He was in charge of preparing the 
1986-1990 first Zairian macroeconomic economic plan related to the Bandundu 
province. In Bandundu, regional tax on diamonds from Kahemba was his main 
concern because most official diamond buying off ices located in Kahemba 
used to not pay required taxes. Traveling through diamonds mining areas in 
the Kasai province from 1985 to 1989 gave the researcher the opportunity to 
observe diamond activities in the Tshikapa and Mbuji Mayi areas. 
In addition to observations on the ground, the researcher read 
documents related to diamond activities at the Ministry of Planning in 1986 
where he worked as Consultant Official published documents and unpublished 
documents were read not only in different libraries in Zaire , but also in 
the libraries at Iowa State University. 
From May 1993 to January 1994, the researcher was on the ground in 
Zaire observing and interviewing persons concerned with the topic (diamond 
miners, and dealers, farmers, officials and others). With statistical data 
collected in different libraries, the research undertook regr essions 
analyses a nd interpreted regression coefficients obtained from various 
s ources (Brittain, 1978; Gould, 1982; Huybrechts et al. , 1982; Jaycox, 
1993; Leslie, 1987; Lungwangu, 1971; Nathan, 1989; UNDP, 1990; USAID, 1994; 
World Bank-East Africa Regional Office, 1979) . Because the IMF and World 
Bank models use reduced form equations to determine instrument variables of 
the policy model (Boland, 1989; Neal & Shone, 1976), the researcher uses 
the same technique in this study. So, the null hypothesis that 
macroeconomic polices undertaken under stabilization programs by the 
government of Zaire could not be verified by statistic tests. Most of the 
tables included in this study were elaborated by the researcher for the 
1973- 90 period. Supplementary data used to develop the regression model are 
shown in the Appendix. 
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Limitations 
Most statistics were collected in the US libraries because of some 
difficulties to collect data in Zaire. Parameters used in the revised 
macroeconomic model were computed based upon regression equations using 
these data. About the microeconomic model, the researcher uses expectations 
to determine quantities of diamonds produced and revenues based on 
information given by geologists. However, the cost of equipment and the 
selling price per carat of diamonds are true prices. 
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CHAPTER 2. ECONOMIC REFORMS AND PERFORMANCE OF 
THE ZAIRIAN ECONOMY FROM 1967-1991 
The major objective of this research is to define an economic policy 
model of Zaire in order to build an economic model. Relevant variables and 
parameters describing the economic situation will be chosen among economic 
indicators to depict macroeconomic indicators of the Zairian economy. 
Leading economic indicators and other indicators used in the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank models will be examined . Variables used by 
Tshibaka will also be examined. These variables may be used as exogenous 
and/or endogenous instruments or targets to develop the model. 
Macroeconomic Indicators 
Aside from the gross domestic product (GDP), the economic indicators 
used in this study are those having a macroeconomic policy impact such as 
money supply, inflation rate, exchange rate, fiscal deficit, domestic 
credit, government tax revenues , government spending, exports , imports, 
current account, investment (public and private), foreign exchange,foreign 
debt and debt service, private consumption and savings . The leading 
indicators, are shown in Figures 5 and 6, and Table 1 (Hodd, 1991, p . 348-
349), will be discussed in each of the following sections. In addition, 
Table 2 gives the World Bank's indicators for the years 1971-1986 (Leslie , 
1987, p. 174) . Finally, Table 3 gives basic data of Zaire from Tshishimbi 
et al. (1994, p. 106) which helps one to understand the economic situation 
when viewed along with the preceding figures and tables. 
Gross domestic product (GDP) 
The GDP grew by 6.4 percent, and then by 4 to S percent during the 
period 1967-74; then it declined an average of 2 percent annually from 
1974-1980. During the period 1976-82, the real GDP declined by about 1 
percent per year, largely as a consequence of the stagnation in Zaire's 
terms of trade (the falling price of copper, the main Zairian export 
mineral) . During the period 1976-82, the real GDP delcined by about 1 
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Figure 5. Leading indicators for Zaire (Hodd, 1991, p. 348) 
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Table 3 . Basic data of Zaire (Tshishimbi et al . , 1994 , p. 116) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Annual rate of growth 
GDP (1970 prices) 2.4 2.9 -3.0 1.3 2.7 2.5 2.7 2.6 2.2 - 2.0 
Consumer price index" 46.7 53.0 4 1.0 101.0 14 .5 39.0 38 .3 106.5 93.7 100.0 
Money supplyl-> 6 1.5 37.9 73 .5 73.8 84.2 27.3 58.8 96.7 127.3 75.4 
Population 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3. 1 3. 1 3.2 3.2 3.0 
Terms of trade -8.1 - 16.5 -5.5 5.7 1.3 - 2.4 -2.3 -8.2 19.6 
Percentage of GDP 
Consumprion 86.0 92.3 91.3 91.8 82.6 8 1.9 87.8 90.8 91.5 92.0 
Gross domestic 15 .0 15.0 14.4 10.9 13.9 13.S 11.2 11.9 11.0 10.0 
invesrmenr 
Resource balance - L. 0 -7.3 -5.7 - 2.7 J .5 4.o 1.0 -2.7 - 2.5 - 2.0 
(g:ip -) 
Gross domesnc savings 16. 2 15.8 11.3 13.2 l 8.8 16.9 16.4 10.0 9.8 15.-
Budgetary defirn (-) - 2.7 -7.2 - 10.5 - 4.0 -3.8 - J.5 -5.2 -9.7 -2 1.2 
Long term public Jebr 4 l.5 46.3 45.8 58.0 101.6 120.4 J 11. 1 137.2 118.0 120.0 
Debt service< 22.5 21.9 13.2 13.7 20.8 25.7 22.0 11 ..., --·' 15.9 16.0 
Su11rce: Tsh1sh1mb1 and Glick, fo rrhcoming, courresr of Cornell Food and Nutrition Policy Program. 
•K111shasa CPI (end of period). 
hBroad mone)'. 
<Debr service (:ifter rescheduling) as pe rcent :i~c: of expom of !!Oods and services. Includes payments ro IMF 
and on shorr-re rm debr. 
percent per year; however, the GDP grew by 1.6 percent a year over the 
period 1980- 87, while it declined at a rate of -1.S percent yearly per 
head. From 1973-89, the least square estimate of the growth for GDP was 
-1 . S percent per year. The estimated equation is 
log GDP = 8.449966 - 0 . 01513 
For the periods of 1975-79, 1980-83, 1984-85 , 1986-87, and 1988-89, 
the percentage change of GDP growth rate were: -2.9, 0.9, 2 . 6, 2.7, and 
0.5 percent, respectively . Hodd (1991) found that GDP grew by 1 . 6 per cent 
a year from 1980 to 1987, while GDP per capita declined at -1.S percent a 
year. The percentage change in the GDP per c apita growth rate for the same 
periods were: -5.6, -2.0, -0 . 6, -0.3, and -.OS, respectively. Tshishimbi et 
al. (1994, p. 116) reported the following results as shown in Table 4: 
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Table 4. Contribution of agriculture to growth in GDP, (percentage) 
Real rate of growth of GDP 
Real rate of growth of agriculture 
GDP caused by agriculture 
Source: Tshishirnbi (1994, p. 106) 
1965-73 
3.9 
-1.7 
1974-80 
- 2 . 0 
1.1 
1981-88 
1.6 
3.4 
42.0 
During the 1981-88 period, improvements in the overall growth rate 
came from liberalization measures and in the production of coffee, maize 
and rice. However, the real GDP growth rate for the 1973-90 period is -1.5 
percent per year . 
When analyzing the structure of the GDP by economic sector, Tshibaka 
(1986, p. 121) reported that during 1966- 70, the output of staple food 
crops grew at an annual average rate of 4.0 percent while major export 
crops grew at 8.9 percent (Table 5). From 1971 to 1982, the annual average 
growth rate of staple food crop output dropped to 1.6 percent, much lower 
than the estimated population growth rate of 2.8 percent. The average major 
export crop output (palm kernels, natural rubber, cocoa beans, and palm 
oil) dropped to 0.8 percent. Coffee growth rate fell from 7 . 1 percent 
during 1966-70 to 2 . 4 percent from 1971 to 1982. While coffee grew by 3.5 
percent, palm oil production decreased by 3.43 percent per year over the 
same period. 
Hodd (1991, p. 344) found that the agricultural growth rate for the 
1980-87 period was 3.2 percent. The regression coefficients for the 1967-89 
show a declined growth rate for cotton production (-6.28%). During the 
period of stabilization and structural adjustment programs, maize 
production had increased by 4.3 percent per year, groundnuts by 3.4 
percent, and paddy (rice) by 4.4 per year. The estimated equations are : 
Maize 
Cotton 
log Prod 
log Prod 
5.782536 + 0 . 042608Year 
4.044902 - 0.062867Year 
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Table 5. Contribution of different sectors to GDP (percentage 
distributions of value added by sector) (Shapiro, 1992, 
p . 39) 
Year 
Sector 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Agriculture: commercial 13 13 14 11 13 13 10 10 
: subsistence 22 21 18 16 16 18 17 15 
Total agriculture 36 35 32 27 28 31 26 26 
Mining, extraction 12 19 25 31 33 24 21 19 
Manufacturing 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 
Other goods 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 3 
Commerce (trade) 21 20 19 17 16 18 17 15 
Other services 20 17 16 15 14 17 23 27 
. Misc. other 5 4 4 4 4 5 7 9 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
"Includes import duties and noncomrnercialized construction . 
Note: Component percentages may not add up to corresponding totals due to rounding . 
Groundnuts 
Paddy (rice) 
Coffee 
Palm oil 
log Prod 5 . 328502 + 0.034193Year 
log Prod = 4.857316 + 0.044278Year 
log Prod = 4 .010759 + 0 . 035052Year 
log Prod = 4.943760 - 0.034314Year 
From 1980 to 1987, the industrial sector, which is largely dependent 
on mining, increased by 3.6 percent per year, while services fell by -1 . 2 
percent a year. In particular, diamond production increased by 2.05 percent 
per year between 1971 and 1987. The estimate d equation is 
Diamonds log Prod = 9.24 + 0.020564Year 
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There has been an encouraging increase in diamonds marketed through 
official channels with the end of the government monopoly in 1982 and the 
depreciation of the currency has discouraged smuggling although this had 
begun to increase again by 1987 . Diamond sales rose by 80 percent in 1983 
and SS percent in 1984 and continued to rise in 1987. 
The least square estimate of the growth rate for diamonds since diamond 
digging liberalization mea sures is 12 percent. The estimated equation is 
express ed as 
DIAM83-89 = 7.901 + 0.127862Year 
Before the 1982 liberalization of gold and diamond digging, the estimate 
regression of the growth rate for diamonds was negative {-0.06S). The 
estimate equation is 
DIAM71-82 9.69 - 0.06S009Year 
Exports 
From 1966 to 1970, crop exports increased, then decreased during the 
1970-82 period. Palm oil and palm kernel oil exports declined at a rate of 
2S.8 percent and 9.2 percent, while exports of natural rubber decreased at 
an annual rate of 4.S percent and cocoa bean exports at 2.3 per cent. 
Cotton disappeared completely from the export list in 1977. Export volumes 
fell by 3.4% a year during the 1980-87 period. 
The output of food crops increased at an average annual rate of 3 
percent in 1982-86 . However, production of industrial and export crops 
continued to stagnate or decline. In 1987 , exports were 33% of the GDP . 
The main exports were copper 42%, coffee 13%, diamonds 9%. In 1991, copper 
exports drastically decreased because of the collapse of a major mine shaft 
at Kamoto due to a lack of maintenance and replacement of equipment at 
Gecamine. This large copper parastatal earns more than half of the foreign 
exchange and is a major source o f tax receipts. As a result, copper 
production in 1991 was expected to be only one-half that of 19S9, the l ast 
year before independence. 
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In 1993, because of ethnic violence in the Shaba province , copper 
production had fallen f rom 470,000 metric tons to about 60,000 tons a year . 
By contrast, diamond production has increased over 20 million carats 
yearly, becoming the main Zairian export . 
Regre ssion coefficients for the 1973-1989 show a decline of - 0 . 12 
percent a year under the s tab i lization and structural programs, while the 
trend of exports shows a positive correlation with increased exports of 
diamonds from 1983. The estimated equation for export growth is 
Exports: log Export = 6 . 947497 - 0 . 001287Year 
A combination of falling prices for Zaire's main mineral exports and poor 
production performance has resu lted in falling export earnings . 
However, from 1973 to 1982, the least square estimate of the growth for 
exports was - 0.03705, when diamond digging by private persons was 
prohibited. The estimated equation is 
EXP7 3-82 7 . 096264 -0.03705Year 
Whereas exports have grown by 1.83 percent sinc e the 1982 diamond digging 
liberalization measures, the least square estimate of growth for exports is 
0.018055 . 
From 1983 to 1989 , estimate coefficient for export is 
seen in the f o llowing predicted equation . 
EXP83-89 = 6.902490 + 0.018055Year 
Leslie (1987, p . 81) found that the percentage share in total exports rose 
from 4% in 1980 to 17.6% in 1984, largel y attributable to measures taken b y 
the government in 1982 to liberalize diamond digging. 
Imports 
Because the growth of food crops was less than that of the population 
and lagged far behind the growth in demand from Kinshasa a nd other urban 
areas, massive amounts of food were imported during the 1970s and 80s. From 
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1967 to 1974, the volume of food importation increased at an annual rate of 
2.1 percent, and the rate jumped to 7.2 percent from 1974 to 1982. From 
1980 to 1987, importation volumes only declined by -0.4 p e rcent. For 
example , in 1980 the importation of maize totaled 147,000 metric tons, 
about 44 percent of total domestic consumption (excluding consumption of 
nonmarketed output); imports of wheat, which was not produced domestically , 
totaled 103,000 metric tons; meat and fish imports each amounted to the 
third of domestic consumption. 
Together with low mandated prices, the government policy of providing 
cheap imports to keep r e tail prices low in urban market s depressed food 
crop prices and discouraged domestic production. With the rising cost of 
oil , the price of imports started to increase in 1974 . By 1975, a shortage 
of foreign exchange , largely due to decreased returns from copper and a 
falling off of other exports, had a dramatic impact on importation of 
intermediate goods. To make them cheaper, the government had chosen to 
overvaluate the currency. Importation also decreased under stabilization 
due to cuts in import levels as recommended by the IMF . The shortages of 
imported inputs explain, in part, one of the most striking aspects of 
Zaire's economic experience, namely, the failure of investment to make a 
mark on aggregate output . At the end of 1987 , imports were 36\ of GDP. The 
main imports were machinery 40\, food produce 29\ and fuels 24\. From 1973 
to 1989, the regression coefficient shows a decline in imports of only -
0 . 08 percent per year. The estimated equation for imports is 
log Import 6 . 577706 - 0.000839Year 
Terms o f trade 
Since 1975 , the Zairian crisis has also contributed to and/or 
sustained by the deterioration of the terms of trade, largely due to the 
depressed level of copper prices throughout most of the crisis . Over the 
period 1975-82, the terms of trade continued to deteriorate with the 
ensuing balance of payments deficits, shrinking the GDP, and raising the 
debt burden. From 1983-89, the terms of trade deteriorated by 20 percent 
yearly. The terms of trade were 104 . 5, 86 . 5, 83.5, 81.6, and 75.9 for the 
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years of 1975-79, 1980-83, 1984-85, 1986-87, and 1988-89, respectively. 
While exports of copper, coffee and diamonds have increased over the 
periods, overall terms of trade have moved in opposite direction. Under the 
stabilization and structural adjustment programs, macroeconomic policies 
encouraged an increase in the traditional exports of copper, cobalt, 
coffee, and diamonds, while export earnings decreased continuously. 
Adding the fact that large portions of exports earnings were stocked in 
Western banks, the government of Zaire had a great difficulty to fully 
implement its conunitment toward its people . 
Current account 
The external accounts deteriorated in 1975. Despite a sharp 
contraction in the volume of importation, the current account showed no 
improvement, largely because of a decline of 38 percent in the terms of 
trade. In 1977, the account deficit rose to US $1 . 45 billion. In addition 
to declining copper prices, a failure to fully repatriate exportation 
earnings, especially from coffee, and a sharp decrease in net capital 
inflows contributed to this deficit. In 19 78, despite a slight improvement, 
the overall balance of payments deficit appears to have remained 
approximately us $500 million. 
The regression equation of current account against imports, exports 
and the exchange rate from 1973 to 1989 is espressed as 
CA -544.59 - 0.58IMPORTS + 0.49EXPORTS + 22.68EXCHRATE 
With a one percent increase in the cost of imports, the current 
account deficit will increase by 58 percent, while a one percent increase 
in the value of exports will improve the current account by 49 percent. If 
the exchange rate appreciates by one percent, the current account balance 
will improve by 2200 percent. 
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Foreign exchange 
In order to finance the large deficit (negative current account and 
balance of payments), in 1975, Zaire drew on its remaining international 
reserves (reserves became negative by about US $320 million) and 
accumulated arrears on external payments rose about US $320 million from 
merchandises imports, debt service and invisibles totaling. Pending a 
renegotiation of Zaire's external indebtedness with both official creditors 
a nd private banks, Zairian authorities suspended most debt service 
p a yme nts, and e xternal creditors and suppliers became increasingly 
r eluctant to extend credit to Zaire. As a result, the authorities 
int roduce d new foreign exchange restrictions. 
However, under a standby arrangement, the IMF and the World Bank 
approved and enlarged credit to Zaire . At the end of 1976, additional 
external payments in arrears of approximately US $130 million raised the 
outstanding arrea rs to about US $450 million . This process (foreign 
exchange shortage , restrictions on foreign exchange, accumulation of 
arrears, negotiation of external interest payment reschedulings, new 
standby arrangement and so on) has been repeated yearly and has raised the 
external debt to approximately US $10 billion by 1994. 
Exchange r at e 
During most of the 1970s and the early 1980s, the national currency~ 
the Zairian currency--was grossly overvalued and the exchange system was 
characterized by a multiple-rate regime. Whereas the 1967 devaluation of 
the currency corresponded to a 201.8 percent increase in the official 
exchange rate (expressed as number of units of local currency per unit of 
foreign currency), the Congolese franc was changed into the Zaire, and was 
set at US $2 for lZ. 
The real exchange rate increased 0.8 percent annually during 1966-70 
but fell 0.6 annually during the 1971-82 period, which contributed to the 
declining performance of the farm sector and the overall economy . In terms 
of foreign currencies, the real value of the Zaire began to deteriorate in 
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1969, resulting in t he progressive reimposition of restrictions on imports 
and foreign exchange transactions. 
From 1970 to 1975, the difference between the parallel market and the 
official exchange rates grew at an average rate of 70.8 percent per year. 
Before the 1983 exchange rate reform, the economy operated under several 
exchange rates: one legal and official rate, and several semiofficial rates 
as well as a multitude of unauthorized rates. The latter were related to 
transactions taking place outside the official banking system. The official 
rate was used for all official foreign transactions except certain mining 
transactions. The semiofficial rates were applied to purchases of gold and 
diamonds by specialized marketing agencies . Both the official and 
semiofficial rates were determined and regularly published by the central 
bank. 
In the 1980s, The currency steadily depreciated, first by 
devaluation, and then, after 1983, by a floating exchange rate. The 
September 1983 reform unified the rates in the official and semiofficial 
markets and gradually eliminated the spread between the official rate a nd 
the parallel markets. This has seen the exchange rate for Zaire depreciate 
from Z2.8 = US $1 in 1980 to Zl31.5 = US $1 in August 1987, and to Z274 = 
US $1 in 1988. Further devaluations brought it down to Z435 , Zl,000, 
Zl,000,000, Z3,000,000, Z6 , 000,000 and to Z9,000,000 by the end of 1993. 
In December 1993, a new reform introduced a new Zaire lNZ equaled to Z9 
million, equaled to US $1. In May 1994, the exchange rate had already 
depreciated, with 456 NZ equal to us $1. The regression coefficient for the 
1973-1989 period shows that the Zaire had depreciated by -44.34 per year 
during the period. The estimated equation is 
log EXCHRATE 2.099391 - 0.443462Year 
From 1973 to 1989, the response of imports to variations in exchange 
rates (US 1$ for Z) shows a positive correlation between imports and 
exchange rates. A one percent change in exchange rate (depreciation of the 
zaire vis-a-vis the US$), will increase the cost of importation by 8.33 
percent. The estimated equation is 
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IMPORTS 6.519 + 0.08334EXCHRATE 
I nflatio n rate 
From 1975 to 1983 , inflation averaged 60 percent annually. 
From 1980 to 1987, infla tion in Zaire was 53.5% a year. 
Inflation performance has been variable, with annual rates of price 
increases in the 1980s between 20% and 75%. During the 1983-85 period, the 
inflation rate fell from 77 to 24 percent, but the rose again to 47 percent 
in 1986. From 1986 to 1988, the exchange rate was again seriously 
overvalued, and inflation surpassed 100 percent. Inflation was over 100 
percent by 1989 . In 1990, the government abandoned the IMF/World Bank 
economic stabilization program and public expenditures soared at the same 
time that bilateral and multilateral donors cut their economic and 
financial assistance. By the end of the year, hyperinflation followed by a 
series of devaluations and runaway public expenditures had put the economy 
into an unprecedented dive. Since 1992, Zaire's macroeconomic environment 
was more unstable than ever, with runaway inflation of from 20 to 50 
percent a month (over 2,000 percent in 1993), and successive devaluations. 
From 1967 to 1987 the least square estimate of the growth rate for 
inflation was 35% per year. The estimate equation is 
log INFLA 1.863668 + 0 . 351454Year 
Fisc al deficit 
The Zairian government ' s expenditure and credit policies have been 
financed by an increasingly large fiscal deficit . From 1967 to 1970 the 
deficit was 10.7 million a year. Then it increased to 400.8 million a year 
during 1971-81. As a percentage of the GDP, the government budget deficit 
was -5.8, -6.1, -2.6, -7.4, -21.0 for the 1975-79, 1980-83, 1984-85, 1986-
87, and 1988-89 periods, respectively . As in the past, these deficits were 
financed by increased money supply by the Bank of Zaire, and the credit 
expansion to the light import susbtitution industries, and for the purchase 
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of coffee and diamonds. From 1977 to 1988, the government expenditure and 
lending minus repayment, as a percentage of the GDP, were: 
1977 16.9 
1978 16.4 
1979 16.1 
1980 12.1 
1981 13.5 
1982 12.9 
1983 11.8 
1984 15.9 
1985 15.3 
1986 16.7 
1987 20.0 
1988 17.5 
The regression coefficient for the period 1973-89 shows that 
government budget deficit grew 36% per year. The predicted equation is 
BUDEFIC = 1 . 37 + 0.369574Year 
Money Supply and Domestic Credit 
The Bank of Zaire has expanded domestic credit and the money supply 
by c reating claims on government. During 1966-70, domestic credit and the 
money supply increased at annual rates of 10.1 percent and 20 . 2 percent, 
respectively, while claims on governmemt rose at an annual rate of 20.8 
percent. 
Between 1971 and 1982, when the deficit in the government account 
increased rapidly, the Bank of Zaire expanded the claims on government at 
an annual rate of 34.2 percent. Domestic credit rose at an annual rate of 
33.7 percent and the money supply by 30 . 2 percent . 
From 1975 to 1983, money supply grew an average of 40 percent 
annually. Zairian budget deficits have been almost entirely financed by the 
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Central Bank and, to a large extent, have been responsible for increases in 
the mone y s upply. 
From 1967 to 1989 the least square estimate of the growth rate for 
money supply was 33% per year. The estimated equation for money supply is 
Money supply: log MONEY = 3.62378 + 0.336685Year 
From 1973 to 1983 , the least square of the growth rate for public domestic 
credit wa s 37.6 percent. The estimatee equation is 
log DEMCRED 3.699082 + 0.376339Year 
I nve stment and Saving s 
Although the investment rate averaged 30 percent in the period 1970-
73 , this was not matched by an increase in domestic savings , and as a 
cons equence a resource gap developed . Only one-fourth of government 
capital expenditures was financed through government savings in 1973 . From 
1967 to 1974, the bulk of investment was allocated to the modern sectors 
(mining and manufacturing) and to services benefiting mostly the urban 
centers , which expanded considerably during this period. The gross fixed 
investment nearly doubled in real terms between 1970 and 1974 to achieve an 
extraordinary rate of 36.4 percent of GDP. However, GFI has declined every 
year since then. 
In 1987 , private consumption was 73% of GDP , with government 
consumption 17% . The level of investment was the lowest compared with the 
rest of Africa, at 13%, of which 10% was contributed by domestic saving. 
From 1973 to 1983 the least square estimate of the growth rate for 
private consumption is 9% per year. The estimated equation for private 
consumption is 
log CONS 7 .2 21823 + 0.098909Year 
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Private savings 
From 1973 to 1983, domestic private savings grew by 0 . 12 percent per 
year. The predicted equation is 
PRIVSAV 7.577137 + 0.001282Year 
From 1973 to 1989 domestic investment decreased by -3% a year. The 
estimated equation for domestic investment is 
log INV 7 .251451 - 0.032666Year 
External Debt 
Since 1975, the Zairian crisis has been also brought about and/or 
sustained by heavy external borrowing in the years immediately preceeding 
the crisis for projects and at terms not always consistent with Zaire's 
economic needs and capabilities. It increased by 50 percent in 1974 , and 
foreign exchange reserves declined by 40 percent . Zaire 's external debt was 
estimated at US $7,800 million, of which 28 percent is with commercial 
banks. The level of financial commitment from the World Bank in support of 
reform programs was in US million dollars, 135.0, 170.0, 220 . 0 , 336.5, 
818 . 2 , 299.9, 1 , 023 . 3, 1,221.4, 1,005.6, 1,544 . 7, respectively, in 1980 , 
1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, and in 1989, giving a 
cumulative of 6,774 . 6 million us dollars. Table 6 displays trends in 
external financing in Zaire, 1971-85. 
From 1973 to 1989, the least square estimate of the growth rate for 
external debt (capital plus interest payments) is 17.7 percent per year . 
The estimated equation is 
log Etdeb 6.617572 + 0.1777415YEAR 
Table 6. Trends in external financing in Zaire, 1971-1985 ( $ millions) 
19 71 197 5 l9 HO l98l 1982 198) 191:14 1985 
eo-ita ents 156 .l 480. 8 369.7 153.8 178 . 0 158 . 9 163.9 143 .6 
lBRD 0 . 0 100.0 o.o o.o o.o o.o o.o o.o 
lDA 23.S 52 . 0 29 . 5 29.3 100 . 8 8fL 5 8 l. 5 91. 4 
Bllatera l 26.0 117.5 216. l 94.6 5'·. 5 63.9 82.4 )6. l 
Pr ivate creditors 106.6 2 ll. 3 124. I 29 . 9 22.7 6 . 5 o.o 16. l 
Supp I le r s 41,. 2 76 . fl 15. 2 10. 7 I 7. I o.o o.o 16 .1. 
Financial ma rkets 62 . 4 I 3L. . 5 108.9 19.2 S . 6 6.5 o.o o.o 
Disburuea cots 
a 
197.8 512 . 8 430.S 285.6 151.4 154 . 1 128.9 105 . 0 
IBRD o.o 11. 8 2) . 3 0 . 1 o.o 0.2 o.o o.o "'" I-'
TOA 2 . I 11. 5 19 . 7 17 . 3 JR . 4 49.8 51.0 55 . 9 
Bll a ttral l l. 8 163 . 6 I 38. 7 212. 3 89 . 0 85 . 4 77 . 9 49. l 
Private c r ed it or s 183.9 325 . 9 248 . 8 55 .9 24.0 18. 7 o.o o.o 
Supplie r s 96.2 88 .9 96 . 6 La.5 22.5 a.a o.o o . a 
FI ncrnc !.II m;irkcts 87 . 6 237 .o 152.2 4 s. 4 l. s IR. 7 0.0 a.Cl 
170.8 425.0 324 . 8 230.3 l l l . l 112-'• ', 34.1 26 .6 
Use of IMF c rtdit o.o 85 . 8 233.l 34 5. 7 422 . 6 510 . l 579 .4 12 1 .a 
a. Inc ludes disbursements of previous l y comm itt ed funds 
b. Di sbursements l ess debt se r vice payments, ca l culated based on c r~dits fr om al l sou rces 
Source: Wor ld Bank, Wor l d Debt Tables 1981, 1986-87; Wo rld Ba nk Annual Re port s . 
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Debt service ratio 
The debt service ratio (debt service/ government expenditures) moved 
up from 4.5 percent in 1970 to 12.9 percent in 1974. Because of default in 
interest payments, arrears have accumulated. The shortage of foreign 
exchange associated with ever-increasing foreign debt servicing obligations 
and continued high demand for imported consumer goods led to a contraction 
of imports for investment and productive purposes. The result is a further 
deterioration of the nation 's capital and infrastructural stocks. Since 
1989 , foreign debt servicing has averaged nearly 40 per cent of current 
government expenditures and was more than four times the Zairian 
government's investment budget. 
In 1988 and 1989 major bilateral donors canceled part of the 
outstanding foreign d e bt, first Canada followed by France, Belgium, the 
USA, and Germany. Such cancellations were conditional on strict a dherence 
by Zaire to the IMF program . For 1990 , the budget savings because of the 
debt forgiveness and reduced interest payments amounted to about US 30 
million dollars , about half of the total investment budge t of the 
government of Zaire in 1989. 
Taxes 
With the exception of rice and palm oil, other major crops were taxe d 
during 1971-82 period . Rates of taxation were, in decreasing order, highest 
for cotton, coffee, groundnuts, and maize. Overall, export crops were 
discriminated against more than food crops. In 1977, an increased new tax 
on coffee had resulted in substantial underreporting and smuggling. 
The average share of taxes on imports and exports was about 52.6 percent of 
total government budgetary revenue during the 1970-78 period against 63 . 9 
percent in 1970. 
In 1978, the average share of taxes dropped to about 28.5 percent. 
The drop was due to a growing weakness in tax administration and tax 
collection, and an increase in tax evasion . The ratio of import taxes to 
import value declined from 25 percent to 20 percent and that of export 
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taxes to export value from 34 percent to 114 percent during 1970-77. The 
fall in the share of export taxes was more pronounced, largely because of 
Gecamine's financial problems and the tax rebate the company received. The 
ratio of export taxes to export value dropped from 32 percent in 1974 to 14 
percent in 1977. 
In early 1977 the Zairian government increased the taxes on other 
exports than those of Gecamine's in order to reduce the budget deficit from 
Z310 million to Zl75 million. From 1973 to 1983 the least square estimate 
of the growth rate for total tax revenues was 2.2 % per year. The estimated 
equation is 
log TAX = 6.55683 + 0.022985Year 
While taxes on goods and services showed an increase of 10.7% per year from 
1973 to 1983, there was a decrease of -1.6% in taxes on international 
transactions. The estimated equations are 
Taxes on goods & services: 
log TAX = 4.256353 + 0.10785Year 
Taxes on international transactions: 
log TAX = 5.984591 - 0 . 016934Year 
During the same period, the least square estimate of the growth rate for 
government revenues was 5.6% per year. The estimated equation is 
log REV 6.351856 + 0.055999Year 
Macroeconomic Reforms in Zaire 
Macro and microeconomic reforms are undertaken in order to achieve 
macroeconomic balances, to increase efficiency in production and 
distribution, and to promote economic growth . The general objective of 
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reforms would consist of mobilizing domestic savings to make it match 
investment requirements . Specifically, the aim of reforms would involve: 
• the increase of the availability of foreign exchange in order to achieve 
balance of payments equilibrium and meet investment requirements; 
• the removal of anti-export bias and introduction of export promotion 
and/or ultra export promotion policy; 
• the promotion of neutral openness of the economy, with selective 
protection of import substitution industries, and at the same time, with 
export promotion policy being applied; 
• the increase in domestic savings (private, governmental and external); 
and 
• a look to increase efficiency in production and distribution of the 
national income. 
Ref orms o f 1967 -1974 
Obj ectives In June of 1967, Zaire requested and obtained a 
standby arrangement from the IMF in the amount of us $27 million to finance 
a stabilization program (Leslie, 1987, p. 61) . The program consisted of 
monetary reforms, including a major depreciation of the currency and the 
introduction of a new monetary unit, the zaire. The objectives of the 
reform were to: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
increase domestic savings (government savings) 
eliminate the effective rate of protection due to exchange rate 
overvaluation; 
increase efficiency in allocation of foreign exchange; 
increase efficiency in production; and 
promote an equilibrium of balance of payments . 
Pol i cie s The reform policies were : 
Exchange Rate Policy - A tremendous devaluation was decided; 
Contractionary Fiscal Policy - The government decided to reduce its 
budget deficit and to limit increases in salary; 
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• Foreign Exchange Control - A relaxation on exchange controls for more 
efficient foreign exchange allocation was to be applied; and 
• Contraction of Domestic Credit - The government decided to restrict 
increase in credit toward the private sector. 
Instruments The instruments developed to achieve reform were : 
• Devaluate the currency by creating a new currency, the Zaire, to replace 
the old "Congolese franc". The exchange rate was set at lZ for US $2, 
representing 1,000 old Congolese franc. This represented a 201.8 percent 
devaluation. 
• Increase domestic public savings by reducing the government budgetary 
deficit (public expenditure cuts, limitation of salary increases), and 
increasing tax revenues. 
• Achieve efficiency in production by the elimination of effective rate of 
protection and the encouragement of export by devaluing the currency. 
• Achieve efficient foreign exchange allocation by reducing exchange 
controls. 
• Reduce investment by restricting the increase in credit accorded to the 
private sector in order to reduce imports and achieve the equilibrium of 
the balance of payments. 
Perfo rmance The performance plans were: 
• substantial increase in foreign exchange from both the 
farming and mining sectors; 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
increase in foreign exchange reserves; 
during 1967-74, increase in GDP output (6.4 percent); 
increase in staple food crops output (4 . 0 percent); 
increase in major export crops output (8.9 percent); 
a substantial rise in government revenue and thus a considerable 
improvement in the budgetary and balance of payments performance; 
a substantial reduction in inflation through 1971; 
In 1969, distortions, or progressive reimposition of restrictions on 
imports and foreign exchange, resulted in deterioration of the zaire 
currency in terms of foreign exchange. In general the program's objectives 
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were achieved mainly through unexpected revenue increase rather than 
through expenditure cuts or revenue policies contained in the standby 
arrangement. 
From 1970 to 1975, the increasing negative current account balance 
was estimated at 60 . 0 per year . The current account deficit rose to US 
$592.7 million in 1975 due to the Zaire terms of trade deterioration. Gould 
(1980) mentioned that the Zaire crisis cannot be exclusively attributed to 
governmental expenses. Other factors had significant impact on 
macroeconomic level, namely the decreasing price of copper (the main source 
of foreign exchange for Zaire) on the international market. The average 
price per metric ton had fallen from 80,384 Belgian Francs in 1975 to B.F. 
45,367, and reached its lowest level in 1976 (B.F . 37,416). 
Falling copper prices, the disruption of the economy caused by the 
closing of the Benguela railroad during the Angolan civil war, the rising 
cost of oil and other crucial imports, and the disastrous reduction in 
levels of economic production and distribution caused by the Zairianization 
of many foreign-owned businesses in key sectors starting in 1973, plunged 
the country into economic crisis. 
While the levels of investment remained high (about 35 percent of 
commercialized GDP, mostly allocated to mining), imports increased almost 
twice as much as exports, pushing the current account deficit to about $650 
million, more than double that of 1973. 
By 1975, the government budget deficit was 73 million zaire, the 
first since 1965 . Overall, aggregate output as measured by GDP fell from a 
high of 1,069.9 million zaire in 1974 t o 996 . 7 million zaire in 1975 . 
Reforms of 1976-1981 
Objectives The first attempt at stabilization took place in 1976 . 
To resolve the balance of payment crisis after the fall of copper revenues 
of 1975, the government of Zaire introduced, and the IMF approved (in March 
1976), a request for financ ial assistance for US $ 150 million. This was 
the first of four programs, including an extended financing arrangement for 
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more than US $ 1 billion, which was negotiated with the IMF (in 1976, 1977, 
1979, and 1981) and resulted in total drawings of SOR 339 million. 
The packages generally combined demand management, supply incentive 
measures, and actions designed to rehabilitate infrastructure in the 
agricultural , transport, a nd energy sectors. Public debt was rescheduled by 
the Paris Club, while private banks met in London Club t o discuss 
commercial debt, reported to be somewhere in the range of $750 to $900 
million. The objectives of the 1976 reform were: 
• increase domestic saving (public savings); 
• eliminate the effective rate of protection due to overvaluation of the 
currency; 
• increase efficiency in foreign exchange allocation; and 
• increase efficiency in production 
Policies The policies were: 
• Exchange Rate Policy 
• contractionary Fiscal Policy 
• Producer Prices Policy 
• Foreign Exchange Control 
• Tax Revenue Policy 
Instruments The instruments developed were: 
• Achieve efficient foreign exchange by imposing new foreign exchange 
restrictions; 
• Increase domestic savings by applying contractionary fiscal policy (the 
1977 cut backs in imports), and increase government tax revenues (the 
1977 increase in taxes on exports other than those of GECAMINES in order 
to reduce the government budget deficit). In addition, there were 
efforts to improve tax collection, and the administration of the 
government payroll. The reorganization of the customs service and public 
corporation measures aimed to increase government revenues. 
• Eliminate the effective rate of protection by devaluing the zaire in 
1976 (58.4%), 1978 50% between November 1, 1978 and January 2, 1979), 
and 1979 (25% on August 24, 1979). 
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• Achieve efficiency in production by reducing the impact of the 
government to control all agricultural prices, and to set official 
prices . 
• Improve the investment selection process. 
Per formanc e With the euphoria of foreign exchange (high 
export earnings, and inflows of Western capital), Zaire embarked beginning 
1970s in expansionary fiscal policies of government over-spending coupled 
with a strategy of reliance on external borrowing to finance investments of 
questionable economic justification. Such investments served merely to 
increase Zaire's dependence on developments in foreign trade . A few 
examples include (a) the costly Inga-Shaba project about $800 million); (b) 
a $200 million steel mill at Maluku; (c) the construction of the Voix du 
Zaire, the country's radio and television station at an estimated cost of 
$100 million; and (d) the construction of an International Trade Center in 
Kinshasa, a replica of the New York World Trade Center. 
The economy had shown no signs of improvement when the Shaba province 
was invaded in March 1977. Shaba I (The War of Eight Days) struck at the 
life-line of the economy, the copper belt, worsening an already serious 
economic situation. The current account deficit rose from US $592 . 7 million 
in 1975 to us $803.2 million in 1976, and to US $1,451.3 million in 1977. 
The government budget deficit reached a record of z 310 million in 1976. As 
a result of tax increase on export crops, substantial underreporting and 
smuggling of coffee were recorded. 
The terms of trade deterioration due to declining world prices of 
copper . Foreign exchange shortages also were due to the nonrepatriation of 
export earnings from coffee to the Bank of Zaire. GDP was about 17% below 
1974 levels; import volumes were about 50% below 1974 levels, and 20% below 
1970 levels . 
The transport sector continued to suffer from a lack of fuel, a 
shortage of equipment and spare parts, as well as inadequate maintenance of 
infrastructure. Agricultural production maintained a steady decline 
relative to population growth, registering 15 percent less per capita than 
in 1974. 
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The consumer price index climbed to 935.8 from 229.7 in 1974, while 
r e al wages were more than 50 percent below 1974 levels. During 1977-78 
pe riod inflation rate averaged 100 percent . From 1975 to 1983, domestic 
inflation averaged 60 percent . 
During 1970-78, average annual share of taxes on international trade 
and transactions was about 52.6% of the total government budgetary revenue. 
It represented 63.9% of the budgetary revenue in 1970 but dropped to about 
28.5% in 1978 due to government weakness in tax administration, an increase 
in tax evasion, and GECAMINES financial problems and the rebate the company 
received . 
The budget deficit moved from Z 10.7 million a year during 1967-70 to 
z 400.8 million a year during 1971-81 . In 1976, the budget deficit reached 
a record of z 310 million (9\ of commercialized GDP). Budget deficits 
increased, financed by credit expansion. Government consumption rose from Z 
150 . 8 million a year during 1966-70 to Z 1,218.2 million a year during 
1971-81. 
During 1966-70, domestic credit and money supply increased at annual 
rates of 10.1 percent and 20.2 percent, while claims on government rose at 
an annual rate of 20.8 percent. From 1971 to 1981, claims on government 
increased at an annual rate of 34.2 percent. Domestic credit rose at an 
annual rate of 33 . 7 percent and the money supply by 30.2 percent. Money 
supply grew an average of 40 percent annually from 1975 to 1983. 
By 1980, the government was allocating some 40 percent of the budget to 
service the debt inherited from the previous years of heavy borrowing . 
In general, the IMF-supported programs did not restore budgetary and 
external balance and reduce inflationary pressures mostly due to a lack of 
commitment on the part of the Zairian authorities to an effective 
implementation of the prescribed policies. Therefore, the 1977 standby and 
the 1981 extended fund facility were both canceled because of the country's 
lack of compliance. Most of the funds made available by the IMF remained 
undrawn (SOR 737 million out of a total SOR 912 million i n the case of the 
extended fund facility). 
Over the period 1975-1982, the terms of trade continued to 
deteriorate with ensuing balance of payments deficits, shrinking GDP, and a 
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mounting debt burden. Beginning in the early 1970s a number of parastatal 
organizations responsible for promoting production and marketing of various 
agricultural products were created. These ' Offices Nationaux" were for 
coffee, cotton, livestock, wood, sugar, rubber, and fish, among others. 
Most of these parastatals were dismantled in 1978, although some have 
survived (e . g., OZACAF for coffee). 
Reforms o f 1982 
Objectives From independence until early 1980s, Zaire undertook a 
set of macroeconomic policies that had adverse effects on the agricultural 
sector. These policies included among others, maintenance of an overvalued 
exchange rate, low official producer prices for food crops, high export 
duties and cumbersome bureaucratic procedures for agricultural commodities, 
numerous internal local taxes on production and marketing of agricultural 
goods, and substantial public borrowing leading to a heavy debt service 
burden which in turn severely limited the availability of foreign exchange . 
Ideally, macroeconomic policy should seek to create conditions 
favorable to investments and to growth of the agricultural sector (control 
of inflation, availability of foreign exchange, fisca l policy that provides 
investment incentives, tariff policies and procedures that encourage 
exports and the development of local enterprises , and an efficient public 
administration). 
Beginning in the early 1980s, Zaire implemented a number of 
macroeconomic policies to promote market liberalization. It has been 
demonstrated that a high GDP growth rate is associated with a high degree 
of liberalization (outward orientation). 
Before Zaire's most significant adjustment effort in 1983, the 
government of Zaire took in 1982 several actions, particularly with regard 
to the reduction of the public sector's deficit, as a precondition for IMF 
support. 
The most important reform was the liberalization of gold and diamond 
digging and the policy of price liberalization including interest rates 
liberalization. Gold and diamond digging liberalization was expected to 
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increase export earnings. Price liberalization was expected to increase 
agricultural produce (food and export crops productions). Interest rate 
liberalization was expected to encourage domestic savings while 
discouraging consumption and capital flight . Making interest rates positive 
would s timulate domestic savings and increase investment. 
Policies The policies were: 
• Interest Rate Policy 
• Producer Price Policy 
• Encourage private enterprises in gold and diamond activitie s 
Instruments 
• interest rate 
The instrument was : 
Performance By the end of 1982, Zaire was again on the verge . of 
default. In spite of two further Paris Club rescheduling (1979 and 1981) , 
an IMF Stabilization Plan (1979), an Extended Fund Facility (EFF) for 912 
million SDRSs in 1981, a London Club rescheduling (1980) and five 
devaluations of the zaire, the country's economy showed no signs of 
improvement. With Zaire's failure to meet IMF criteria, the EFF was 
officially suspended in July 1982. 
The economic indicators remained discouraging. The 1982 budget 
deficit was estimated at Z3.00 billion. Copper prices were averaging $0 . 69 
per pound compared to $0.99 in 1980 and $0.79 in 1981. Further, in the face 
of weak market demand for cobalt, Zaire had to reduce its selling price 
from $17.50 per pound to $12.50 . By June 1982, Zaire had accumulated 
arrears of some $863 million in Paris Club debt, and by October was unable 
to make payments on London Club debt for the second time that year. 
Reforms o f 1983-1985 
Objectives By mid-1983, after following a year-long "shadow 
program," Zaire and the IMF agreed on the terms of a new standby agreement . 
The formal agreement with the IMF was signed in December and included a 
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fifteen- month standby agreement for $237 million and another $119 million 
from the Compensatory Financing Facility. Official debt was rescheduled by 
the Paris Club for a fifth time. The IMF program stressed economic 
liberalization and included measures such as decontrol of producer prices , 
particularly in the agr icultural sector; strict controls on public 
spending; liberalization of the trade system; and revision of c u stoms 
duties. 
Becau se of tentative signs of recovery showed by the economy in 1984, 
a new one-year arrangeme nt was approved by the IMF in April 1985. The 
$160.4 million arrange ment aimed to support the government of Zaire's 1985 
austerity program to achieve a viable e conomic position in the medium term. 
Ninety-five percent of Zaire ' s payments of interest and principal due in 
1985 and the first quarte r of 1986, totaling approximately $500 million , 
was rescheduled. Monthly payments were raised from $4 million to $4.5 
million for the period of May to December 1985, and to $6 million from 
January to April 1986 (Tshishimbi, 1994). 
Policies The policies of this period are discussed in the form of 
reforms in the exchange rate, exchange rate and trade system, monetary and 
credit policies , fiscal and institutional reforms, and Price and market ing 
reforms in agriculture. 
Exchange rate reform A mass ive 77.5 percent devaluation o f 
the zaire was decided in order to narrow the gap between the official rate 
and the paral l el market rate . Following the 1983 devaluation, the zaire's 
link with SDR was scrapped. Under the new system, the Bank of Zaire and 
commercial banks would meet weekly t o fix a rate for the zaire against the 
US dollar, based on recent transactions among themselves. Outside this, the 
banks were free to set their own rates and allocate their own foreign 
exchange according to the market. 
In September 1983, the government started unifying multiple exchanges 
rates. The complete unification was achieved on March l, 1984 . 
Subsequently , the unified rate was to be determined in much the same way as 
the free market, reflecting t he interaction of market forces . 
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Reform of the exchange rate and trade system The government 
decided on the abolition of a provision that requ i red commercial banks to 
surrender 30 percent of their foreign exchange receipts to the central bank 
within a period of three months following the export of goods or services. 
Gradually the government liberalized the system of foreign exchange 
allocation applicable to the commercial banks. Also mentioned is the 
elimination of the system of retention of exports proceeds, except those 
specified under international credit arrangements and for the state 
company, GECAMINES. 
In July 1984, the government decided to remove the prohibition 
against transfers of dividends by companies with foreign participation. 
Also decided was the liberalization of the overall import licensing 
procedures. The old system of "licenses sans achat de devises", that is, 
licenses concerning import financed without rescourse to the country's 
official foreign exchange reserves, was abolished. The government reduced 
the number of tariffs from four to two. It also reduced the rate on raw 
materials and essential food and nonfood products from 10-20 percent to 3 
percent. However, it was decided to increase tax rates on luxuries up to 
200 percent. 
Monetary and credit policies One of the major points of the 
1983 reforms was to improve the credit structure and money and financial 
markets through the creation of institutions such as an effective interbank 
market and market for treasury bills. In the early 1980s the Bank of Zaire 
began to use, actively and increasingly, interest rates to control monetary 
expansion and the allocation of credit to the economy. Initially, credit 
was regulated exclusively through quantitative limitations . Gradually, 
credit a llocation relied partly on ceilings and increasingly on mandatory 
reserve requirements and interest rate policy. With the introduction of 
treasury bills, the Bank of Zaire started paying interest on reserves 
requirements of the commercial banks held by the bank. Starting in 1981, 
commercial banks were asked to freely set lending rates, except for 
interest rates on loans to noncoffee agriculture. The 1983 reform measures 
liberalized most of the remaining interes t rates . In addition, a market for 
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short-term treasury bills was created, designed to provide incentives for 
holding zaire instead of foreign exchange. 
Fiscal and institutional reforms Under the 1983 SAP, the 
government was asked to reduce its budget deficit by cutting public 
expenditures, increasing taxes, improving tax collection and rationalizing 
the regime of exemptions. Another condition was a comprehensive reform of 
public enterprise (the layoff of thousands workers), including the closing 
(but not the privatization) of unprofitable units and large-scale 
privatization. The 1983 reform also decided to make selective public 
investments in a few key sectors that needed to be revamped, such as 
education and health (human development investment) . In 1983, the 
government introduced important changes in GECAMINES' tax regime to allow 
the state-owned copper company to be more responsive to fluctuations in 
revenues. In 1984, the government adopted a reorganization recommended by 
the World Bank and designed to reduce the operating costs of the copper-
mining industrial complex and to ensure greater transparency . 
Price and marketing reforms in agriculture In 1982, the 
government began implementation of a three-year agricultural recovery plan 
designed to correct distortions and government neglect of the agricultural 
sector of previous years. Actions considered essential to agricultural 
recovery included price, marketing, and exchange rate reforms to restore 
incentives to agricultural productions; strengthening of agricultural 
training, research, and extension services; increasing the availability of 
credit for crop marketing; restoring incentives to agricultural investment 
by the private sector; and institutional reorganization to improve planning 
and programming capacities. Some of these measures were , to a large extent 
implemented. Price controls on most agricultural products were removed by 
May 1982, and the right of local authorities to intervene i n marketing was 
abolished . In 1983, price controls on all remaining crops were removed. The 
77.5 devaluation was expected to give a boost to the export crop sector. 
Some restrictions remain on the domestic prices of manufactured 
goods, which can be adjusted freely but must conform to the cost of 
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production plus 20 percent formula and are subject to ex-post price 
controls. The government continues to intervene directly in price 
determination only for petroleum products, public utilities, and domestic 
public transport. 
Instruments The instruments were: 
• The 1983 devaluation (77.5\); 
• Introduction of a transitional dual exchange rate regime, leading to the 
unification of the two rates in February 1984; 
• The floating of exchange rate; 
• A substantial liberalization and simplification of the exchange and 
trade system, including a comprehensive revision of customs duties; and 
• Decontrol of most prices, including agricultural producer prices, and 
interest rates. 
Performance Following a 2 percent decline in 1983, real GDP 
increased by 2.8 percent in 1984 as a result of some recovery in mining 
production, particularly diamonds and petroleum . several sectors registered 
positive growth in 1984. For example, oil output rose by 24 percent. In 
the mineral sector, diamond production rose from 430,000 carats in 1982 to 
6.2 million in 1983 and to 11.6 million carats in 1984. The percentage 
share in total exports rose from 4 percent in 1980 to 17.6 in 1984, largely 
attributable to measures taken by the government in 1982 to liberalize 
diamond digging. 
The budget deficit decreased by 4 percent of the marketed GDP. In the 
first two years of implementation of treasury bills, the sale target was 
successfully met and real interest rates became positive for the first 
time. However, achieving positive real interest rates became a wrong policy 
when the inflation rate drastically increases. Under conditions of 
hyperinflation, only prohibitive nominal interest rates can bring about 
positive real interest rates. In 1978-88 the inflation rate rose above 100 
percent. In 1990-93 it was about 300 percent (1990), 1,000 percent, 2,000 
percent, 3,000 percent (1992) and 7,000 percent (1993). The staggering 
inflation comes largely because the Bank of Zaire simply prints the money 
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whenever more is needed, entailing the depreciation of the zaire. At one 
point, $1 fetched 4.5 million zaire, then 7.2 million zaire, then 9 million 
at the end of 1993. 
In 1984, the inflation rate was reduced. The Kinshasa CPI, which had 
risen over 100 percent 1983, increased less than 20 percent. This decline 
in inflation , together with the nominal devaluation, brought about a 
substantial depreciation of the real effective exchange rate for 1984 as a 
whole. 
Despite the depressed export prices for coffee, total export earnings 
increased substantially due to higher than anticipated exports of diamonds, 
crude oil, cobalt, and coffee. As a result the balance of payments improved 
markedly and Zaire met its external debt service commitments through the 
year. However, from 1982 to 1985, a growing debt burden rose from 11 
percent of total government expenditures in 1982 to 56 percent in 1985, in 
the face of reduced funds from creditors, had resulted in a net resource 
outflow in 1984 and 1985. 
The government budget deficit was restrained within the limits laid 
down by the adjustment program. GDP grew by some 3 percent in 1984, not 
greater than the growth of population. Growth was led by the mining sector, 
which expanded by almost 7 percent. Commerce, services, and manufacturing 
also picked up. 
In the agricultural sector, real producer prices increased 
substantially over 1981 levels. Overall, the growth in aggregate food crops 
increased slightly after 1982, but was still less than population growth. 
As a result of the removal of agricultural price controls, output of food 
crops increased at an average annual rate of 3 percent in 1982-86. 
Chronic transport problems were a major factor in the poor aggregate supply 
response of agriculture. These problems, including the deteriorated state 
of the rural network, the high cost of fuel, and difficulty in getting 
spare parts for vehicles, add up to very high transport costs which depress 
farmgate prices . 
With regard to industrial and export crops, price liberalization 
combined with the 1983 exchange rate devaluation resulted in significant 
gains in real producer prices of export and industrial crops. In spite of 
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improvements in prices after 1982, production of industrial and export 
crops continued to stagnate or decline, due to the deterioration of 
transport infrastructures, regulation and taxation on the plantation 
subsector. For both industrial and export crops, exchange rate reform has 
given Zaire the potential to be competitive at current world prices. A 1986 
study by ZTE/SOCFINCO showed that the costs of domestic resources used to 
produce rubber, tea, chinchona, coffee and cocoa for export and palm oil 
and cotton for domestic use are less than the world prices, indicating that 
the country has a comparative advantage in the production of these crops; 
only sugar appears to be uncompetitive. 
The reorganization and changes in the tax regime of GECAMINES, 
together with the 1983 devaluation, resulted in a substantial improvement 
of the company's financial position in 1984 and 1985. The net loss of Zl.5 
billion recorded in 1983 was transformed into a net profit of Zl.5 billion 
in 1984 and Z2.2 billion in 1985. 
In 1986, program implementation encountered a number of difficulties. 
Because of terms of trade deterioration, net outflow of foreign exchange to 
servicing external debt without being accompanied by increased foreign 
investments, the government decided to limit payments on its external debt 
to 20 percent of its national budget and 10 percent of its export revenue. 
In addition, the government budget deficit sharply increased (40 percent 
increase in wages and salaries of civil servants, and increase in public 
domestic credit from the banking system). In turn, this induced a sharp 
expansion of money supply and an acceleration of inflation from 50 to 60 
percent (partly because of shortages of foreign exchange) . Exchange 
controls emerged. 
This signaled noncompliance with the end-of-June criteria for drawing 
down the second tranche (installment) of the twenty-two-month standby. 
Hence, by the beginning of 1987, the reform process in Zaire had once again 
broken down. From 1986 to 1988, the exchange rate was again seriously 
overvalued, inflation surpassed 100 percent, and the economy performed 
poorly. 
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Reforms of 1987-1990 
The reforms of 1987-90 are discussed in terms of structural 
adjustment . In 1987-88 the government entered into a lengthy discussion 
with the IMF, the World Bank, and bilateral donors in which in the end it 
reaffirmed its commitment to its economic liberalization program. Zaire's 
debt servicing obligations were rescheduled and fresh donor funding was 
made available. 
In 1986, the government began implementation of several structural 
measures with the support of an industrial sector adjustment credit of US 
$80 million, consisting of a World Bank credit of $20 million and an IMF 
special facility for Africa credit of $60 million. 
In 1987, the government adopted a structural adjustment program, 
financed partly by a World Bank structural adjustment credit of us $ 165 
million and by an IMF structural facility of US $ 75 million . The 
structural adjustment credit consisted of a World Bank credit of $55 
million, an IMF special facility credit of $94.3 million, and a special 
Japanese joint financing of $15.7 million. The aim of the new policies was 
to lay the basis for long term growth and a sustainable external financial 
position through improvements in macroeconomic management, reform of 
agricultural and transport sector policies, and enhancement of incentives 
for the private sector. The major production increase was to come from the 
private sector, particularly nontraditional tradables, which were viewed as 
a means of eventually achieving external balance 
Instruments The instruments were : 
• Tax Reforms - In 1986, export taxes were abolished on all manufacturing 
exports. The only remaining export taxes were on mining products, wood, 
and coffee, with rates for these items ranging from 3 and 4 percent 
(arabica and robusta coffee, respectively) to 40 percent (copper). 
• Tariff Reforms - The tariff schedule was also rationalized in 1986, 
narrowing the range of rates to a minimum of 10 percent and a maximum of 
60 percent. Exceptions were permitted at both ends of the range : 5 
percent tariffs were required on some basic consumer goods (e.g., 
59 
sardines, smoked and salted fish) and agricultural inputs (e.g., 
tractors, fertilizer, animal fed), but luxury cars, tobacco, textile 
products, and alcohol tariffs remained above 60 percent. These 
exemptions were eliminated progressively starting September 1987, and 
the range of tariff rates narrowed. 
• Fiscal Reforms -The 1986- 89 public investment program (PIP), revised in 
1987 in consult ation with the World Bank, emphasized infrastructure 
rehabilitation, improvement of basic services to agriculture and 
industry, and improved productivity of major parastatals . Reforms of the 
civil service were also implemented, resulting in the removal from the 
payroll of some 25,000 fictitious workers since 1987 . Also included in 
the PIP was an emergency rural roads rehabilitation program, financed in 
part through revenues received by the Off ice des Routes from increased 
taxes , to alleviate constraints on the provision of agricultural inputs 
and evacuation of products. 
• Agricultural Reforms - In order to benefit the agricultural sector, 
reforms included a revision of the tariff structure to eliminate 
disincentives to the production of agricultural tradables (coffee, 
cotton); reduction of duties on agricultural exports except coffee and 
wood , and simplification of export procedures; and measures to remove 
institutional and infrastructural constraints regarding marketing 
credit , public investment projects, transport, and agricultural research 
services. In this regard, the Bank of Zaire removed commercial bank's 
interest ceilings on agricultural credit. In addition, the PIP allocated 
10 percent of the funds (Z 9 . 7 million= US $ l) to agriculture. 
Perfo rmance With tight monetary policies and renewed budgetary 
restraint, the exchange rate stabilized and inflation declined in 1987. In 
1988 and 1989, major bilateral donors canceled part of the outstanding 
foreign debt. Such cancellations were conditional on strict adherence by 
Zaire to the IMF program . For 1990, the budget savings because of the debt 
forgiveness and reduced interest payments amounted to about 30 million 
dollars , about half of the total investment budget of the government. 
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Overall, the performance of the economy after implementation of the 
structural adjustment was disappointing in more than one respect. Because 
of the stagnation in production of the mining sector (copper), GDP only 
grew by 2 .6 percent . Implementation of investment geared toward increasing 
the capacity of the Office des Mines d'Or de Kilo-Mote (gold production) 
was delayed. In contrast, the manufacturing sector, helped by domestic 
credit policies and disbursements of foreign exchange under the industrial 
sector credit, recorded substantial growth in 1987. 
Despite small positive effects, the overall performance of the 
economy has been poor due mainly to the irresponsible conduct of fiscal 
policy, and a decline in government revenue. The anticipated increase in 
revenues resulting from changes in the tariff failed to materialize due to 
collection inefficiency and excessive investment code exemptions. The 
increase in revenues from import duties was limited to 60 percent. As a 
result of these developments, the government budget deficit was close to 10 
percent of GDP in 1987 , nearly doubling from the previous year. Inflation 
greatly increased (over 100 percent) due to an expansionary monetary 
policy. As a result, only US $82.5 million were released by the IMF and the 
World Bank because the government has shown its inability to control public 
expenditure, and has continued the creation of money to finance its budget 
deficit. Inflation soared again at high levels. 
In 1990, because the IMF, the World Bank, and other bilateral and 
multilateral donors suspended financial support, Zaire responded to the 
reduction in balance-of payments assistance by suspending its debt service 
and accumulating a substantial amount of arrears. In April 1990, in 
response to substantial internal pressure, the President of Zaire 
announced a move towards a multiparty political system and democratic 
elections. A transitional government was set up, with the responsibility to 
prepare for the creation of more democratic institutions , the holding of a 
national conference, and the revision of the constitution. With the 
creation of hundreds political parties, and strike after strike of civil 
servants and private sector workers, the economy was completely 
destabilized. The government abandoned the IMF/World Bank economic 
stabilization program and public expenditures soared at the same time that 
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bilateral and multilateral donors cut their economic and financial 
assistance. By the end of the year, hyperinflation followed by a series of 
devaluations and runaway public expenditures had put the economy into an 
unprecedented dive. This was exacerbated by the collapse of a major mine 
shaft at Kamoto because of lack of maintenance and replacement of equipment 
in GECAMINES. As a result, copper production in 1991 was expected to be 
only half that of 1959, the last year before independence. In 1993, 
GECAMINES produced only about 60,000 metric tons of copper against 470,000 
in the 1980s. 
Results of these analyses push us to ask the question about the 
structures of stabilization and structural adjustment programs. The next 
chapter will discuss how the IMF and the World Bank determine the values of 
intrument variables that can push the economy at targeted levels of real 
GDP , and balance of payments. However, since the observed results show us 
that the current account deficit has been deepening while real GDP has been 
decreasing, one can conclude that the targets fixed by these international 
institutions were not attained. If they were not achieved because of the 
negative socioeconomic and political environment, and given the assumption 
of any change in the political situation in Zaire, our concerns remains the 
question to know what can be done to improve the country's economy with 
President Mobutu in power. The assumption is made that, by introducing new 
variables in the IMF and World Bank models, one can achieve the targets and 
generate foreign exchange needed to satisfy the investment requirements. 
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CHAPTER 3. MACROECONOMIC INVESTMENT MODELS 
In this chapter, attention is focused on polciy distort ions that led 
to macroeconomic polices under stabilization programs . Then, by introducing 
new instrument variables we will see how high level of real GDP may be 
achieved . 
Policy Distortions 
From 1967 to 1991, macroeconomic policies used by the Zairian 
government under stabilization and structural adjustment programs aimed to 
remove some distortions limiting economic growth. The ma jor types of policy 
distortions are described as follows. 
Exchange rate distortions 
The exchange rate distortion is related to the overvaluation of the 
currency; while trade distortion refers to the nominal and the implicit 
rate of protection. Tshibaka {1986, p . 21- 32) reported Cassel's law that 
producer prices can be related to the world prices as follows: 
where 
Px price paid to the exportable crop producer in domestic currency, 
* Px exportable crop world price in foreign exchange, 
E0 official exchange rate expressed as a number of units of domestic 
currency per one unit of foreign exchange , 
tx = export tax , 
dx =domestic parallel market price distortion, and 
Tx = price-distorting policy adjustment factor for exports. 
The price paid to farmers in the parallel market is related to the 
world price as follows: 
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where 
Pm price paid to importable crop producers in domestic currency, 
* Pm importable crop world price in foreign exchange, 
tm = import tariff rate, 
dm domestic parallel market price distortion, and 
Tm = price-distorting policy adjustment factor for imports. 
The structure of relative prices between traded and nontraded commodities 
is represented by 
(~) = (::};(1-txXl-dx) 
( ::) = (::}~(1 +tmXl + dm) 
Eo 
These expressions show that the real exchange rate plays a 
Ph 
crucial role in both export-oriented and import-oriented competing farm and 
nonfarm activities. It provides a measure of the relative prices of 
importables and exportables to home goods in the economy. 
This expression implies that the domestic price of importables 
relative to exportables is a function of world prices, trade regime, and 
other price policy measures. The implicit rate of taxation is measured as 
the wedge between the average price received by local producers and the 
relevant world price, c.i.f. or f.o.b. 
-( P*EoFPI) ( p ) l:.P - - --
CPI CPI 
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where 6P is the producer price wedge in local currency, 
* P is the world price in foreign exchange, 
P is the local producer price, 
FPI is the consumer price index of Zaire's principal trading partners 
(the U.S. the European community and Japan), and CPI is the domestic 
consumer price index. The implicit rate of taxation or subsidy of an 
individual product would be: 
( * J ( J P EoFPI p 6P I = 1 -CPI P*E0 FPI 
Trade distortions 
The nominal rate of protection of agricultural products for example 
is defined to be the difference between agricultural producer prices and 
world prices, expressed as a percentage of world prices (in domestic 
currency at the official exchange rate). The nominal rate of protection 
also indicates the size of the direct taxation of a commodity relative to 
the world price. 
The nominal distortion introduced in the economy by the trade policy 
is measured as the difference {tm - sx), which is decomposed into two 
terms: 
tm - sx = (tm - dh) + (dh -sx), interpreted as follows: producers in the 
importable goods sector receive an implicit subsidy given by (tm -dh) 
rather than the nominal tariff (tm), whereas producers in the export 
sector are implicitly taxed to the extent of (dh - sx) . 
where 
dh increase in the price of nontradables, 
tm = import tariff, 
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sx = export subsidy, 
w = incidence parameter. 
In the case of Zaire, the demand for exportables in the domestic 
market rises while production contrasts as resources move toward 
importables (maize, rice, groundnuts) and home goods (cassava) . Tshibaka 
(1986, p. 24) reported that maize was taxed about 2 . 3 percent during 1971-
74 and 27.3 percent during 1980-82 but was protected only 1.1 percent 
during 1975-79. For all of 1971-82, maize growers sustained an average 
direct tax of about 12.4 percent per year. In contrast , rice was protected 
during the entire period. The average direct rate of subsidy to producers 
was about 32.5 percent during 1971-82. Groundnut producers bore the highest 
burden of direct taxation. 
For export crops, palm oil production was subsidized at an average 
annual rate of 51.1 percent during 1971-74 and about 32.5 percent during 
1975-79, and was taxed only 16.3 percent during 1982-83 . Coffee and cotton 
were directly taxed during the entire period at an average annual rate of 
55.1 and 87.7 percent. 
The period 1971-82 was marked by the direct intervention of the IMF 
into the Zairian economy. Before the IMF intervention (1971-74), cotton, 
groundnuts, coffee , and maize were taxed but rice and palm oil were not. 
Direct IMF intervention in the economy (1975-79) coincided with a reversal 
in government policy. Rice was highly protected, the level of direct 
taxation of maize production was maintained, and ta.x burden on groundnuts 
was significantly reduced. Rates of taxation of coffee and cotton were 
increased, while the subsidy rate of palm oil was lowered. Export crops as 
a group were discriminated against even more during 1975-79 than during 
1971-74. Importable food crops were subsidized during 1975-79. During 1980-
82 (no IMF intervention), the rate of taxation of the export crops was 
increased, while food crops were no longer subsidized but taxed. Results 
obtained by Tshibaka suggest that the protection of one sector, say the 
importable goods sector, causes damage to other sectors. The extent of this 
damage depends on the degree of substitution between sectors in production 
and demand. An import tariff meant to protect an import competing sector 
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may end up being partly or totally transformed into a tax on exportables,. 
An export subsidy may become partly or totally an import subsidy . 
Tshibaka used the following regression equations: 
Model 1 lnY a + bl(lnPh/Px )+ bl(lnPh/ PXA )+ 
b3(lnPh/PNXA) 
Model 2 lnGIE the same regressors 
Model 3 BOT = the same regressors 
Model 4 T the same regressors 
where the dependent variables are respectively lnY (real GDP), lnGIE (real 
government capital expenditures), BOT (balance of trade), and T (trend); 
while regressors are, respectively, 
lnPh/Px (terms of trade between home goods and exportables) , 
lnPh/PXA (terms of trade between home goods and agricultural 
exports), 
lnPhf PNXA (terms of trade between home goods and 
nonagricultural exports). 
Table 7 shows the regression results for total, agricultural, and 
nonagricultural exports, for the 1970-82 period (Tshibaka, 1986, p. 34). 
The regression coefficients for the BOT, GIE, and T were not significant. 
The estimated coefficients for the Y were significant and negative, 
implying that a positive growth of real income leads, other things being 
equal, to decrease in the domestic price of home goods relative to 
exportables. The regression coefficient for the price of nonagricultural 
exports relative to agricultural exports is positive and significant. This 
implies that the domestic price of home goods is positively and 
significantly affected by changes in prices of nonagricultural exports 
relative to agricultural exports. 
The estimated numerical values for the incidence parameters are 
significant for all the categories of tradable and home goods. For total 
exports, an estimate of the incidence parameter is about 0.52 . In practical 
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Table 7. Regression results for nonagricultural exports, 1970-82 
Independent 
Variables 
Constant 
lnY 
All 
Exports 
ln Py.: Px 
9.079 
(3. 493r 
0.5222 
-2.065 
<- 3.461r 
ln GIE 0.087 
(o.865) 
BOT -0.000 
( - 0.447) 
T 
R2 0.904 
Deg. of freedom 5 
a 
Significant at the 1 
b 
Significant at the 5 
Dependent 
variables 
Agricultural 
Exports 
ln Py.: PXA 
7.850 
(2. 655)b 
0.407 
0.736 
-1.858 
(-2.736)b 
0. 143 
(i. 305) 
0.004 
(1. 772) 
0.926 
4 
percent level 
percent level 
Nonagricultural 
Exports 
7.984 
(2. 598)b 
(5 .0l7t 
o. 721 
0.172 
(0.031) 
-1. 671 
(-2 .453)b 
0.001 
(o.365) 
-0.029 
(-1. 017) 
0.949 
4 
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terms, the domestic price of home goods relative t o exportables would 
increase by 0.52 as a result of a l percent rise in the domestic price of 
importables relative to exportables. 
The implication is that a price distortion (from tariffs, 
quantitative restrictions, domestic pricing and marketing policies, and so 
forth) that leads to an increase in the domestic price of importables falls 
partly as a tax on producers of exportables. 
Capital distortion 
When Zaire maintained a negative interest rate, one could conclude 
that there was capital distortion. It consists of lowering the user cost of 
capital. The profit maximization rule requires, first , the selection of the 
most profitable investments, those having the highest internal rate of 
returns, or having the highest positive discounted present values (DPV) . 
Then, firms will keep investing in low profitable projects until the 
marginal efficiency of investment equals the market interest rate. So, with 
negative interest rate, there was a tendency to invest in projects with low 
internal rate of returns. Authorities and entrepreneurs did not make a good 
selection of investment projects. 
Labor distortion 
The labor distortion consists of goverrunent intervention in the labor 
market . The fixation of minimum wages has resulted in making the labor more 
and more expensive. Hence, there was a tendency to invest in capital 
intensive industries to emerge (Leyland, Fiat, Peugeot for assembling cars, 
trucks and tractors ; Good Year, for the production of tires; etc.). 
Service sector distortion 
Distortions related to the service sector consist of subsidizing 
public transportation, electricity, water services in urban areas. This has 
resulted in increasing government budget deficits. 
69 
Monetary policy distortion 
With the frequent printing of money, variations of inflation have 
affected investments, because inflation is related to interest rate, which 
in turn affects the user cost of capital. In order to stimulate domestic 
private savings, the Bank of Zaire used the treasury bills mechanisme that 
l ed to positive interest rates, but at prohibitive nominal interest rates. 
Population growth distortion 
Population growth rate is another type of economic growth distortion. 
In a model describing output, saving, and investment per worker, investment 
per worker is a function of n (labor force growth rate, d (depreciation 
rate of existing capital stocks, and k (capital-labor ratio): 
investment per worker (n + d)k 
An increase in labor force rotates up investment per worker line, 
decreasing production per worker. Zaire is among the African countries with 
a high population growth rate. Its agriculture has been growing (about 1.3 
to 2.8 percent per year), behind population growth rate (around 3.1 percent 
per year). 
In general, political stability is favorable for sustained economic 
growth. However, with the rent-seeking ha.bit characterizing the Zairian 
ruling elite, and institutionalized corruption, the dictatorship regime 
that has been ruling the country for 29 years, under a unique political 
party, the Popular Movement for the Revolution (MPR), has been in more 
respects acting against e conomic growth. 
Policy Implications 
From the preceding observations, one may state that economic growth 
depends on internal and external policies . 
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Internal policies 
Export promotion policy Some cross country studies have shown 
that the highest growth is associated with high levels of exports. 
g = f (exports, import substitution industries) 
e, the residual represents TFP (total factor productivity) 
GDP growth is positively related to exports, and negatively related 
to light import substitution industrialization policy, encouraging the 
production of manufactured goods for a small domestic market. In Zaire, for 
example, light import-substitution industry relies on imported intermediate 
goods. The steel mill in Maluku was supposed to use imported scraps from 
Italy, while Midema (Minonterie DE Matadi), the wheat mill company imports 
wheat grains from the US. 
Under stabilization and structural adjustment programs, with the 
financial support of bilateral donors, the IMF and the World Bank, Zaire 
has been involved in import substitution industrialization policy. With 
high effective rate of protection, this policy had led to the 
overvaluation of the currency. Since 1975, the effective exchange rate for 
exports was less than the effective exchange rate for imports. Table 8 
shows the average domestic relative prices and real exchange rates for 
1966-82 Tshibaka (1986, p. 28). 
It was believed that protecting infant industries would encourage 
industry to become a leading growth sector. However, is it true that 
producing canned tomatoes at the Presidential farm of Nsele, Good Year 
tires, assembling cars and Fiat tractors, and milling imported wheat grains 
from the US, for example, would generate economic growth? Only to a limited 
extent because these import substitution industries were producing only for 
the domestic market. 
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Table 8. Average domestic relative prices and real exchange rates, 
1966-82 
Period Relative Relative Real Rate of change 
price for price index exc hange of real exchange 
exportables for index 
import ables [ (FPP~Eo ] 
(pi() 
1966-70 264.6 59.9 120.6 0.8 
1971-74 130.2 70.8 106.l 
1975- 79 96.9 132.l 87.2 
1980- 82 83.5 118.6 84.6 
Export promotion during the colonial era and after independence 
In Zaire, during the colonial era, economic policy mainly consisted of 
promoting export of minerals and agricultural produc ts (coffee, rubber, 
tea, cotton, palm oil, tea). After independence i n 1960, traditional 
exports had been also promoted, especially for coffee , copper, cobalt and 
diamonds. However, because of inappropriate macroeconomic policies, 
economic performances were poor. The production of copper has decreased 
from 470,000 metric tons in 1980s to 60,000 tn in 1993; cotton and palm oil 
are no longer exported. Only coffee and timber (logs plus sawn) exhibit 
positive growth rate . 
In addition, because of inc reased urban population growth rate, 
demand for food has increased over time. There was a need to increased food 
products to feed explosive urban populations. Though investments in light 
import substitution industries produced goods f o r final demands (wheat 
flour, tires, and others) food shortages have remained a major constrai nt. 
Government policy bias against agriculture, neglect of government 
agricultural budget, frequent devaluations and other inappropriate 
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macroeconomic measures, have caused a shift of scarce available resources 
from tradable (cotton, palm oil,) to nontradables (maize, groundnuts, 
cassava). However, the purchase of coffee beans and diamonds has absorbed 
most of available funds . Meat food and fish experienced low growth rates. 
Though increasing maize production, imports of foodstuffs and investment 
goods h ave been of grea t concerns. However, until the 1982-83 
liberalization measures, t he nominal protection of imports against domestic 
agricultural productions (taxes and tariffs discrimination on imported raw 
mate rials and intermediate goods) did not solve the issue. This had led to 
overvaluation of the zaire, the national currency. 
The implicit rate of taxation which is a wedge between the average 
price received by producers and the relevant world prices, c.i . f . or 
f . o . b., at market exchange rates, adjusted for purchasing power parity, was 
also high. Light import-substitution industrialization policy has a 
negative impact on GDP growth: 
g f (import s ubstit ution producing for domestic market) 
where g is GDP growth rate. 
In Zaire, GDP growth has been negatively related to investment in 
import substitution industries producing for final demand. Light import 
substitution manufactured industries have been producing low value added 
products. 
Assuming that at the same time, neutral openness policy is practiced 
(both imports and exports are subsidized), the overvaluation of the local 
currency would be avoided. As we said before, Zaire has been promoting at 
the same time its traditional mineral exports (copper, cobalt, zinc, stain, 
gold, and diamonds), and coffee exports, and protecting its import 
substitution industries. This neutral openness policy did not give good 
results because of wrong choice of import substitution manufacturing 
industries. We are inclined to say that instead of producing manufactured 
goods for the domestic market, Zaire would be better off producing 
manufactured goods for international markets. This would be true without 
any institutionalized corruption and rent-seeking habit of the corrupted 
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ruling elite. In addition, producing manufactured goods for export 
requires as prerequisite "selected heavy import substitution industries," 
generating technologies. 
Heavy import-substitution industries If GDP growth is negatively 
correlated with light import substitution producing goods and services for 
a small domestic market, it in contrast highly correlated with heavy import 
substitution industries producing machine-tools, that can enable the 
production of manufactured goods for export. Thus, by exporting 
manuf actured goods, Zaire, for example can improve inflows of foreign 
exchange. 
g f (heavy import substitution industries, manufactured 
export industries) 
First, a country may get involved in heavy import substitution 
industries (machine tools), generating t echnology. However, Zaire did not 
use this kind of growth policy, not only because of inappropriate 
macroeconomic policies, but also because a lack of investments in applied 
research and development linking universities and colleges to the business 
sector. Heavy import substitution industries require skilled labor force 
and innovative entrepreneurs. 
In the second step, the country will be able to develop light 
industries producing for the domestic market. Again if the domestic market 
of outputs produced by light industries is protected (discriminated taxes 
and tariffs on raw materials and intermediated goods against other 
products), then effective rate of protection and overvaluation of the local 
currency may appear . These type of light industr i es will not necessarily be 
producing low value added products. These light import substitution 
industries using high skilled labor force, will rely on domestic produced 
intermediate goods. 
Assuming that a neutral openness policy is applied (imports and 
exports are both subsidized), then effective rate of protection and 
overvaluation of the local currency may be reduced. Equilibrium GDP growth 
rate will appear at the point where the predicted GDP growth rate explained 
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and predicted by exports growth rate intersects the predicted GDP growth 
rate explained by import substitution growth rate (Figure 7) . 
In a third step, this country will be able to invest in light 
industries producing for international markets. Should the country invest 
first in light manufactured industries producing for the domestic market, 
or should it invest in manufactured industries producing for international 
markets? Advocates of export promotion policy would prefer first the 
implementation of light industries producing for export because of 
increased foreign exchange expected to be generated, 
g f (other exports, exported manufactured goods produced 
by import substitution industries) 
The GDP growth rate will be positively related to all exports. So, import 
substitution industry policy has both positive and negative impacts. 
Positive impact consists of the generation of foreign exchange, while 
negative impact is related to shortages of foreign exchange, restrictions 
on foreign exchange, licensing of all imports, high effective rate of 
protection, overvaluation of the national currency, and a lack of 
competitiveness and efficiency in production, due to overprotection of the 
local market. 
Producing domestically raw materials and intermediate goods needed by 
highly protected import substitution industries will be expensive compared 
with subsidized raw materials and intermediate goods. Thus, both exchange 
rate overvaluation and high cost of domestically produced inputs will be a 
disincentive to exports. The country will experience foreign exchange 
shortages. In addition, because growth of import substitution industries 
is not accompanied by significant growth of employment, private savings may 
not increase significantly. 
With increased physical capital-labor ratio due to increased 
investments, if the labor force does not increase quantitatively, but 
increases qualitatively, total factor productivity will increase, rising 
salaries and wages. This may reduce profits for capitalists, and 
industrialization growth may be slowed. 
g 
Figure 7. 
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Depending on the size of domestic market, outputs from import 
substitution industries may increase. Under condition of large size of 
domestic market and economies of scale, ICOR (incremental capital-output 
ratio) will decrease with faster increased import substitution industry 
productions, compared with increase in physical capital. 
Af< 
ICOR=-
6Q 
s 
g=--
ICOR 
High growth rate of GDP will be associated with low ICOR, meaning 
that output increases faster than investment growth. When investment grows 
faster than output, ICOR will tend to increase, requiring more domestic 
savings for maintaining constant GDP growth rate. 
With the import substitution industrialization policy In Zaire, in 
the early 1970s, investment had increased faster than output, increasing 
ICOR, and requiring more domestic savings. Domestic savings (10% of GDP), 
did not match investment demand. Lack in domestic savings was compensated 
with foreign loans. Unfortunately, over time, inflows of foreign assets 
have decreased, while output has decreased as well, due to a lack of basic 
infrastructure (inter-provincial highways, paved rural roads, and a lack of 
road maintenance throughout the country); declining investment; accelerate 
population growth; declining return of investment; failure to make good use 
of investment; inappropriate macroeconomic policies (imbalances, erosion of 
incentives in agricultural, overprotection of industry , expansion of the 
public sector, neglected of community activity, neglect of the private 
sector, poor project selections, inefficient organization of marketing) . 
One may claim that in the Zairian economy, GDP growth is strongly related 
to export of copper, coffee, and diamonds: 
GDP growth = exports + e 
where e is the residual is total factor productivity. 
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What is wrong i n this model is t he fact that the exports variable is 
in both sides of the equation. 
Export promotion and neutral open.ness This implies that both 
exports and imports are equally protected and promoted: 
• subsidizing imports (domestic market : still protected) 
• subsidizing exports 
The effective exchange rate for exports is equal to effective exchange 
rate for imports : 
Ultra export promotion--free market With ultra export promotion 
policy, all anti-export biases must be removed. Import must be liber alized. 
In 1983, Zaire embarked in the most structural and adjustment reforms, it 
ever had liberalized, not only imports, but also all agricultural prices 
and interest rates. Some tariffs and truces were reduced. The most liberal 
1969 investment code was modified increasing profit opportunities to 
investors . Did economic growth come? We know that except light improvements 
after 1983, overall economic performance was the poorest in Africa . 
One may join Japan's view in this matter. Japan's view of industrial 
policy is consistent with its belief in the protection of immature 
industries . An important recent paper by Japan's aid agency, the Overseas 
Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF), challenges the conditionality of rapid 
trade liberalization in structural ad justment loans. 
If i mports are liberalized too quickly, is it possible to develop 
industries that will play leading roles in the next stage of e conomic 
development? Is it not necessary to protect domestic industry to some 
extent for a certain period of time in order to allow a viable export 
industry to develop? (Jayawardena, 1992 , p. 51-56). The paper argues that 
conventional trade liberalization is limited to capturing the state 
comparative advantage typical of a developing country, which is to be found 
in primary products and light industry with low value added. Since the 
objective of developing countries is to move toward high value added 
production, with more sophisticated technologies and a more substantial 
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growth potential, the OECF concludes that "sticking to simple trade 
liberalization based on static comparative advantage may have a negative 
impact on the possibility of economic development." The study argues that 
it is too optimistic to expect that industries with high value added will 
automatically emerge from the private sector in the absence of deliberate 
measures to foster such industries, including protection . The OECF's 
preferred policy prescriptions is to protect chosen industries for a 
specified period, taking precautions to avoid the harmful effects of 
protection. 
The way is open for us to suggest good selective heavy import 
substitution manufactured industries in Zaire . However, one does not 
disagree with advantages of export promotion policy: 
• Increased competitiveness 
• Increased foreign exchange (if fully repatriated) 
• Access to more capital and technologies, acquisition of 
technology can be financed 
• Increased productivity 
• Increased efficiency in production due to increased 
international competition with local products. 
One can formulate that productivity depends positively on exports. 
productivity f(exports) 
Studies that had regressed GDP growth against income per capita, have shown 
that a technology gap exists between developed and developing countries . 
GDP growth = f(income per capita) 
To fill the technology gap, developing countries have to invest in 
increased factor inputs, applied research and human development. These 
empirical studies have found that high income countries were associated 
with high level of technologies, high level of investments in physical 
capital, and the learning effect induced by transfer of technologies . 
Therefore, we believe that the best macroeconomic policies are also those 
that induce transfer of appropriate technologies, and increase total factor 
productivity . 
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- GDP growth = f(income per capita, investment, education) 
According to neoclassical theories of economic growth, sources of 
growth are: 
• Capital accumulation (savings-investment); 
• Increased labor force participation in quantity and in quality; 
• Increased domestic production of raw materials, and intermediate goods; 
and 
• Increased total factor productivity. 
The GDP growth is a positive function of factor inputs. 
g = f(factor inputs)e = TFP 
Solow (1956) argued that aggregate savings finance additions to the 
national capital stock (see Romer, 1994, p. 25). An economy with an 
initially low capital-labor ratio will have a high marginal product of 
capital. Then, if a constant fraction of the income generated by a new 
piece of equipment is saved, the gross investment in new capital goods may 
exceed the amount needed to off set depreciation and to equip new members of 
the workforce. But a rising capital-labor ratio means falling returns on 
investment when technology is characterized by constant returns, so the 
incentive to accumulate capital might vanish over time (Scott,1989, p. 1-
19). 
During a transition period, autonomous investment in machinery and 
equipment would be a primary force behind rising incomes, and policies that 
altered the savings rate could be used to accelerate growth . But even when 
the transitional phase would come to an end, economic growth could proceed 
unabated if technical knowledge were to expand over time. Solow showed that 
advances in technology- which he took to augment the productivity of labor 
at an exogenous and constant rate, the marginal product of capital need not 
decline as capital per worker increased. 
With its economic plans, Zaire tried to practice a balanced growth 
with the help of the Planning Department (Ministry). However, this policy 
was not well performed because GDP growth depends on a wave of investments. 
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This involves huge available funds (foreign loans and domestic credit). 
This is the concept of balanced growth : 
g = f(massive and integrated investments, at the same time) 
The industrialization process did not make appropriate reallocation 
of resources (capital and labor) from low productive uses (traditional 
agriculture) to high productive uses (industrialization, and high value 
added agricultural productions). The 1976-81, the 1983- 85, and the 1986-90 
economic plans relied on availability of external financing. Though the 
support in 1986-87 of an industrial sector adjustment credit of US $80 
million, consisting of $20 million and an IMF special facility credit of 
$60 million, balanced industrial growth did not come. Evidently, with light 
import substitution industries policy, and export promotion of traditional 
exportables (copper, coffee, cobalt, diamonds produced by the state- owned 
company, before the 1982 diamond digging liberalization), the process of 
absorbing rural labor force by the modern sector has failed, as stated by 
structuralists. The structural adjustment in industrial sector itself did 
not operate as planned . 
GDP growth total factor productivity growth + capital growth*share 
of capital + labor growth* share of labor . 
Without any empirical studies, one may guess that the share of total 
factor product ivity has been insignificant in Zaire with respect to the 
modern sector contribution to growth. In addition, rural population 
migrations to urban areas are not caused by the absorbing rural labor 
process of the modern sector. Rural-urban areas migrations are due to the 
worsening of standard of living in rural areas, where villages are almost 
returning to bush because of lack of rural road maintenance. However , in 
the diamond mining areas, diamond digging activities have been absorbing 
increased rural labor force. Macroeconomic policies should also think about 
efficient resource reallocation as pretend structuralists. Therefore, 
structural adjustment programs should also take in account variables 
allowing efficient resource reallocation between industries, between 
sectors , between regions. 
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Structural adjus tment Given constrained markets plus lags in 
adjustment; potential transformation of productive structures producing 
disequilibria in factor market; sources of growth are: 
• capital accumulation (savings-investment); 
• increased labor force participation, in quantity and quality; 
• increased local production of raw materials and intermediate goods ; 
• increased total factor productivity; 
• r ealloca tion of resources from low productivity to high productivity; 
• economies of scale; and 
• reduction of internal and external bottlenecks. 
Change in GDP change in Agricultural production + change 
in industrial productions + change in services 
So, GDP growth = agricultural growth*share of agricultural sector + 
industrial growth*share of industrial sector + service growth*share of 
service sector. 
investment = f(expected profits) 
Investment opportunities undoubtedly come from inventions, and are a 
response to economic factors similar to investments themselves. 
research + development 
TFP = f(investment) 
f(expected profits) 
As markets develop and expand, as exchange opportunities increase 
there will be a tendency for increased human capital specialization. 
specialization in the diamond industry requires more education, more 
investment in research and development projects. 
GDP growth = f(well integrated markets, human capital 
specialization, diversification in all sectors) 
To summarize, one can say that growth i s a function of investments 
physical capital , labor force education and professional training, 
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inventions, and in marketing organization. Investment projects may be of 
intensive capital use or of intensive labor use. In Zaire, within the 
primary product category, one may distinguish modern agriculture, 
traditional agriculture, and mineral extraction. Large scale operations 
characterize the modern sector (industria l sector), while small scale 
operation characterize the traditional sector in agriculture and in mining. 
The traditional sector in mining consists of gold and diamond 
extraction by peasants. While both traditional agriculture and diamond 
digging use low skill labor force, the traditional agricultural sector 
produces low value added products, whereas traditional diamond digging 
produces high value products . Therefore, reallocation of economic resources 
from low productivity uses (traditional agriculture) to high productivity 
uses (industrial sector ) would be unnecessary and maybe unproductive in the 
case of traditional digging of diamonds and gold . In addition, investment 
in industrial and export crops have some lags (shorter variety crops and 
perennial variety crops). In contrast, investment in diamond digging may 
yield very high value added products within a month . So, macroeconomic 
policies should address not only agricultural export crops, but also export 
of diamonds and gold according to the comparative advantage of natural 
endowments . Zaire is not only well endowed with low skill labor force, land 
surplus, but also with abundant mineral resources (diamonds, and gold) 
exploitable by low skilled peasants. Investment in traditional diamond 
digging may be more profitable than those in modern agriculture or in some 
industries, even if these industries use high technologies. Total factor 
productivity may result from low skill labor force combined with small 
capital of simple techniques, whose total cost may not exceed $65,000. 
However, such an investment in diamond mining may generate billion of 
dollars within a month. 
Aware of these observations, let us see the IMF and World Bank 
investment strategies for achieving economic growth and macroeconomic 
balances, as expressed in terms of macroeconomic policy models. 
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External policies--The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank 
models 
The International Monetary Fund model Any country should be 
careful when using the IMF and World Bank models for stabilization and 
structural adjustment programs because of some weaknesses that appear in 
the models. First, in the simple Fund model, real output is essentially 
determined outside the system, whereas in the World Bank model prices and 
monetary variables do not play any direct role. In the linking of these two 
models, growth becomes formally endogenous, along with inflation and the 
balance of payments, and the policy instruments include monetary variables, 
fiscal variables, and the exchange rate. The merged model retains many of 
the other limitations of its two components. Such limitations have to be 
recognized and taken into account if this model is to be used for designing 
adjustment programs or for projection purposes. 
With reference to Khan et al. (1990, p. 176-177), one should think 
about the monetary sector in order to introduce more realism into the model 
in the case of Zaire. Indeed, for the IMF and the World Bank, foreign 
exchange is generated by exports. It can be introduced in the Zairian 
economy through foreign loans, direct investment (participation of foreign 
multinational firms) and development grants. 
Khan et al. (1987) said that the monetary sector is itself quite 
rudimentary. Money, credit, and foreign reserves are the only financial 
assets in the system, and no mention is made of other assets such as bonds 
or treasury bills (domestic and foreign), foreign currency , or equities. 
Furthermore, in many developing countries, curb markets have a significant 
role in the intermediating process, and their influence on monetary policy 
has to be taken into account. The most important exclusion from the model 
on the monetary side is the interest rate. In both Fund and Bank programs, 
interest rate policies - raising nominal interest rates to obtain positive 
real rates - are key measures to influence private savings. While this 
extension in itself is not too difficult, the expansion of the menu of 
financial assets or the introduction of a transmission mechanism via 
interest rates would very quickly increase the complexity of the model. 
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Second, the model assumes that prices adjust continuously to maintain 
flow money market equilibrium. The introduction of short-run dynamic 
behavior, say through lags in adjustment of prices to monetary 
disequilibrium, or through slow revision of expectations of future 
inflation , while perhaps not changing the overall conclusions, would 
nonetheless yield useful insights on the time path of prices and thereby 
the adjustment process. In addition , one may wish to bring cost factors, 
particularly wages, into the picture. In programs involving devaluation, 
controlling factor costs, i.e., wages, is essential if a desired real 
exchange rate is to be achieved. Without such policies in place, be they 
fiscal or monetary restraint, or control over public sector wages, or 
elimination of indexation schemes, a devaluation will only have a 
transitory effect on the real exchange rate. In the long run, domestic 
wages and prices will rise by the full amount of devaluation and the rea l 
e x change rate would return to its original level. An obvious extension of 
this model, would involve the explicit treatment of wages in order to have 
a more complete wage price determination process, and also be able to 
explain unemployment. 
As is evident from the above examples, the merged model has a number 
of shortcomings. Some of these can be corrected relatively easily, but 
others would require serious theoretical and empirical study. As we know , 
GDP growth rate is a function of savings divided by ICOR (incremental 
capital output ratio). 
g s/ICOR 
This means that as savings (numerator) grows, GDP growth rate increases; it 
decreases when ICOR increases. Remind that ICOR increases when investment 
increase faster than output. Howev er, when investment growth rate is kept 
constant over time, ICOR may increase if output decreases for following 
reasons: deterioration of basic infrastructures (lack of road, waterways 
and railways maintenance), lack of maintenance of existing investments 
(equipment and machinery), lack of managerial skills , diversion of profits 
generated by existing investments, nonrepatriation of export earnings and 
profits, excessive debt serv icing absorbing large portions of export 
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earnings. Finally, ICOR may even increase more rapidly if output growth 
decreases faster than declining investment growth. 
Over time, Zaire has been facing what economists call twin deficits, 
which means government budget deficit and current account deficit. At 
equilibrium, the sum of savings + investment must equal next export (the 
difference between exports and imports). 
S - I = X - Z 
where S is domestic savings, I investment demand, X is exports, and Z is 
imports; assuming that X > Z, and s > I. 
Assume that X < z, the economy is experiencing a negative trade balance. If 
a negative services balance is added to a negative trade balance. the 
economy is experiencing a negative current account balance. 
The budget deficit increases the difference between national savings 
and investment 
SN - (Sp - I) x - z 
where SN is national savings, and is lesser than Sp, private savings. The 
budget deficit decreases private savings from Sp to SN. 
In an open economy, when S < I, foreign assets (F) may be lent to the 
Zairian economy, such as S + F I, and S + F will be equal to the negative 
current account. So, for the current account deficit to be totally 
absorbed, inflows of foreign assets must be equal to the current account 
deficit. Ideally, inflows of foreign assets should be greater than the 
current account deficit, in order not only to cover the balance of payment 
deficits, but also in order to restructure the economy and expand growth. 
In the absence of sufficient foreign assets, the government of Zaire 
used to increase its budget deficit financed by domestic credit and 
increased money supply. The Fund model explains balance of payments 
disequilibria, and emphasis on the real sector, while the World Bank 
approach aims to determine medium-term growth. Therefore, one would expect 
that the IMF remedies to the Zairian balance of payments disequilibria 
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would consist of substantial inf lows of foreign assets necessary to cover 
each annual balance of payment deficit under the stabilization programs. 
Ideally, the policy variable instrument should be a specific amount 
of foreign assets enabling the elimination of a given annual balance of 
deficit. Otherwise, inflows of foreign assets must enable Zaire to generate 
enough foreign exchange in the next period, such as the balance of payments 
deficit is totally absorbed or substantially reduced. After implementation 
of IMF stabilization programs, we would expect economic performance 
reflected by improvements in balance of payments deficits . 
Structural equations In the IMF model (see Table 9), the economy of 
a country, say Zaire, is divided into four sectors: the private sector, the 
public sector, the foreign sector, and the domestic banking system, which 
is assumed for simplicity to consist solely of a central bank. The private 
sector is assumed to own all factors of production . The sale of current 
output yields nominal income (Y) to the private sector, which it uses to 
pay taxes (T), purchase goods for consumption (Cp) and investment (AK), 
and accumulate financial assets. To keep matters simple, i nterest payments 
and receipts are ignored, as is the distribution of central bank profits. 
All variables are measured in nominal domestic currency terms . The private 
sector's net accumulation of financial assets consists of money (6.M) and 
foreign assets (AFp), minus borrowing from the banking system (ADp) 
The private budget constraint is 
Y - T - Cp - M.. = 8M + Mp - ill>p ( 1) 
Where y Nominal Income 
T Tax 
Cp = Disposable income minus Private consumption 
Sp Private savings 
AK Investment 
6.M = Private sector's net accumulation of 
financial assets 
AFp Foreign assets 
ADp = Borrowing from the banking system 
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Table 9. Structure of the IMF model 
Targets Endogenous Exogenous Instruments Parameters 
Variables variables 
6R 6Y 6y 6Dp v (velocity of money 
6Po ~ PF 6DG (share of 
importables in 
the price index) 
6P X_l 6e a (marginal propensity 
ty to import) 
z z_l b (coefficient of 
response of 
imports to relative 
prices) 
6Fp c (coefficient of 
response of exports 
to relative prices) 
6F 
T-CG 6FG 
Khan, 1987, P· 163 
The public sector receives taxes and uses the proceeds for 
consumption (CG) · It does not engage in any investment. this assumption of 
inexisting public investment does not hold in the case of Zai re where the 
country not only owns factors of production, and financial assets, but 
intervenes in investment process . Any surplus is devoted to accumulation of 
financial assets in the form of foreign assets (6FG) and borrowing from 
the banking system (6DG) · This produces the public budget constraint. 
( 2) 
Where T Government taxes revenues 
CG = Government expenditures 
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= Government savings 
AFG Accumulated foreign assets 
ADG Public domestic credit 
The foreign sector receives revenues in the form of imports purchased 
by the domestic economy (Z), and it spends on domestic exports (X). To the 
extent that its revenues exceed expenditures , i.e., a current account 
deficit, it buys back its liabilities from the domestic private and public 
sectors acquires reserves from the domestic banking system (AR), so that 
its actions obey the constraint 
z - X = - (Mp + Ma + LlR) ( 3) 
This means that (SN) which is equal to private savings in foreign exchange 
(AFp) plus public savings in foreign exchange (AFa) plus reserves from the 
domestic banking system (AR), is identical to positive net export (X - Z). 
Finally, the central bank is simply a financial intermediary which 
acquires assets in the form of international reserves and claims on the 
domestic private and public sectors and supplies its own liabilities in the 
form of money to the private sector. These transactions must satisfy the 
balance-sheet constraint 
This means that private savings (.6.M) is identical to the sum of the 
domestic total debt (public debt ADG +private debt ADp), plus reserves 
from the domestic banking system. 
Summing equation 1 to 4, yields 
Y - Cp - /!u<. - CG - X + Z 0 
( 4) 
( 5) 
which is the familiar national income accounting identity. Put differently 
in terms of supply side and demand side, we have 
Y = Cp + /!u<. + CG + X - Z 
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As mentioned above, because the Zairian public sector owns factors of 
production (state owned companies and parastatals ) and is involved in 
public investments, to be realistic, the IMF model must take these 
variables in account. 
The real GDP is taken to be exogenously determi ned, i.e., 
Y = Py ( 6) 
Where p 
y = 
domestic price level 
real GDP, regarded as exogenous. 
The change in nominal output can be approximated as 
( 6) 
In this equation, both last period ' s real GDP, y _ 1 , and last period's price 
level, P_l, are predetermined. The change in real GDP, given by 6y, is 
exogenous, and 6P, the change in the domestic price level, is the 
endogenous variable. 
The velocity of money is assumed to be constant : 
vf:.Y 
where v is a constant which represents the inverse of income velocity of 
money, and MD is the demand for nominal money balances. 
( 7) 
The velocity is meant to convey the speed at which the money stock is 
turned over from one individual to another during a period of time such as 
a year . In practice veloci ty i s usually calculated by dividing the money 
stock - in the case of M1 , currency plus checking deposits, into nominal 
GNP. 
Nominal GDP 
velocity = -----=---
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If the value of this ratio is 6, for example, then o ne might be tempted to 
say that the money stock has turned over six times in spending on a year's 
GNP. However, since total GNP is only a smal l fraction of the tota l number 
of transactions in the economy , all transactions in intermediate goods and 
all financial transactions are excluded, money really turns over much more 
frequently than six times in a year. 
Velocity is best thought of in terms of the demand for money. If the 
demand for money shifts up, velocity shifts down, and vice versa. 
The inverse relationship between velocity and money demand shows the ratio 
of currency to GNP and checking deposits to GNP, respectively. The sum of 
these two ratios is simply the ratio of M1 to GNP, which is precisely the 
inverse of velocity. When the sum of the currency and checking deposit 
ratios declines, velocity must increases. 
The money market is assumed to be in flow equilibrium. Therefore, 
filiD ( 8) 
where M5 is the supply of money. This equilibrium condition does not imply 
that the public holds the stock of money it desires at each i nstant, but 
rather it will succeed in adding t o its cash balances at the desired rate 
during the programmed period. 
These equations, together with identity (4), permit the balance of 
payments (6R) to be expressed as a function of exogenous and policy 
variables. This can be shown by taking first differences in eq. (6) and 
substituting successively into (7), (8), and (4), where 6.M in (4) is to be 
interpreted as the flow of money. The resulting expression is written as 
(9) 
By monitoring the expansion in domestic credit it is possible to 
determine if the program is on track in achieving the targeted increase in 
reserves. The demand for money increases with income , increases with the 
price level, and decreases with interest rate, as in the following 
algebraic expression 
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MD (kY - hr)P 
where MD is demand for money, Y is nominal income, r is market interest 
rate, and P is the general price level. 
Eq.(9) is a straight line in 6R - 6P space, denoted MM, with 
intercept vP_16y - (6Dp + 6DG), and a positive slope vy_1 • A reduction in 
the rate of expansion of domestic credit will shift this line upwards, so 
an improvement in the balance of payments will be associated with any given 
rate of inflation 6P. 
We will see in the following section how instrument variables are 
determined in both the IMF and the World Bank models. 
A Revised Macroeconomic Model 
In the revised model, we deal with the production and export of 
diamonds as a leading industry that may have strong backward and forward 
linkages. We believe that the big push to economic growth in Zaire may come 
from the diamond industry because diamonds can generate foreign exchange 
within the country, without relying on any conditional IMF and World Bank 
loans. In the original IMF and World Bank stabilization and structural 
adjustment models, foreign exchange is provided under specific conditions 
and is exogenously treated. 
Foreign exchange is generated by economic activities within Zaire. It 
is endogenous to the model. Foreign exchange needed to promote growth is no 
longer a loan or a development grant, but it is induced by economic 
activities. Assuming the state of institutionalized corruption, the 
weakness of government tax administration and collection, that foreign 
investors hardly reinvest profits earned from economic activities in Zaire, 
that the corrupted ruling elite diverse public wealth and hide large 
portions of official and private export earnings outside Zaire, in Western 
banks, that villagers can earn foreign exchange from sale of precious 
stones, mainly diamonds, within Zaire, assuming that exports of diamonds by 
buying offices (official and unofficial) may not fully be repatriated, 
e conomic growth of the Zairian economy is not only possible but also 
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feasible. Economic growth will come from unskilled villagers who extract 
diamonds and gold and sell them within Zaire in foreign currencies. 
New instrument variables 
New macroeconomic instruments that can be controlled by the 
government must be included in the model, allowing the economy to achieve 
high level of targets variables within short periods o f time and most 
policy distortions will be removed and forgotten. That policy variables 
are: 
1 . The organization of international tourism allowing diamond miners to 
travel abroad and foreign tourists to visit diamond producing areas; 
2. The sale of passports by a private organization playing the role of 
intermediate between diamond miners and the state; 
3. The creation of a private diamond bank; 
4. The imposition of traveler check system throughout the country and 
outside Zaire; 
5. The obligation for importers in diamond producing areas to use the 
services of the new private diamond bank; 
6. The obligation for diamond miners to pay in kind (in diamonds) the 
rights to pollute water and damage the environment through the private 
diamond bank; 
7. The construction in diamond producing areas of private groceries and 
stores equipped with computerized sys tems, inked with the private 
diamond bank; 
8. The obligation in diamond producing areas to use a computerized bank 
card in stores; 
9. The construction of teller machines linked with the private diamond 
bank; 
10. The construction of wholesale groceries for agricultural products in 
diamond producing areas equipped with computerized systems. This 
implies the supression of open air public markets. 
11. The installation of sophisticated systems of control detecting 
diamonds in luggages in all airports and custom services in Zaire; 
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12. Reduction of export taxes and tariffs on diamonds; 
13. Reduction of import taxes and tariffs in diamond producing areas; 
14. Maintaining the sale of diamonds and gold in foreign currencies; 
15. Moving gradually to the dollarization of the Zairian economy, that is 
the use of the US dollar as national currency, first in diamond 
producing a reas, then in Zaire as a whole.; 
16. The liberalization of export licences for diamonds to foreign 
tourists. But if quantities to be exported exceed 50 carats, exporters 
are required to export diamonds via the private diamond bank. 
17. The building of a diamond cutting industry within Zaire. 
18. The obligation for the private diamond bank to make different types of 
loans not only to investors in diamond producing areas , but a l so to 
other investors in agricultural zones . 
These variables instruments will be examined later . 
Assumptions of the revised macroeconomic model 
The selling price of diamond is a positive function of quality 
stones. The flow chart below shows that village diamond miners extract 
diamonds, sell to official and unofficial diamond buying offices, and are 
paid in the US dollars. Buying offices export diamonds, sell in Western 
countries at highest prices, and return again to Zaire in order to buy more 
diamonds, as long as variations in international demand for diamonds allow 
dealers to make profits . However, in the case of Zaire, assuming a decrease 
in average international price of diamonds, as long as the price of 
diamonds is determined by the quality of the stones, Zairian producers will 
still make enough profits needed to sustain economic growth, because of low 
producing cost of diamonds. In addition, a $65,000 initial investment cost 
in diamond dredge may generate millions of dollars, even billions of 
dollars, because of the richness of its mines . Lack of bank deposits 
characterizes households in diamond producing areas. 
Production ~ Foreign ~ Buying ~ Export rough <::::> Foreign 
exchange Offices Diamonds exchange 
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Villagers• incomes from sale of diamonds are used for: 
• consumption expenditures; 
• savings; 
• investment; and 
• importing goods without going through the official banking system. 
However, because of the political situation created by the ruling 
elite which wrongfuly sees the emergence of wealthier peasant diamond 
producers, villagers do not make any bank deposits in foreign comme rcial 
b a nks (Banque Commerciale Zairoise, Union Zairoise des Banques, City Bank) 
nor in the "Bank de Kinshasa" and "Banque du Peuple", both national banks. 
Because savings and commercial banks are not trusted by households, a 
parallel exchange market functions along with the official exchange market 
in Tshikapa , Mbuji Mayi, Kahemba, Kisangani and Isiro where diamonds are 
produced. In diamond producing areas three different types of currencies 
are in circulation. Inflows of foreign currencies is made via diamond 
trade . In addition, three types of currencies officially circulate 
throughout Zaire, the old zaire, the New zaire, and foreign currencies, 
mainly US dollars. 
While prices of diamonds and gold are expressed in the US dollars, 
local agricultural production is sold in the national currencies. What 
macroeconomic policies may be used in the current context of the Zairian 
economy? What levels of target may be considered? What are the new policy 
variable instruments expected to push the economy to higher levels than did 
IMF and World Bank original models? 
First, diamond mining is the main economic activity - Assuming the 
selling price per carat of gme diamonds is us $1,000 in Tshikapa and Mbuji 
Mayi, that the average production of GEM diamonds varies between 1 to 5 
million carats per year, expected income from sale of diamonds will be from 
US $1 billion to US $ 5 billion, regardless of other productions . We will 
assume that Zair e only produces diamonds (tradable), maize and cassava 
(nontradables), and coffee (tradable). 
Second, relevant alternative growth policies may be performed in 
diamond producing areas . 
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Export promotio n pol i c y Growth is a positive function of trade 
(exports). The main objective would consist of exporting high value added 
goods. When comparing coffee to diamonds , diamonds is the highest value 
product, as seen in Chapter 4. 
We may formulate different steps of investment growth, starting with 
diamonds activities . 
Step 0 Investment in financial development institution objectives: 
• purchase of diamonds 
• export of diamonds 
• tax collection and rights 
• savings institution 
• tourism promotion overseas 
Step 1 
Step 2 
Step 3 
Step 4 
Step 5 
Organizing heavy manufacturing (polishing+ cutting diamonds) . 
The objective is to export polish and cut diamonds to generate 
more foreign exchange. 
organizing industries producing synthetic diamonds objective: 
export of synthetic diamonds and generation of more foreign 
exchange. 
Organizing industries producing jewelry objective : export of 
jewelries (rings, necklaces, and so on} and the generation of 
more foreign exchange. 
Organizing industries with backward linkages and with forward 
linkages with the diamond industry. 
Infrastructure investments (roads, rural electricity, improved 
water services, communications, irrigation systems, human 
capital, social investments, research and development). 
Step 6 Organization of agricultural loans 
• building storage facilities 
• import of agricultural equipment 
• agricultural marketing channels 
• agricultural productions 
food crops 
• industrial crops 
export crops 
. livestock 
• fisheries 
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• treatment of agricultural products 
Savings policy In order to promote the diamond industry, the 
Zairian government should adopt a tax cut policy on export of diamonds. 
Tax cut policy: 
S = (Y - T) - Cp 
T tY 
A decrease in t, decreases T, and increases disposable income. Savings 
increases if Cp remains constant. 
S = yD - Cp 
S = sY 
Savings is a positive function of output per worker 
With its low value of capital used in diamond digging , and the large 
number of workers involved in this sector, diamond activity is a labor 
intensive business. Potential savers are in large proportion compared to 
agricultural sector. The more diamonds produced, the more output per 
worker, the more savings per worker, the more investment per worker in the 
next period. However, workers must be stimulated in order to increase 
savings. 
Y = f(K,L) 
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S = sf(k) 
As output per worker increases, savings rate per worker increases, given 
appropriate incentives. 
Savings is positively related to output growth, but negatively 
related to ICOR (incremental capital output ratio). GDP growth rate is a 
positive function of factor inputs . 
g = f(K,L,m) = (factor inputs) 
s 
g=--
ICOR 
S = g*ICOR 
As GDP growth rate increases, savings increases. As ICOR increases, savings 
must rise in order to maintain sustained GDP growth. However, we know that 
increases in ICOR result from falling output growth compared to a faster 
increase in investment non-accompanied with rapid output growth. In the 
e quation above, when g increases, this implies that ICOR has decreased. If 
ICOR increases, savings decreases because an increase in ICOR implies a 
slow employment growth, meaning that a small number of workers are earning 
income, and they cannot expand savings. As said before, this happens when 
the country had get involved in import substitution industrialization 
policy based on the production of goods and services for final demands. 
Saving is positively related to payment of interest on savings 
account, checking accounts , and medium and long term bank deposits. 
Positive real interest rates stimulate private savings, while decreased and 
negative interest rates lower the cost of capital and investors are 
stimulated. As stated in previous chapters , investors invest in project 
with higher internal rate of returns (IRR > r : internal rate of returns 
greater than market interest rate). They keep investing in less profitable 
projects until internal rate of returns or marginal efficiency of 
investment equals the market interest rate . This is the profit maximization 
condition for investment. 
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If market interest rate decreases, investment will expand more due to 
a decrease in the user cost of capital, which depends on the real price of 
new equipment, the real interest rate, and the rate of depreciation: 
where RK is the rental price of capital, r is the market real interest 
rate, is the rate of existing capital depreciation, and pK is the price 
of new equipment. 
User cost also decreases with a decrease in rate of capital 
depreciation, or when the price of new equipment declines. 
Ig = In + dI 
Gross investment equals to new investment plus depreciation on 
existing investments. 
Desired capital stock by firms is a function of wages (W), rental 
price and income. 
K * = k( RWK )y 
New investment in a specific year is the difference between desired capital 
stock (K*) and existing capital stock (K_1 ). 
Increased income, low wage rates and low user cost increase the desired 
capital stock. 
According to new economic theory of growth, the depreciation of 
existing capital is not due to physical depreciation, but to decrease in 
prices of output produced and sold. 
Ig = In + dI 
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where Ig is gross investment, In is new investment, and is the 
depreciation rate of existing investment (is incorporated in the selling 
price of output, and constitutes part of business savings). If the price of 
output decreases, existing investments risk being scrapped. So, gross 
investment is equal to accumulated gross investments minus scrapped 
investments (Scott,1990, p. 1-19). 
Ig = Igo - scrapped investments 
Therefore, terms of trade deterioration scraps existing investme nts, 
decrease profits, decrease business savings. Thus, macro economic policy to 
increase or maintain constant business savings, will consist of avoiding 
terms of trade deterioration, or will consist of creating economic 
environment that allow the private sector to increase the quantity of 
output produced, by increasing the size of firms (economies of scale), and 
lowering producing costs. Tax cut on investment projects may be an example 
of such policies. Tariff and tax reductions on imports, not only decrease 
domestic inflation, but also reduce the price of new equipment (PK) in 
terms of local currency. 
Private savings is negatively related to inflation. Thus investment 
is also negatively related to inflation. 
where tr is inflation rate. As inflation rate decreases, saving increases. 
However, because negative interest rates are disincentive for private 
savings, commercial banks will not have enough resources to make 
substantial loans to potential investors. So, negative interest rates do 
not practically stimulate investment; but positive real interest rates 
encourage private savings who increase the volume of bank deposits . 
i - tr r 
As inflation rate decreases, real interest rate increases, and may become 
positive, and stimulate private savings. Commercial banks will get enough 
money to make loans. 
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s = f(r, ro) 
where s is savings, r is the market positive interest rate, and ro is 
charges on bank deposits. As positive market interest rate increases, bank 
deposits increase, savings increase. But savings decrease as charges on 
bank deposits increase because this disincentives bank deposits. 
Demand of money for bank deposit Demand of money for bank deposit 
decreases with increase in inflation rate. As the general price level 
increases, households need more cash (currency), and make less bank 
deposits . 
1. Payment of interest on saving accounts 
2 . Payment of interest on checking accounts 
An important motive for holding checking account balances is to pay 
the bank for the services it provides. With most checking accounts , you can 
eliminate service charges by keeping a high enough balance. Instead of 
paying you interest and then charging you for the services you use, the 
bank offsets one against the other. In effect, you are earning a reasonable 
return on your wealth, but the return is paid in banking services rather 
than in cash. 
3. Payment of interests on medium and long term deposits 
For business customers, banks have traditionally linked loans and 
deposits. A business is likely to get a loan if it has kept large deposits 
with a bank . Some loans require explicitly that part of the proceeds be 
kept as compensating balances, which are inactive, non-interest - bearing 
balances in checking accounts. The bank charges for its services by paying 
its depositors less than market interest rates on their deposits. 
The demand for currency depends negatively on the interest rate and 
positively on income and the price level. The demand for checking deposits 
depends negatively on the difference between the market interest rate and 
the rate on checking deposits, and positively on income and the pr i ce 
level. 
CU CU(r, Py) 
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BO BD(ro, Py) 
where CU is currency, BO is checking deposits. 
The first equation shows that the demand of currency is a function of the 
market interest rate r and nominal income PY (the pri ce level times real 
income y) . The second equation shows that the demand for checking deposits 
is a function of the opportunity cost of checking deposits r 0 and nominal 
income. Total money demand is the sum of these two demands. 
Demand depends negatively on the costs of holding currency and checking 
balances. In the case of currency, the cost is just the interest rate, r. 
In the case of checking deposits, the cost is the difference between the 
market interest rate and the rate on checking deposits, less the reduction 
in services charges obtained by having a larger balances. 
Political stability and the degree of corruption and diversion of 
public resources have also an impact on currency and checking deposits. 
CU = f (PU, COR, DIV) 
BO f (PU, COR, DIV) 
The first equation shows that households hold more cash when politically 
the country is unstable, corruption is institutionalized, and diversion of 
public resources is very high. So, checking deposits decrease, savings 
through official saving institutions and banking system decrease as well. 
Savings mobilization is a positive function of initial investment in 
spiritual activities. Thus, macroeconomic policy that can reduce the degree 
of corruption and diversion of public wealth may consist of allowing people 
to build more churches, to provide more religious programs on television 
and radios throughout the country, in cities and in rural areas as well . 
S = f(Mo) 
where S is savings, and Mo is expenditures on churches, and programs 
related to morality. 
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The government may subsidize large churches able to contain thousands of 
people, social community agencies, and religious programs on TV. The 
government should create a favorable environment to a cohesive community, 
spiritual restoration and reformation (churches and community activities). 
Savings mobilization is a function of demand for imports through 
official banking system . Increase in imports demand through the official 
banking system increase bank deposits, and stimulate private savings. 
Import liberalization will give incentives to a large number of private 
diamond miners to import more goods . If they address their demands through 
the official banking system, they must make bank deposits in order to 
allow commercial banks pay for transactions to the banks of their foreign 
suppliers. Commercial bank revenues increase, as well opportunities to 
increased loans. 
Savings mobilization is a function of tourism activities overseas. 
Savings is also positively related to expenditures on passports and 
travelers• checks . The promotion of tourism activities outside Zaire will 
give incentives to bank deposits. 
Savings is positively related to the organization of games and sports 
activities to a large extent. The construction of large stadiums for all 
possible types of games. 
s = f (expenditures on sports) 
Savings is related to dowry, baptism, marriages, graduation, and 
mourning ceremonies 
S = f(expenditures on cultural ceremonies) 
In Zaire marriage requires the payment by the man of a dowry to the family 
of the fiancee. The more young men are encouraged to get married, the more 
they save money in order to pay for the bridal gift. Parents have also to 
save money in order to organize the baptism or graduation ncerernonies of 
their children. To be able to face expenditures required by a mourning 
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ceremony, namely the removal of dark clothes worn by members of the family 
who had lost a relative, some relatives have to save money. 
The likelemba is a practice consisting of giving a membership of a 
group, a fixed amount of money when his turn comes. Assuming that 10 
diamond sellers agree on a likelemba. Each of them will give to others US 
$1 , 000 every month until everybody in the group will receive its us $9,000 
from others. 
s = f (likelemba) 
Saving is also positively related to sale of diamonds and gold in 
foreign currencies within Zaire. The sale of precious stones within Zaire 
in fore ign curr encies increase potential savings because incomes received 
are in strong money, namely the US dollar, that hardly devalue, compared 
with frequent devaluation of the zaire. With a stable currency, households 
can save a constant portion of their incomes. With a depreciated zaire, 
households have a tendency to spend all their income in goods, as soon as 
they receive it. 
S = f (sale of diamonds + gold in US $ within Zaire) 
Saving is positively related to export of manufactured goods from 
the diamond industry. Macroeconomic policy promoting manufacturing 
industries producing for international markets, will increase opportunities 
of more profits from export earnings. The propensity of capitalist to save 
is high. 
S = f(manufactured goods in diamond) 
Saving is related to the payment of rights to pollution and depletion 
of environment by diamond and gold miners . These payments should be in 
kind . One can argue that right now diamond diggers pay some taxes for the 
damage caused to the environment. However, these taxes are mostly diverted 
as we said before. The revised IMF/World Bank model suggest the 
organization of rights for polluting and damaging the environment. In 
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addition, their p a yments should be through the private financial 
inst itution organized in Chapter 5 of this study. 
S = f (rights for polluting and damaging environment) 
Savings is related positively to the promotion of art, dancing and 
musical act ivities. 
• dancing bar and music promotion 
. public building lent to privates 
. increa ses con sumption of drinks (taxes on alcohol and cigarettes) 
• promotion of Television in rural areas 
regulation of public goods (public T.V room managed privately (small 
fees) 
TV increases consumption of power 
. people stay home and spend less time outside their houses 
• learning effects 
S = f(expenditures on art, dancing, + musical activities) 
Saving is related to the organization of marketing channels with 
computerized stores and the use of banking cards: 
• wholesale of agricultural products or computerized grocery stores) 
which proceeds to packing and sell to retail computerized stores. 
S = f (computerized stores) 
Saving is positively related to enthusiasm given to value the Zairian 
family and clan : 
• Each tribe, each clan , as well each family, must hold a album or a film 
of all memberships for the history of the clan. 
S = f (family value) 
Saving is positively related to a compulsory saving system: every 
citizen must have a saving account (lZ per capita, per month). 
Sn = f (compulsory saving) 
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The struggle against deforestation, erosion and desertification 
requires a compulsory planting system of trees (lumber, and fruit trees). 
Net GDP material product = f (replanting expenditures) 
Research and development must be encouraged by subsidizing university 
and college professors . 
(R+D) = f (subsidy) 
Savings is positively related to trade policy 
S f (trade policy) 
The more economic agents within a country export and import, the more they 
have incentive to save money. 
Determination of the values of instrument variables in the IMF model 
In the IMF model, AR* (balance of payments), ap* (inflation rate) 
are the targets. The IMF model deals with the way to determine the values 
of instrument v ariables which are ae (exchange rate), aop (domestic 
private debt), and Af)G (domestic public debt) which would lead the system 
to a specific target levels of balance of payments, given a specific level 
of inflation rate. 
1. OLS of export against the exchange rate to see how exports respond to 
changes in price due to variations in the exchange rate. 
where u (unexplanatory variation) is the residual; it shows the 
contribution of international demand expressed in terms of international 
prices. 
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The regression coefficient +B1 shows that if more zaire are required per US 
$, meaning that the zaire exchange has depreciated, export crops for 
example cost less in term of zaire than international prices. Zairian 
products are more competitive, and exports increase. 
2. OLS of imports against the exchange rate to see how imports respond to 
changes in prices due to variations in the exchange rate. 
~ 
Z Bo+B1e+ut whereu-NID(O,CY-) 
where u (explanatory variation) is the residual; it shows 
the contribution of international demand expressed in terms of 
international prices. 
The regression coefficient -B1 shows that if more zaire are required per US 
$, meaning that the zaire exchange rate has depreciated, imported goods and 
services cost more expensive in terms of the local currency, the zaire; 
volume of imported goods and services decrease. 
3 . The World Bank determines the value of its target Ay*. so, output is 
exogenously determined in the IMF model. 
4. The domestic private debt is used as a target in the expansion credit 
function 
* ( AP ] 
ADp = Y_ l AY 
5 . The domestic public debt is determined as the difference between 
total debt and domestic private debt. 
or 
6. The targeted balance of payment is determined by 
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flR* (X_1 - z_1 - 8F) + (X_1 - z_1 - ~ + (b +c)] 
8e - a/j,y - (b + c)8P0 
7. The last instrument, the exchange rate 6e is determined 
6R * -(x_l - Z-1 - 6F) + 6y + (b + c)AP; 
Ae = -------------------
x_1 - z _ 1 - AF + ( b + c) 
Assuming that diamonds are sold in foreign currencies , namely the US 
dollar; assuming also that Zaire exports various manufactured goods using 
diamonds as inputs, export earnings would increase . As a result, the zaire 
exchange rate will appreciate, and external purchasing power will allow 
Zaire to imports more consumer goods , more new equipment and appropriate 
technologies. Both productive capacity and total factor productivity will 
increase, output will continue to increase as long as the socioeconomic 
environment will be stable. 
Advocates of exchange rate depreciation policy would argue that 
because of appreciation of the Zairian currency, Zairian exports may be 
leas competitive in international markets . We do not think so because 
Zairian products were more competitive in international markets during the 
1967-70 period when its exchange rate was set at lZ for US $2. Exports 
increased during that period. In addition foreign investors were 
attracted by that strong currency. Next, with import of export 
manufacturing industries, Zaire will be able improve the quality of its 
exports and be competitive in world markets. 
In order to promote economic growth Zaire needs a strong currency, 
but not a weak currency that must always need to be rescued by the 
i nternational community that could not make positive the balance of 
payments at any time. 
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Determination of the values of instrument variables in the World Bank model 
In the World Bank model, 6R* (balance of payments), and 6y* (output) 
are the targets . Instruments to be determined within the model are CG 
(government spending), or T (government tax revenues), and 6F (foreign 
assets). With those calculated values of instruments, the government would 
lead the system to achieve specific targets. 
1. Change in real GDP (6y*) is a function of change in investment divided 
by ICOR (k: incremental output-capital ratio ). 
* AK 6y =-
k 
2. The ordinary least square estimation of the marginal propensity to 
import is given by regressing imports (Z) against real GDP (y). 
where ut (unexplained variation) is the residual and shows the contribution 
of other factors such as exchange rate. 
3. The ordinary least square estimation of the marginal propensity to 
save is obtained by regressing savings against i ncome . 
S = ay + Ut 
where u, the residual (unexplained variations) expresses the contribution 
of other factors such as positive real interest rate. 
4. * * sy - ST + T - CG + ay - x 
liK. - (s + a)y* + X = (l -s)T - CG 
5 . If we assume that T is a target, and CG an instrument, and given the 
value of private consumptio n 
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Cp (l - S)(y* - T) (l- s)y* - (1- s)T 
6. The value of government tax revenues is given by 
* T 
7. Then we can determine the value of CG, the instrument 
CG = s(y* - T*) + T* + ay* - X - DK 
Next we introduce into the model defining the current account new 
variables, namely (VS) which stands for revenues from sale of passports and 
document related to trips abroad, rz2 , representing all revenues earned by 
the financial institution described in chapter S (interests on loans, 
financial charges on travelers' checks and on imports), RTPDE' 
representing the rights to pollute and damage environments. Those three 
variables are our instrument variables that we include in the IMF and the 
World Bank model. However, instead of computing least square estimates, we 
will use the reduced form equation for their determination. 
Determination of the values of instrument variables in the revised model 
We distinguish two economic models, one describing areas of Zaire 
that do not produce diamonds; and another describing the economy of diamond 
producing areas of Zaire. 
Zairel: Non producing diamond areas za1 , equivalent to the state of Iowa. 
Zaire2 : diamond producing areas za2 , equivalent to the state of Colorado . 
za1 + za2 =Zaire, equivalent to the USA. 
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Case 1. Economic model for Zaire 1: 
private consumption 
government tax revenues 
imports 
net exports 
investment 
aggregate demand 
Y1 =a1 + b 1 [Y1 - (g1 +t1Y1)] +r~-d1r+(i+xTFl)x1 - z~ -m 1 (1 - zTFl) 
Y1 + h 1e - n1r + (vs1)+rz1 + G1 +c 1e 
Reduced form equation for Y1 
Determining values of policy variable instruments 
Let L1 be the sum of values of variables instruments 
1 1 Setting G1 , z0 , r 0 , e, and r 
* targets Y1 = Y1 
O, and taking in account the values of 
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Therefore, 
Knowing the value of L1 , we can either determine the number of Zairian 
tourists to stimulate to make a trip to the us. Current imports are 
positively related to autonomous imports (which do not depend on income, 
i.e., grants), and on income. They are negatively related to tariffs and 
taxes on imports, and on exchange rate. 
Differentiating with respect to 
CJl 
a) - - > O , An increase in autonomous imports increases current 
CJlo 
imports. 
CJl 
b) y - > O, 
8t 
An increase in income, increases current imports. 
CJl 
c) ZTF --- < O, 
ozTF 
An increase in imports' tariffs, decreases imports . 
CJl 
d) e -< O, 
aa 
When exchange rates depreciate, i . e., the Zairian 
currency costs less, in terms of foreign currencies, imports become 
expensive in terms of zaires, imports decrease. 
Exports are positively related to quantity of goods and services demanded 
by foreigners (g2 is gold and diamonds; g 1 is other goods and services), 
and on exchange rate. But they are negatively related to exports taxes and 
tariffs , and negatively related t o interest rate . Visa and passports are 
considered as goods. Exports are positively related to passports and visa 
sold to Zairian tourists traveling abroad . An increase in imports through 
the banking system means an increase in commercial bank revenues on 
imports. The trade balance will increase. 
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Differentiating with respect to 
me 
a) -- > 0 , An increase in quantity of other goods and services 
q..1 
exported, the value of exports. 
b) y 2 where v is a constant which represents the inverse of income 
velocity of money, and MD is the demand for nominal money balances. 
The velocity is meant to convey the speed at which the money stock is 
turned over from one individual to another during a period of time such as 
a year. In practice velocity is usually calculated by dividing the money 
stock - in the case of M1 , currency plus checking deposits, into nominal 
GNP. 
c) 
d) 
e) 
Nominal GDP 
velocity=----~--
me 
-- > O, An increase in quantity of gold and diamonds exported, 
q..2 
increases value of exports. 
me 
e - > 0, When exchange rates depreciate, the zaire costs less in 
~ 
terms of foreign currencies, goods and services exported by Zaire 
become less expensive, international demand for Zairian goods and 
services increases, exports increase. 
--- < 0, An increase in taxes and tariffs on exports 
bXTFl 
decreases exports of other goods and services . 
--- < 0, An increase in taxes and tariffs on export of gold 
bXTF2 
and diamonds purchased in foreign currencies within Zaire decreases 
exports , while a decrease will increase exports. 
f) 
g) 
h) 
I) 
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R 
~ 
- < 0, An increase in domestic interest rates, decreases 
01r 
investment , decreases output , decreases exports. 
~ 
VS : -- > 0, an increase in number of passports and visas 
ova 
delivered, increases exports. 
~ 
XTcK = --- > O, An increases in Vs, i mplies an increases in 
01rTCK 
traveler checks delivered, meaning an increase in conuner cial bank 
revenues on t r aveler checks. This increases exports. 
~ 
-- > 0 , An increase in imports through the banking syste m, 
01rz 
increa ses the balance of service surplus . 
Case 2. Economic model for Zaire 2. 
In the second case we deal with areas of Zaire which mainly produce 
gold and diamond . These areas are characterized by water pollution and a 
high degree of depletion of the environment. In another study we will see 
how the s upply and demand for rights to pollute and to damage the 
environment will be organized. At this level we assume that miners must pay 
for t hese rights to consumers who had received them from the government. 
During the time miners cannot extract diamonds they may sell their rights 
to other producers or consumers. This mechanism will lead to the 
determination of a market rate for damaging and polluting the environment. 
Payments for these rights may be in cash or in kind. An institution should 
be created in order to link polluters and consumers who hold rights. 
Assuming that the government issue to consumers one billion US dollars of 
rights, consumers may sell them for two billion US dollars. This will 
represent the domestic savings generated from the market of rights for 
damaging and polluting the environment. 
The gover nment will get back its billion in cash through the 
financial institution. With these revenues the government can finance 
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through the financial institution the instrument variables described in 
previous paragraphs (computerized groceries, rural electricity,and so on) . 
Government revenues (T) becomes a positive function of taxes on revenues 
and rights for polluting and damaging the environment. 
T = tY +RTPDE 
where RTPDE =(i+rtPDE)P2y 2 . The rights for polluting and damaging the 
environment is related to incomes earned by miners. 
Differentiating with respect to 
a) 
~TPDE 
---- > 0, An increase in the rate of right for polluting 
ortPDE 
and damaging the environment increase the amount of rights collected, 
and increase government revenues. 
If part of rights is paid in imported investment goods, the level of 
investment will shift upwards. For example, polluters will be required to 
pay in kind (water wells pumps, water well drilling equipment , gold and 
diamond dredging equipment, mini power station equipment, agricultural 
equipment, medical equipment, scientific and laboratory equipment, export 
industries, import substitution industries, transportation means, paving 
roads equipment and materials). A new financial institution in charge of 
importing these investment goods ,should be created, and act as a bank. 
Investment becomes related to private, government and external savings, 
and to the value of instrument Li in case 1. Instrument Li comprises rzi 
which represents all financial charges and interest payments collected by 
the new financial institution in areas not producing diamonds , but that 
will benefit credit allowances from the financial institution. 
where [(Yi +y;)-T - cp] is private savings 
[ T - CG] is government saving, and 
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[ Z - X] is the rest of world saving in Zai re. 
However, when we include domestic debt and foreign loans in the 
equation above, we have the value determined by the IMF model 
If we replace foreign loans by the value of instrument L1 , we get an 
expression defining the revised investment model, where foreign exchange is 
generated within the country from sale of diamonds and gold in the US 
dollars , for example 
We find that 
Investment = private savings + government savings + external savings + 
foreign direct investment (F) 
Af<=(HHS) + (BSS) + SG + Sx +F 
Private savings = household savings + business sector savings 
Sp = (HHS) + (BSS) 
HH savings HH savings in foreign exchange + HH savings in zaires 
HHS = (HHS)$ + (HHS)z 
Household savings will include the margin on the government price of rights 
for polluting and damaging the environment. 
BS savings = BS savings in foreign exchange + BS savings in zaires 
BBS = (BSS)s + (BSS)z 
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Busine s s savings in foreign exchange (investors in the diamond industry) 
equals to retained profit + depreciation allowances 
BSSS = 7rRET + bk_ l 
Household savings in foreign exchange (savings of individuals involved in 
diamond activities) 
D R 
HHS$ = sYS + ( ZUDB )$ + BSSS 
Financial development enterprises' revenues equal to revenues on sale of 
passports , plus revenues on travelers' checks, plus interest received on 
l oans . 
R 
( ZUDB) $ = vs + rz + r (Loans) 
We will s e e in chapter five c a tegories of loans to be promoted. It 
seems useless to try to statistically reject the null hypothesis that 
macroeconomic and government of Zaire policy measures could not increase 
domestic savings under stabilization and structural adjustment programs . 
Chapter two gave us an illustration of economic performance of the IMF , 
World Bank and Government of Zaire macroeconomic policies. Investment 
growth rate is the lowest in Africa (13% to 16%), while only 10% had b e en 
financed by domestic savings. 
IMF and World Bank instruments had been off set by Government of Zaire 
macroeconomic policies. Reducing credit expansion and imports did not 
increase private savings, neither in zaires nor in foreign exchange. In 
addition, balance of payments never became positive at any time. On the 
other side , by reducing government spending, the World Bank model did not 
give any incentive to private savings mobilization. Government savings did 
not increase substantially especially in foreign exchange . The crowding in 
effect did not appear. 
We assume that when new variable instruments are included in the 
model, whatever the political environment and attitude towards development , 
new policy measures will mobilize more domestic savings and push the 
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country's economy t o targeted real GDP growth rate, and balance of 
payments equilibrium. 
(l) Instead of decreasing imports, the revised model encourage i mports i n 
diamond producing areas. 
(2) Instead of maintaining high tax on export of gold and diamonds, the 
revised model favors decreases on import and export taxes related to 
diamonds. 
(3) Instead of discouraging tourism abroad, the revised model encourage 
tourism outside Zaire for people working in the diamond industry. 
(4) Instead of making financial institution untrusted organization, the 
revised models encourage the creation of a private financial bank by 
diamond miners in the Kasai provinces. 
(5) Instead of giving massive credit to selected group of firms namely, 
foreign owned enterprises, the revised model would like to expand 
credits to diamond miners, and to activities that can further mobilize 
private savings. 
(6) Instead of neglecting traditional agriculture, the revised model 
favors agricultural credit using irrigation systems. 
(7) Instead of asking miners to pay in cash some taxes related to diamond 
activities, the revised model would like diamond miners to pay taxes 
in kind (in diamonds) to the private financial institution that will 
be an intermediary between diamond miners and sellers and the 
government of Zaire. A free market of rights for polluting and 
damaging the environment will generate private and government savings 
needed to satisfy investment dernnds. 
(8) Instead of discouraging private investments in electricity, and 
improved water services in rural areas, t he revised model would like 
the financial development enterprise to provide some public goods such 
as rural electricity and improved water services, including the paving 
of road linking cities producing diamonds. 
(9) Instead of discouraging external donors, Western banks and foreign 
investors t o operate in Zaire, the revised model will appreciate the 
Zaire currency (no more devaluations), in order to attract foreign 
investors. In addition, the revised model is in favor of the 
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progressive dollarization of the Zairian economy, meaning the 
suppression of the national currency in favor of the US dollar as 
national currency. 
(10) Instead of discouraging import substitution industrialization policy, 
the revised model favors sequentially, heavy import substitution 
industries, then light export manufacturing industries using diamonds 
as inputs. Let's summarize these ideas in three instrument variables 
in foreign currencies earned within Zaire and related to diamond 
activities. (vs2 ) will stand for the value of passports sold in 
diamond producing areas by the new financial instituiton; rz 2 will 
stand for all financial revenues earned by the new institution, and 
RTPDE will stand for private and government savings in foreign 
currencies generated by the rights for polluting and damaging the 
environment . 
Structural equations for the real sector of the economy for the 
second case are presented as follows: 
Economic model for Zaire2: Diamond producing areas 
private consumption 
T2 = g2 +t2Y2 government tax revenues 
RTPDE = (1 + rtPoE)PoQo rights for polluting water and for 
damaging the environment. 
imports 
Net exports 
investment demand 
aggregate demand 
Considering interest rate r, exogenously determined, and solving 
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Y2 = a2 +b2[Y2 -{g2 + t2Y2) ] + I~ - dr + RTpoE + 
(1 + xTF2 )x2 - z~ - m2 (1 -zTF2 )Y2 h2e+ c 2e - n 2r + vs2 + rz2 
The major difference between the IMF and World Bank models and the 
revised model is the inclusion in the model of these three variables which 
appear clearly in the numerator of the reduced equation for Y2 . Indeed in 
the logic of the IMF and World Bank models, the reduced form equation Y 
would be given by this expression 
_ a 2 -b2g 2 + I~ -(d2 + n 2)r + G2 + (1 + xTF2)x2 + (c2 + h 2)e y = ~~~~~~~~"--~~--=-~~~--''--~~----=-~~-'-~~~'--
l - b2 - b2t2 +m2(1 - zTF2) 
In the revised model, L2 is the sum of the values of three variable 
instruments in foreign currencies earned within Zaire peasants and other 
investors (value of passports sold in diamond producing areas by the 
financial instrument, the revenues gained by the financial institution on 
traveler's checks, and on import-export services, interest received on 
loans, savings on rights for polluting and damaging the environment, and 
export taxes and tariffs related to diamond operations). 
Setting Io, G , Z, a, y, r, and e = 0, we determi ne the value of 
instrument L2 as follows 
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From 1973 to 1989 the regression equations in chapter 2 give us the 
values for the following parameters: 
marginal propensity to consume 
marginal propensity to import 
import taxes 
autonomous consumption 
response of import to exchange rate 
response of exports to exchange rate 
b 
t 
m 
z 
a 
h 
c 
= 0.89 
= 0.000084 
= 0 .048 
= 0.30 
= 150 million us $ 
0.096 
= 0.016 
Assuming that the target level of real GDP is 1 billion US dollars, 
that interest rate does not account in the model because it does not exist, 
the value of the instrument L is 
* L [(l - 0.89 + 0.89(0.000084) + 0.048(1 - 0.30)]Y 
L (0.14367476)1,000,000,000 = 143,674,760 US $ 
By promoting giving incentives to domestic savings in foreign 
currencies, as described in this chapter and in chapter 5, and to travel 
abroad, and by helping diamond miners to import through a financial 
development enterprise, and by organizing the market for rights for 
polluting and damaging the environment, we can collect that amount of money 
within few days. Investing that amount in the diamond industry and in other 
sectors, real GDP will increase more rapidly and reach the level of 1 
billion us $ within less than one year. 
If we increase the level of the target from one to four billion US 
dollars, which represents the sale of 4 million gem carats by villagers and 
other producers per year, at the selling price of US $1,000 per carat, the 
value of our instrument variable L will become 574,699,040 US dollars. By 
investing a 500 million dollars, which are generated within a short period 
of time in the diamond industry, rural electricity, improved water services 
in rural areas for human and animal consumption and for irrigation 
purposes, social and human development activities, in computerized stores 
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and in paving rural roads, the Zairian miracle may possibly become 
feasible within less than one year. 
The Zairian economic miracle is based upon prof it maximization of 
villagers and firms extracting diamonds. Villagers, mostly unskilled people 
invest their physical energy associated with low level of capital to 
produce million carats of diamonds. In Western countries, skilled people 
associated with high level of capital produce high value products. While in 
Zaire, unskilled people with low level of capital extract millions of 
precious stones worth about 5 billion US dollars per year on average . What 
would be the profit maximization rule of people producing high value 
products with low level of capital, with low level of labor quality, and 
without any notion of discounted present value of revenues, and where the 
capital market does not exist such that interest rate does determine 
neither future consumption, nor investment level? With the introduction of 
new technology in diamond activities able to increase production and reduce 
important man hours used, we expect that an employment shift may result 
from diamond to agriculture, to schooling and a dministrative functions in 
diamond producing areas. In Zairian agricultural zones, the introduction of 
small scale irrigation systems, involving new appropriate technologies may 
increase internal rate of returns such that agricultural loans from the new 
financial instit ution created in diamond producing areas can be justified. 
In the next chapters we are going to understand these issues and show 
that instead of neglecting traditional agriculture producing food crops, 
industrial and export c rops, the revised model would like to promote not 
only export crops but also at the same time stimulate irrigated food and 
industrial crop productions. Indeed promoting only export crop such as 
coffee has only been beneficial for licensed exporters who have access to 
foreign exchange. With the gradual dollarization of the Zairian economy, 
growers will also taste how sweet is the US dollar. 
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CHAPTER 4. MI CROECONOMIC REFORM INVESTMENT I N PRI VATE DIAMOND PRODUCTION 
This chapter analyzes possible assumptions of the microeconomic 
model of investment in diamond mining. By computing the benefit cost ratio 
of a project we will see whether villagers and other private firms make a 
r a tional investme nt decision. To see this, we will also compute the 
i nt e rnal rate of return. Finally we will see what can limit the investment 
process in diamond mining. 
Assumptions of the Model 
In Zaire, efficient allocation of resources in the diamond industry 
is met when the p r ivate sector is involved in the investment process . The 
legalizat i on of informal activities in 1982, has caused a decline in 
diamond smuggling , and has increased incentives to investment in diamond 
activities. Ag r icultural labor force h as shift ed from subsiste nce 
agriculture to diamond mining, and affected the already neglected 
agricultural output, namely food crop production has decreased in the 
diamond mining a r e a s in the Kasai provinces (Kasai Occidental, and Kasai 
Oriental). Recent discoveries of new mines in the provinces of Haut Zaire 
a nd Ba ndundu, have pulled in many people regardless of sex and a ge . 
As seen in Chapter 2, private diamond production has increased 
tremendously from 432 , 000 carats in 1982 to about 6 million in 1983, and to 
about 14 million carats in 1984. This t r e nd keeps continuing up to now . 
Incentives to invest in the diamond industry have i ncreased even more after 
the 1991 measures allowing the sale of precious stones within Zaire in 
foreign currency . Some diamond miners have wisely spent their revenues from 
diamonds i n cars, trucks, refrigerators, boats, constructions. Most of the 
wealthiest ones had bought planes and cargoes that shuttle between the 
Republic of So uth Africa , European countries and Mbuji Mayi , the regional 
Capital of the Kasai Oriental province. They used to carry manufactured 
goods and foodstuffs. 
For diamonds investors, efficient resources allocation, pricing , 
taxation , national and international diamond market structures, demand and 
prices constitute the major concerns . 
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Results of our analysis show that prof it maximization is realized 
when internal rate of return of marginal i nvestment equals to the domestic 
market interest rates. This would be true if the Tshikapa and Mbuji Mayi 
commercial banks were giving loans to diamond miners. Traditionally, 
commercial banks do not give short and medium term loans for the purchase 
of diamond mining equipment to the private sector. In addition, in diamond 
mining areas, there is not any financial institution that could provide 
investors with long term loans . With the absence of capita l market, it 
becomes hard to say that profit firms and individuals involved in diamond 
activities maximize their profits when internal rate of returns of marginal 
investments equal the market interest rate . However, individuals and firms 
make their investment decisions based upon the price of equipment, the 
market wage rate, the prevailing selling price, the expected diamond 
production, and personal savings or retained profits. Under those 
conditions, we can formulate that private investment model as follows: 
where I is investment, Po is the average expected selling prices per 
carat, PKis the price of equipment, E(Q) is the expected quantity of 
diamond to be produced , S is personal savings or retained firms' profits, 
and r1 is the opportunity cost of lending personal savings. 
The selling price of diamonds is expressed as a function of quality 
stones, and the prevailing international prices. 
P0 = f c 4c, Pr ) 
where Po is the average selling price per carat, 4C stands for the quality 
of the stone, and Pr is the prevailing international price per carat known 
by diamond buying off ices located in Tshikapa. 
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Expressing quality 
The basic elements of quality have been publicized by De Beers under 
the name the Four Cs (Bruton, 1978 , p. 190). Three of them refer to 
quality. They are clarity, color, and cut . Of these, the first two have 
mos t affect on price, e xcept when the cut is very bad. 
The word clar ity was chosen not just because it began with c but 
beca use it is a much better word than purity for the jeweler to use. By 
s a ying a diamond is pure or perfect implies that others are impure or 
imperfect, whereas a stone of different clarity or color is really one 
crea ted in a slightly different way by Nature. The inclusions that lower 
the clarity of a diamond a r e commonly called carbon spots . Most are small 
fis s ures caused during the natural growth of the stone, or small pieces of 
the original minerals with which the diamond grew . 
Color seems the most difficult of the quality factors to j udge, since 
it r equires entirely subjective decisions. In this sense , color means the 
exact tint of white would normally be called white. Even white is not 
right, because the finest color is transparent and colorless . The finest 
color used to be described as of first water , which means a s pure as clear , 
limpid stream water. Stones tinged with yellow were called by-water or bye . 
In practice, clarity is more difficult. Price concerned here are related 
to rough and uncut stones. 
Price of diamonds 
The fourth of the four Cs is carat weight. This obviously affects 
prices. Most people know that the price of diamonds goes up as the weight 
goes up and also as the quality goes up . What is not realized is that the 
price per carat increases. In practice this favors those who want a large 
show of diamonds rather than a single stone in a ring or other jewelry. For 
example, four diamonds each weighing a quarter of a carat each have a 
lar ger superficial area than one diamond weighing l carat. If they were of 
exactly the same quality as the 1-carat stone, they would still be much 
lower priced because the price per carat of quarter-carat stones is much 
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lower than the price per carat of 1-carat stones. It also explains why 
diamonds are good supporting stones for rings with colored main stones. The 
price o f the colored stone will probably be much the same per carat within 
wide limits of weight, so a large one will not be too expensive. A number 
of small diamonds around it will give a good show of diamonds at a 
relatively low price. Large diamonds have great intrinsic beauty if 
effectively cut, but they are being found much less frequently. There is no 
doubt that smaller gem diamonds are coming from most of the world's diamond 
sources and that designers and manufacturers of jewelry will have to use 
smaller stones increasing ly in their jewelry as the years go by. 
Controlled prices of diamonds 
The Central Selling Organization (CSO) is a group of marketing 
companies through which all the principal diamond producers sell diamonds 
on a cooperative basis. The company is located in the Republic of South 
Africa. The CSO has set up buying offices in a number of diamond-producing 
African countries that do not supply directly through cso channels. Some 
offices were set up to help combat illicit digging, smuggling, and general 
lawlessness on the diamond fields. The cso controls 80 percent of the 
world ' s diamond production. 
Similar problems occurred in Zaire. The government invited the CSO to 
establish a buying office in Tshikapa , in the diamond producing areas some 
400 mile (600 km) from the capital, Kinshasa. Nowadays, other offices have 
opened their off ices in Tshikapa, Kahemba, and Kinshasa. The carat cartel 
comprises the Republic of South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Angola, 
Austra lia, and Russia. 
All diamonds the cso handles are first sent by mines to the Diamond 
Producers Association (DPA) offices in Johannesburg or to the Diamond 
Corporation offices in London. They are divided into two groups~em and 
industrial, each of which is sold through different organizations. If 
demand falls badly, the (DPA) can allocate sales quotas to each of its 
producing members and also instruct the Diamond Corporation to limit its 
purchases from producer s who have agreements with the DPA. 
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A recent article published by The Economist on September 17th, 1994 
published some statistics about the diamond cartel (see Figure 8) . The 
reader may see himself that Zaire is not in this cartel. The Economist 
reported that the South African company produces just under half the 
world ' s annual output of gem-quality diamonds (measured by value); Russian 
mines produce just over one-quarter. Diamonds are bought for reason of 
vanity, not necessity, so, cooperating to get the highest possible price, 
rather than fighting over market share, makes sense . Russia seems 
det ermined to play an endless game of chicken, suggesting that the Central 
Selling Organization (CSO)~a subsidiary of De Beers which controls the 
wholesale market~needs Russia a lot more than Russia needs the cso. 
Relations between the two have never been particularly easy. De 
Beers is worried by the continuing leakage of diamonds outside the 
agreement. In 1993, Russia sold diamonds worth $1.14 billion through the 
CSO, and, directly to the market, another $680m of technical diamonds-
stones which are too small or not good enough to make gems , although in 
practice many stones the Russians classify as technical are whoppers. 
Estimates of how many more gems leaked onto the world market range up to 
$500m. De Beers is obliged to buy as many of the leaked diamonds as 
possible in order to maintain its control of the flow of gems onto the 
market. If producers get away with selling their best stones directly, 
there is a risk that the CSO will turn into a dustbin for otherwise 
unsellable goods. 
For their part, the Russians suspect that their diamonds are 
undervalued by the CSO. Many of De Beers•s overheads are fixed: Russia has 
to pay for an elaborate sales and marketing system and finance a large 
stockpile of diamonds regardless of market conditions. It makes a profit by 
shoving the largest possible number of diamonds through this system. If one 
of the world's largest producers of high-quality diamonds decided to leave, 
it might be hard to hold the cartel together, much less make a profit . 
Also, the CSO agreements cover only rough diamonds. Producing countries can 
do whatever they like with diamonds that have already been cut and 
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Figure 8. The Carat Cartel 
(Russia and De Beers. Russian diamonds : Disputes are forever. 
1994. New York Times - The Economist, 332 (7881), p. 73) 
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polished. What is to stop Russia breaking free from the cartel and building 
up its own cutting industry? On the surface it makes admirable sense to 
build up a high-value industry such as diamond cutting. The Russian 
government has already promised to plunge in. Before it does, it would be 
wise to ask two questions: why do no big diamond-producing countries have a 
significant cutting industry (South Africa tried to develop one, but gave 
up)? And, why do Antwerp, Tel Aviv, Bombay and New York~the four big 
cutting centers produce not a single diamond? The answer to both these 
questions lies in the fact that diamond cutting is a fashion business, 
dominated by small, family-owned firms with a keen instinct for what the 
markets wants. It is also a business which operates on fine margins: if an 
Israeli cutter loses half a percentage point more of a stone than he had 
planned to while cutting it, he makes no profit. Russia's few existing 
cutting factories are sprawling, unproductive operations which employ 
thousands and are light years away from any kind of market. If Russia 
insists on developing its cutting industry, it will probably end up 
subtracting value from its diamonds and lose a fortune. 
The above text was extracted from The Economist September 17th 1994), 
was not signed but gives us some insights about what the revised model is 
suggesting in the next chapter. On September 17th 1994, The Economist 
published a figure giving the production sale and for the carat cartel, and 
the price of a medium quality carat stone. 
Expected production 
According to geologists, producers can found from 0.9 to 5 carats per 
cubic meter in the Zairian mining areas in Tshikapa and Mbuji Mayi (MPR 20 
ans, 1985 , p. 203). In addition larger stones can also be extracted. To 
illustrate the richness of the fields in Mbuji Mayi area, Bruton (1978, p. 
193), reported that a curious mining official washed some of the gravel 
from the tranunels used to cover paths in the city. Bruton found that they 
had a content of 20 to 25 carats of large diamonds per cubic meter . 
Because of the number of large diamonds rejected, it was decided to install 
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a crusher to reduce all the large rejected material and to repass it 
through the recovery plant. Any large diamonds are therefore crushed. 
We would like to introduce the concept of the production function, 
but according to the fact that fixed proportions of inputs do not produce 
exactly a standard per unit of output in diamonds activities, i.e., 1 man 
hour plus 1 machine hour may produce different quantities of carat stones 
depending on the richness of the site, the depth of the mine , and the labor 
productivity. Because of its density, large diamonds are expected to be 
found at the deepest level . Therefore, in this study we will not look to 
maximize a standard production function subject to inputs costs because of 
the variability of output per unit of fixed proportions of input 
combination. However, we can make this approach if we use the concept of 
expected quantity to be produced. 
Alternative diamond investment projects 
We may think about six alternative investment projects, and we define 
probable states of nature for each project and distribute some probability 
to each state of nature. 
a1 : This project consists of buying diamonds from producers located in 
villages distant from Tshikapa where are situated diamond buying offices. 
a2 : This project consists of alluvial diamond exploitation without any 
equipment. Without any equipment courageous young men dive in rivers in 
order to prick gravel from the bottom of rivers. After straining on the 
riverbanks, they may pick up some diamonds. If the river is not deep 
enough, miners can just bound and pick gravel that will be strained on the 
riverbanks. If they dive, they cannot remain under water very long, and 
pick up small quantity of gravel. 
a3 : In this project, miners exploit alluvial diamonds with equipment 
(SCUBA diving system). With a diving system, men c an stay about 30 minutes 
to one hour under water, picking gravel, filling baskets that are pulled 
out by other workers in the barge or r ow boat. Then they will pan gravel 
and by chance pick some diamonds . A air compressor is necessary to fill air 
tanks borne by divers under water . 
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a 4 : This project uses floating dredging equipment such as 5 in., 6 in . , 
and 8 in. Keene Engineering triple sluice dredging pumps. You may use 
diesel or electric engines. 
Among different diamond dredging equipment made in the US, we have 
found that small equipment supplied by Keene Engineering Inc. in California 
are the most efficient for alluvial diamond exploitation in streams and 
rivers in Zaire. 
The 4 in . and 5 in. triple sluice dredges are designed and engineered 
for ultra fine gold and gem recovery, with a variety of engines and pumps 
to meet any requirement for portability, altitude or deep dredging needs. 
The new Triple Sluice Hedder Box and Expansion Chamber has been enlarged to 
accommodate greater capacity for more selective classification in all three 
sluice. All minus 1/8 in size side gates are provided for more precise 
metering of flow, that is necessary for proper recovery of super fine 
values. The larger and coarse materials is processed through the enlarged 
center sluice. The center sluice also classifies and screens the larger 
material through two different types of riffles for separation of all 
course values. All new 4 in. and 5 in. triple sluice dredges feature the 
new 4 Module Marlex flotation frame assemblies with pin lock fasteners for 
greater stability and ease of assembly. All 4 in. and 5 in. triple sluice 
models are equipped with 15 feet of suction hose and are powered with the 
extremely efficient power jet suction system. Model 5511PH (5 inch) for 
example is powered by an 11-hp Honda engine with a P-350 pump. Featuring 
oversized impeller for up to 30% more suction power and heavy-duty 263 
compressor for additional air supply for two divers to 50 feet. This is 
ideal for deep dredging and high-altitude use. The assembled weight is 378 
lbs. and the shipping weight is 439 lbs. The most important 4 in. and 5 in. 
sluice specifications are: the dredge capacity of up to 8 yards, consuming 
half a gallon of fuel per hour. 
For more economy, portability and efficiency you can use the 
selection of new compact 6 and 8 inch heavy duty dredges. The sluice box 
sets below the surface of the water, reducing out of water lift increasing 
suction power efficiency and is equipped with a winching level system for 
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fine sluice box adjustments. The range of maximum dredge capacity is 14 to 
20, and 22 to 30 yards per hour respectively for the 6 and 8 inch model . 
The new 8 and 10 inch hydromatic jig diamond and gold dredge are 
available with either gasoline or diesel fueled engines. Equipped with an 
effective and efficient 5 stage recovery system designed to recover gold 
and gemstones . The new economical model 8080 dredge, for example, is the 
only one of its kind employing several unique patented recovery techniques. 
It can be shipped in a 20 foot container and field assembled anywhere in 
the world. This dredge has proven itself in the diamond fields of Africa . 
While we were working on this research, Keene engineering sale manager told 
us that one of this type of equipment was sold to Zaire. 
The fifth and sixth alternatives are described as follows: 
a5 : Miners may also dig inland with rudimentary tools. In the Tshikapa 
area, they may find diamonds at the depth of 6 to 10 meters. The bedrock 
is located at about 15 to 20 meters. 
a6 : Finally, in project six we consider the case of inland mining using 
dredging equipment. 
States of nature and probabilities 
We define different states of nature that may happen. The state of 
nature represents the decision maker's estimate of events that could occur 
in the natural or economic process. The states of nature to be considered 
are those that can affect the production or pricing process. Definition of 
states of nature requires judgment about such variables as rainfall; 
prices; government actions regarding diamonds; the collapse of mines ; 
crocodiles can also attack miners in rivers; mechanical disruption of 
equipment; and the richness of the sites. We will call: 
e1 mining in areas where one may get 0.9 carats per cubic meter; 
B2 mining in areas where one may get 1 carat per cubic meter; 
83 mining in areas where one may get 2 carats per cubic meter; 
84 mining in areas where one may get 3 carats per cubic meter; 
Bs mining in areas where one may get 4 carats per cubic meter; 
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86 : mining in areas where one may get 5 carats per cubic meter. 
Then we attach subjective probabilities to each state of nature 
denoted P(Bj) where j is the jth state of nature. As denoted, these 
probabilities represent the decision maker's degree of belief in the 
occurrence of a particular outcome and can be formulated in a variety of 
ways. They do have the axiomatic properties ascribed to probability and 
must sum to one when added over all states. The P(Bj) are called prior 
probabilitie s because they represent the initial degree of belief about the 
richness of the mines. These prior probabilities and expected production 
(Table 10) might eventually be modified by new information. The expected 
quantity is equal to state of nature times probability times quantity of 
gravel extracted. 
3 
E(Q0 ) = 0 . *P(B . )*m J J 
Table 10 . Prior probabilities and expected production 
States of Probability 
nature 
P(B) 
0 . 9 0.40 
1. 0.20 
2 0.15 
3 0.12 
4 0.08 
5 0.05 
l 
Expected production 
per cubic meter of gravel 
# of carats 
0 . 90*0.4 = 0.036 
0.20*1 0.200 
0.15*2 0.300 
0 . 12*3 0.360 
0.08*4 = 0 . 320 
0.05*5 = 0.25 
---
1 . 466 carat 
per cubic meter of gravel. 
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So, we can now say that expected output is a function of input factors (K : 
capital , L:labor, and m: gas , oil, spare parts, maintenance and repairs 
costs). But because we already know the quantity the firm is assumed to 
produce, there is no more need to go through the process of maximizing the 
production function subject to input costs . 
Short run total cos t 
The total economic cost will be equal to explicit costs + implicit 
costs. Explicit cos ts are highly visible costs that the owners of firms 
incur when acquiring resour ces services from other households or when 
acquiring inte rmediate goods from other firms. These costs include: wages 
and salaries paid for the use of other people ' s labor (W), rental payment 
for the use of other people's money (i), payments of raw materials and 
intermediate goods to other firms (Pm), rental price of land (rland ), and 
payment of taxes (t). 
Because of the variability of quantity of carat-stones extracted, 
which are not highly correlated with man hours and machines hours, but 
depend also on the richness of the site, and the productivity of the labor , 
and because we have avoided the standard formulation of the Cobb Douglas 
production function, we cannot say that wage rate is equal to the marginal 
product of labor . Wage should be determined based upon expected quantity 
that can cover average variable and total cost. Being very high business 
because of uncertainty in output determination, in the Tshikapa areas, 
minings are organized mostly on a family basis in order to avoid the 
payment of salaries to workers in the case where the firm did not find any 
diamond. Family members can bear easily the loss than other workers would 
not do. 
With respect t o capital the cost of equipment used vary depending on 
the type of exploitation, from simple tools to dredging equipment such as 
Keene engineering dredges. Up to the Tshikapa diamond mining areas in 
Zaire, total costs of these equipment are approximately US 10,000, 
$.30,000 , and S 60 , 000 , respectively for a 5 in., 6 in., and 8 in . model. 
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Expected revenues and profits 
Knowing the expected quantity of production, given the average price 
per carat in buying offices, the firm or individual producers can form 
their expectation on revenues and profits. 
Expected total Revenue = Price * expected quantity. 
TR = TR = Po * E ( Oo 
Prices of diamonds are determined by the Bureau d' expertise, an 
off ice that examine each stone and determines the quality and value of 
stones. In the city of Thsikapa, price per carat-stone averages US $1,000, 
while villagers can sell in their villages at US $300 to 500 per carat . 
So, expected profit will be the difference between expected total revenue 
and total cost. 
Net Profit TR - TC 
Benefit Cost Criterion of Investment Decision 
For a private investor, common sense requires that benefits must 
exceed cost for projects to be implemented. The rate at which benefits 
exceed costs, as expressed by the ratio has an important influence on the 
choice of projects. 
For marketable commodities , the benefit of a project to an investor 
is equal to revenue or to market value. The benefit of a project is the 
stream of resources which is released from the alternative and which 
becomes available to produce other outputs. 
The money costs of the project reflect the value of the resources 
which are used. Project cost is the value of goods and services used to 
establish, maintain, and operate a project. Associated cost is the value 
of goods and services needed, beyond project cost, to make the output of 
the project available. 
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Direct benefit is the value of the immediate products or service 
resulting from the measures for which project and associated costs were 
incurred. Indirect benefit is all other benefit attributable to the project 
that can be expressed in monetary terms. Intangible benefit is all the 
benefit that cannot be expressed in monetary terms. 
In evaluating the benefits and costs of a project, two situations 
must be compared: the development of the economy with the project and the 
development that would occur without it. The change in the path of the 
economic system because of the project involves certain costs and certain 
benefits, and it must be the objective of benefit-cost analysis to identify 
these changes. The with and without principle requires that the economic 
analysis contrast these two hypothetical situations. 
In order to compare projects, the data on benefits and costs must be 
organized into some specific form which can serve as a criterion: 
(l) compare the difference between benefits and costs , 
(2) compare the rates of return on investment, 
(3) compare the ratio of benefits to costs. 
Suppose that a diamond miner has an investment in dredging equipment 
of $10,000 (a 5 in. Triple sluice dredge); suppose that its sales are 
$1,800,000,000 a year and that the operating profit on these sales is 
$984,000; its total annual cost is $816,000, and suppose that the 
opportunity cost of lending his savings is 3 percent. Let us assume that 
capital market does not exist such as there is no market interest rates. 
Investment was funded by personal savings. The ratio benefit cost will be 
B 984,000 
c 
- ----= 1.2058 
816,000 
A calculation of crude rate of return of this investment will give a 
rate of 98.4 per year 
B 984,000 
----- =98.4 
I 10,000 
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Marginal Efficienc y o f Inves t ment 
In 1988, we saw a diamond miner diving in the Tshikapa River without 
any diving system, picking up some gravel, coming up at the surface. 
After he panned them he found some stone carats of gem diamond per week. 
Let's assume that he only found one carat per week, that he may work 
during 13 weeks in the dry season and gets 13 carats of gem diamonds. We 
also know that one can get from 0.9 to 5 carats per metric cube in the 
Kasa i mining areas. 
At unit selling price of $1,000, total expected revenue will be 
$13,000 us. If he t a kes $10,000, his revenues of 10 weeks to purchase a 
Triple Sluice dredge at Keene Engineering in California, he can then 
produce 115 carats per week. The 114 additional carats per week for 13 
weeks (1482 carats) is a measure of the Gross Marginal Productivity of the 
Triple Sluice Dredge. Whether the dredge (capital) is productive depends 
on balancing the gain in output against the cost of purchasing the 
equipment. The Net Marginal Productivity will be computed as follows: 
1482 - (10 carats = the purchasing cost of the equipment, 
(130 carats the cost of other inputs (Variables costs), 
(60 carats = the tax values, 
(200 carats= the export cost up to the USA). 
(80 carats other charges) 
1482 - 480 carats 1000 carats would be sold in the USA at $3,000 a 
carat. Thus, $3 million is the Net Marginal Productivity. 
When capital's dredge marginal productivity is positive, investment 
(the act of adding to the amount of capital) allows the miner to produce a 
larger output even after 'netting• out the cost of the capital. The annual 
percentage rate of return is a measure of the Net Productivity of 
Investment in Capital that allows us to compare the productivity of various 
projects. 
R 
I - --
0 - l + g 
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where Io is the initial cost and R is the resulting addition to output 
(capital's gross marginal value product) the next year; g denoting the rate 
of return is a percentage. When Io (capital equipment) yields services 
over more than one year, 
Rl R2 R3 Rn 
Io = + 2 + 3 +, ••• ,+ n 
(l + g) (l+g) (l + g) (l + g) 
Given the initial cost of the equipment and the contribution to output in 
each year , we can solve this expression for g. The marginal rate of return 
on the investment g is the net increase in revenue resulting from the 
investment expressed as a percentage of each extra dollar invested . 
Internal Rate of Return is also called Marginal efficiency of investment . 
Rt+l Rt+2 Rt+n 
O= - Io + Rt + + 2 +, .•. ,+ n 
(l + m) (l + m) (l + m) 
m is the IRR (internal rate of return) such as PV (present value of future 
revenues) equals to zero. 
The marginal efficiency of an investment project, g, is defined as 
the rate of interest that will discount the PV of the project to zero. If 
with any C and R stream, we solve for g, we have the interest rate that 
would discount the project's net returns back to zero. Investment projects 
can be ranked by gas well as by discounted present value (DPV). It would 
seem that a project with a high returns stream would have a high PV and 
this requires a high g to discount the net returns stream to zero. Thus, g, 
can be plotted against i (see Figure 9). 
As the size of the total investment program is increased, we go to 
projects with lower and lower R streams, so that as i rises, g falls. Thus 
g function representing investment demand, can be confronted by a supply-
of-funds schedule to determine the equilibrium level of investment. 
The supply-of-funds schedule r shows that up to a certain point the 
interest cost of financing investment is roughly constant. But as the size 
DPV,g,r 
g = r 
F igure 9. 
' 
' ' ' ' 
' I 
I 
I 
I 
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Discounted present value, interest rate, marginal efficiency of 
investment and investment level 
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of the investment program goes beyond that point the cost of borrowing, or 
the opportunity cost of using retained earnings, begins to rise. 
Present Value and Marginal Efficiency of Investment 
The marginal efficiency makes no reference to the market rate of 
interest, which measures the opportunity cost of investment. The present 
value ranking depends on the market rate of interest, the rate a t which 
earnings can be reinvested, while the marginal efficiency of investment is 
not related to the market rate. Therefore, the marginal efficiency 
rankings may be different from present value rankings. Suppose two projects 
I and II. 
Project I: MEI 
Project II: MEI 
0 4 
0= - 1 + 0 +--+----
l + g (l+g)2 
4 
l=----
(l+g)2 
4 =(l + g)2 
g = 1 
2 1 
0 = - 1 + 0 + --+--- -
l + g (l+g)2 
2 1 
l= --+---
l + g (l + g)2 
2(l+g)
2 
l(l+g)
2 
l(l+g)
2 
= +--- -
(l + g) (l + g)2 
2 l+g) =2+2g + l 
2 g = 2 + 2g + 1 - 2g - 1 
g 2 = 2 
g = 1.414 
The marginal efficiency of investment criterion indicates that 
project II is unequivocally better that project I, since g 2 > g1 . However, 
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under the present value criterion there is no unequivocally correct answer 
because the PV ranking depends on the market interest rate. 
With i = 0 
Project I: PV 
0 4 
-1+ 0 +-+- = 3 
1 1 
2 1 
Project II: PV = - 1 + 0 +-+- = 2 
1 1 
With low interest rate Project I is preferable. 
With i = 1 
Project I: PV 
Project II: PV 
0 4 
= -1+0+-+ =O 
2 (1 + 1)
2 
0 4 
= PV = - 1 + 0 + - + - = 0 
2 4 
2 1 
-1+0+-+ = 0.25 
2 ( 1 +1 )
2 
With high interest rate Project II is preferable . 
With the marginal effici ency criterion we may have the case where at 
* interest rate below a specific market interest rate, i , project I will 
* have the higher PV , but above i , project II wins (see Figure 10). 
Thus, a firm can obtain a true ranking of investment projects in terms of 
their opportunity cost by computing DPV for each project at the relevant 
rate of interest. Instead of g, we will use r in the denominator of the 
formula we used to compute the marginal eff iciency of investment or 
internal rate of return. 
Assuming that life machine of a 5 in. triple sluice dredging 
equipment supplied by Keene Engineering is three years, that net returns 
are those specified in column 2 , and that the opportunity cost of lending 
its savings is 50 percent, the internal rate of the investment project is 
computed (see Table 11). 
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DPV 
Pro ject 1 
Figur e 10 . Internal rate of return (or marginal efficiency of investment) 
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Table 11 . Internal rate of the investment project 
Year r = 0.5 Net Return DPV 
1 1 
o 
(1 +0.5)
0 -10 , 000 0 *(- 10,000) =-lO,OOO 
(1 +0.5) 
1 1 
1 *(984,000) = 656,000 1 
(1 +0.5)
1 984,000 
(1 + 0.5) 
1 1 
2 *(884,000) = 392,000 2 
(1 +0 . 5)
2 884,000 
(1 + 0.5) 
1 1 
3 *(784,000) = 232 , 296 3 
(1 + 0 . 5)
3 784,000 
(1 +0 .5) 
1 , 171,184 
With a discounted present value o f US $1,171,184 internal rate of return 
(IRR) for this project will be determined as f o llows: 
DPV 
0 = - - - I 
l+g 
1,271,184 
0 = - 10,000+-----
1 , 271,184 
10,000 =-- ---
l + g 
(l + g)l0,000 1, 271,184 
10,000 + 10 , 000g = 1,271,184 
l + g 
10 , 000g = 1 , 271,184 - 10 , 000 
1 , 2 71 ' 184 - 10 , 000 
g = = 126.12 per cent 
10 , 000 
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Assuming that i, the nominal market interest rate is 50%, while inflation 
is 100%, this project would still be profitable because the internal rate 
of return is greater than the market interest rate. 
In The Tshikapa area, nominal interest rate is not an investment 
determinant of potential investors because capital market does not exist. 
In addition, the Central Bank of Zaire has removed it as a choice indicator 
guiding investment decision because of its high level due to inflation . 
A firm can raise money for the purchase of new capital in five ways: 
by using internal funds, by selling bonds (debt), by issuing stock 
(equity), and by borrowing funds to the commercial banking system or to 
investment banks . In practice commercial banks give short term loans to 
finance circulating capital, while development banks give medium and long 
term loans to finance the building of plants, the purchase of equipment 
animals, or some physical assets such as plantations. The fifth financing 
source consists of selling part of physical assets. In a world of perfect 
competition and no tax biases, the imputed cost assigned to each of these 
means of raising money would be the same, allowing for risk differential. 
As a fact, however, because firms assign extra cost to funds borrowed 
outside due to the fixed liability associated with bond sale or the 
dilution of control that comes from stock issue, firms are likely to impute 
a lower rate to funds raised inside the firm by retained earnings plus 
depreciation allowances than to the other three sources of funds apart the 
sale of physical assets . Thus, the interest rate, or opportunity cost used 
to compute the user cost of capital may be a weighted average of the 
interest which apply to these four different sources, where the weights are 
the fractions of total funds from these alternative sources: 
internal funds bond issue equity issue 
u = r 1 + r 0 + rE -
total investment total investment total investment 
bank loans 
+ r -----=------
total investment 
where r1 is the opportunity costs of lending the firm• s retained 
earnings; 
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r 0 is an established bond rate; 
rE is average earnings-price ratio on corporate equity; 
r is the real market interest rate. 
In the Tshikapa areas, individual miners do not have any idea about 
nominal or real interest rate. The concept of internal rate of return is 
also unknown. They work in diamond digging because they need to get 
diamonds that can be sold at any time at high price. They invest their 
physical energy with some small capital because they expected high ret urns 
in comparison with few money spent in digging operations. They are 
motivated by very expected returns . Assuming that a grant of $10,000 is 
given to someone in the Tshikapa area , he or she would likely invest in 
diamond activities, instead of investing in agriculture. The reasons are 
that not only expected returns in diamonds seem to them to be greater than 
in agriculture, but also because agricultural products require too much 
time before harvesting. In addition, the quality of soil and temporary 
drought do not allow high yield for food crops such as maize, or cassava. 
However, as we sai d before, variability of output in diamond 
activities make it so risky if miners do not get any diamonds. So, if 
workers were hired, any firm or individual would be facing serious problems 
because workers must be paid . The bearing of loss is dramatic in that case. 
For this reason diamond activities are often organized on a family basis. 
Members of a family can bear easily the risk of loss. 
Funding Diamond Activities 
As stated before, official capital market is not o rganized in the 
Tshikapa areas. Households hardly make bank deposits because they do not 
trust any financial institution for political instability. Thus potential 
investors cannot apply for bank credits or issue bond and equity. So, 
interest rate cannot be used to confront marginal efficiency criterion . 
For interest rate to be used in the calculation, it must first be assumed 
that the firm faces a competitive capital market, so that the interest rate 
at which it can borrow appears fixed . When this market does not function, 
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it is impossible to form a function that describes the relationship between 
investment and the interest rate. Our understanding at this level is that 
kind of relationship appears between investment and the capital price, 
personal savings, and other factors such as the selling price of diamonds. 
Investment is only funded by internal funds or personal savings 
If internal personal resources or internal funds are less than any 
investment project cost, potential investors will keep raising money. They 
may keep the same rate of saving or increase it b y reducing current 
consumption. 
In industrialized societies increase in interest rates may cause 
increase in further expected future consumption reducing current 
consumption. However, in the Tshikapa areas where market interest rates are 
absent, and if someone wants to purchase a floating dredge, the motivation 
to save is the expected high returns in diamond mining . In the case where 
personal savings or familial savings, or the total savings of a clan, do 
not match the cost of equipment, potential investors may also sel l some 
physical assets in order to increase savings. Sometimes kinship may work 
and other wealthier relatives may give the potential investor some money to 
help him buy equipment or start a business. Cooperative or so-called 
temporary associations hardly work especially where investors are unskilled 
people. 
If personal funds are equal to the cost of equipment, potential 
investors will make investment decision: first, the decision will lead to 
the purchase of equipment, and second it will lead to the study of the area 
assumed containing diamonds to be mined. Thus, if price of equipment 
increases, expenditures on capital decrease; if price of equipment falls, 
expenditures on capital increase. 
Therefore, without any least square estimate, we learn from our 
observations in the milieu that a correlation between expenditure on 
capital and the price of capital exist in the mind of any investor as well 
with wages, and the opportunity cost of lending savings. 
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where I is investment, W is wage, RK is the user cost of capital, and PK 
is the cost of new equipment. 
Limitations on Investment in Diamond Activities 
Marginal efficiency of investment 
We have seen that individuals or private firms will keep investing 
until marginal efficiency of investment equals the opportunity cost of 
lending private savings in the absence of market interest rates. 
Geographic limitations 
Geographic limitations refer to the size of diamond beds under 
exploitation and estimated mineral reserves in Zaire. Investment will 
expand until complete exploitation of the Kimberlite rock under conditions 
of existing demand for diamonds and the financial capability of firms and 
physical energy of individuals to work in diamond activities. Let us remind 
that the field size of the area where diamonds are extracted in the two 
Kasai provinces is estimated at about 340,000 kilometers square. However, 
nowadays new diamonds beds have been discovered in the Bandundu province in 
the Kahemba areas, and in the province of Haut Zaire, in the Kisangani and 
Isiro areas. In addition, the big portion of the Kimberlite rock is located 
down underground at deepest levels. 
Financial and technical constraints 
In the future, firms may be facing some technical and financial 
constraints as well if they want to extract diamonds at deepest levels. 
More sophisticated and costly equipment will be required. That is the 
reason why the revised model for investment is suggesting that investments 
in applied research and development must be undertaken and import of heavy 
manufactured industries must be one of the priorities of macroeconomic 
policies. 
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Marketing prices of diamond s 
By increasing its already impressive diamond production, Zaire may 
inflate supply. This would lead to decrease international prices despite 
the fact that prices of stones are mainly determined based on their 
quality . However, with macroeconomic policy that support import of export 
manufacturing industries using rough diamonds as inputs, international 
prices of diamonds may be stabilized though increasing production of rough 
diamonds. 
Findi ngs 
Expectations on output and on revenues in foreign currency are the 
most important incentives to increasing diamond production. Holding fore ign 
currency such as the US dollar has become a dream for most Zairian because 
of the protection of purchasing power the dollar guarantees. Appreciation 
of the zaire due to the massive presence of the us dollars possibly may 
occur if some mechanism is set up and that can give incentives to bank 
deposits. 
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CHAPTERS. FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN RURAL DIAMOND PRODUCING AREAS 
This chapter analyzes the structure of capital market in Zaire, 
different savings mobilization policies under stabilization programs, the 
structure of savings , and the role of a new financial institution. A 
particular attention will be given to loans to irrigated agriculture . 
Structure of Capital Market in Zaire 
The main objective of the financial system in Zaire has been the 
mobilization of savings via fiscal and monetary regulation, direct savings, 
or as a result of inflation, forced savings. The effects of financial 
development on real economic growth depend on whether external (market) 
finance or internal finance is predominant and, in either case, whether the 
financial system is allowed to influence the volume and composition of 
inves tment. 
Does free weak capital market development inhibit very rapid economic 
development or is there any correlation between planned rapid capital 
market development and rapid real growth? However, a planned rapid capital 
market would be associated with high costs and maybe high benefits as 
well. 
In Zaire, the formal financial sector consists of the Banque du Zaire 
(BZ), the central bank; ten commercial banks of which two are state owned 
(the Banque Zairoise du Commerce Exterieur (BZCE) and the Nouvelle banque 
de Kinshasa (NBK); the Societe Financiere Developpement (SOFIDE) and the 
Banque de Credit Agricole (BCA), both development banks; the Societe 
Nationale d'Assurance (SONAS), the national insurance company; the Institut 
National de securite Sociale (INSS), the national institute for social 
security; the Caisse d ' Epargne du Zaire (CADEZA), a saving bank; and a 
network of cooperative savings and loans institutions, the Cooperatives 
d'Epargne et de Credit (COOPEC's) . 
The ten commercial banks have a network of 116 branches across the 
country, 23 of them situated in Kinshasa, the capital of the Zaire. Only 
four of these banks are actually represented throughout the countr y , i . e., 
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the Banque Zairoise de Commerce Exterieure (BZCE), the Union Zairoise des 
Banques (UZB), and the Nouvelle Banque de Kinshasa (NBK). 
As we said before, the clientele of the commercial banks is recru i ted 
essentially from the modern sector of the economy, concentrated in the 
urban areas. In 1985, 71 percent of deposits originated from enterprises, 
the balance from private persons. The agricultural sector provided only 4.2 
percent of deposits while the commercial, industrial, and service sectors 
(including transport) accounted for 68 percent of deposits. We remember 
that in 1987, investment represented 13 percent of GDP, and that only 10 
percent was financed by the domestic savings. 
Let us recall also that SOFIDE, which was established in 1970, is 
really the only institution providing any medium and long term credit for 
agricultural development. However, many of its investments over the past 
decades have been for the rehabilitation and modernization of industrial 
capacity and for agricultural and transport projects. Until the 
liberalization of Zaire's foreign exchange market in 1983, SOFIDE, was the 
only local non governmental source of term lending in foreign exchange to 
the productive sectors. The minimum loan SOFIDE handles is the equivalent 
of $20,000. The World Bank has been a strong supporter of SOFIDE. 
The BCA, which was established in 1982, was given a very broad 
mandate to further economic development by supporting the creation, 
extension, and modernization of enterprises set up in Zaire in the 
agriculture, fishery, and livestock sectors, as well as in those sectors 
serving agriculture. BCA's lending has been limited by its low level of 
capitalization. At the time of incorporation, BCA's potential total 
capitalization was the equivalent of almost $22 million; however, at the 
end of 1986 its equity was only a little more than $1 million. Moreover, 
until the late 1980s it had only one office, situated in Kinshasa, making 
it very difficult to attract deposits from the agricultural community. The 
loans made by BCA since its inception have been located in all regions of 
the country, but nearly half of the loans have been for the Bas-Zaire, 
Bandundu, and Kinshasa provinces. At the end of 1985, 75 per cent of 
deposits came from the tax feeding the Fonds des Convention de 
Developpement and from the Fonds Agricole, a tax on agricultural exports, 
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both of which have since been abolished. In 1986 USAID agreed to loan 
$450,000 from it counterpart funds for funding of medium term credit. In 
1987, the German credit agency KfW agreed to a $1.4 million in credit line . 
In 1988, the Belgian government agreed to provide 250 million zaires to the 
BCA from its counterpart funds. 
In 1987-88 the BCA set up offices in Lubumbashi, in the Shaba 
province, and in Kikwit, in the Bandundu province, and was participating in 
the establishment of a local bank in the Kivu province (Caisse Populaire de 
Credit Agricole) . 
In 1991 BCA became virtually bankrupt and was placed under the direct 
supervision of the Bank of Zaire. Its overhead costs on loans remain quite 
high, and it usually charges negative rates of interest if inflation is 
taken into a ccount, thus eroding its own capital. BCA is now a mixed 
capital company and is looking for foreign participation in its capital. 
The CADEZA, a saving bank that was created in 1950. With its 72 
regional offices established throughout the country CADEZA is in principle 
well placed to launch a major effort to mobilize domestic savings in the 
interior since it accepts accounts with more modest initial deposits than 
do most other banks. It has, however, accumulated major losses over the 
past years and is continuing to operate only because of support from the 
Bank of Zaire. For practical purposes, CADEZA is bankrupt. 
In a survey done in 1986 by the Ministry of Rural Development, a 
total of 800 cooperatives were listed. Among these, about 400 are savings 
and loans cooperatives, 200 are agricultural production and marketing 
cooperatives, about 100 are livestock cooperatives, and the remainder are 
medical and rural housing cooperatives (Shapiro, 1992). 
The largest cooperatives are the savings and loans cooperatives . They 
can be divided up into three networks according to their religious origins : 
1. The Caisse Populaire de Credit Luymas (CPCL/CBZO) in Kinshasa and 
Bas-Zaire. They were funded by Luyeye Massamba, a Protestant pastor 
trained in the US. They are inspired by American Cooperative Savings 
and Loans Associations but they are not recognized as an authentic 
cooperative by the Association of Savings and Loans Cooperatives in 
Africa. Thus, Luymas is not part of UCCEC, the Union Centrale de 
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Cooperatives d'Epargne et de Credit, as they do not a c cept all 
conditions pertaining to cooperatives. In 1989 there were 36 caisses 
Luymas with 210,617 members and 1.118 billion zaires in deposits, 
equivalent to 
2. The network of COOPECs in Kinshasa, Bas-Zaire, Bandundu, and Kivu 
which is inspired by Protestant missions. 
3 . The network of COOPECs in Equateur and Shaba which are of the 
catholic denomination. 
There are 120 COOPECs in total with six hundred thousand members, grouped 
in five COOPECs and represented by UCCEC. In 1989 they had 1.5 billion 
zaires in deposits . 
Agricultural production and marketing cooperatives in Zaire have a 
reputation of being unstable institutions as they go from prosperity to 
decline, eventual disappearance and rebi rth. Most cooperatives are active 
in the supply of inputs and in the sale of agricultural products. The 
government does not offer them financial assistance in the form of 
subsidized credit or grants . 
Most of the Non Governmental Organizations NGOs are religious 
organizations, either foreign inspired or local ones . In many cases, they 
provide basic economic and social services to the population and have 
effectively taken over many of the functions which are normally expected 
from the state. However, they do not command the resources needed to 
adequately fulfill their role which usually cover a wide range of 
activities. Many NGOs lack the technical capability and skills required to 
adequately solve the problems they confront . Some NGOs have a purely social 
objective, some have an economic objective, some are mixed and aim for 
integrated rural development comprising health, education, agricultural 
production, community development, etc. Some NGOs are really fake and 
exist only as a vehicle to attract and absorb funds. Some NGOs such as 
GENAGRO are the receiving end of large agro-industrial companies (UNIBRA 
AND ESTAGRICO) and carry out activities which are not directly profitable 
but which enhance the organizat i on and benefit rural people working 
indirectly for the company . 
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Does the financial structure of Zaire seek economic development by 
controlled inflation, or is there any financial planning that stimulate 
growth, or does the financial structure makes use of financial techniques 
to stimulate growth? 
Savings Mobilization Policies in Zaire 
The government of Zaire has mainly been using inflationary finance 
measures during almost three decades since independence in 1960. Under 
stabilization programs, the IMF and the World Bank policies for savings 
mobilization consisted of reducing government spending (cut in imports, in 
public employees wage, and cut in public investments), and domestic credit 
contraction. With the treasury bill starting in 1981, financial techniques 
of savings mobilization have appeared. 
Inflationary finance measures 
Under stabilization programs, the government of Zaire had been 
expanding the money supply in order to expand the amount of investment 
which can be undertaken . However, expanding the money supply has affected 
price levels. Hyperinflation has affected the productivity of investment to 
the extent that prices become unrelated to scarcity values, less rational 
investment decisions are made due to the increased uncertainty created by 
inflation, and changes in the structure of financing have resulted, leading 
to less productive investment being undertaken. 
Inflationary financing through expansion of the money supply leads to 
increased savings through the accumulation of money balances. However, the 
expansion of the money supply and/or inflation may not have neutral effects 
on the rate of savings through other financial channels, that is, 
accumulation of financial assets as a percentage of the gross national 
product. But savings rate through accumulation of money balances were 
completely offset by inflation causing decreases in savings rates for other 
financial assets . Following reasons may explain savings rates in Zaire: 
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(i) For many channels of savings, the rate of savings is in part 
dependent upon the difference between the expected yield and the rate 
of inflation expected over the period during which the financial 
instrument is maturing. 
(ii) For other channels of finance that are affected by the current rate 
of inflation, for example government self-finance has been inversely 
varying with the rate of inflation. Inflationary measures were relied 
upon in the place of taxes to finance not only desired investment, 
but mostly increased government fictitious expenditures. Indeed 
falling tax collections has forced the government to turn to 
inflationary finance measure. 
Financial techniques to stimulate savings, investment and growth 
Under stabilization programs the government of Zaire had been 
expanding domestic credit to finance desired investment and expenditures 
through increased money supply . After 1981, the treasury bill has been a 
dynamic domestic savings mobilization mechanism. It led to positive 
interest rates, but at prohibitive nominal interest due to hyperinflation. 
However, because a large portion of currency and bank credits have been 
directed to the purchase of coffee and diamonds, huge amount of cash was 
held by diamond sellers, and coffee plantations without returning into 
official banking system. This is due not only to a lack of savings 
institutions and bank agencies through rural areas, but also it due to the 
fact that households do not trust savings institutions and commercial banks 
especially in diamond producing areas. 
The degree of financial intermediation may be roughly measured by 
r elating money and near-money (quasi-money) to gross domestic product. This 
measure, despite its many weaknesses for international comparisons, can be 
accepted as a broad index of the degree of financial development and the 
quality of the financial markets in these countries where the liabilities 
of the monetary sector (central bank and deposit institutions) account for 
the bulk of financial assets. The ratio of money and near-money to the 
gross domestic product measures the extent to which nonfinancial sectors 
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hold part of their wealth in the form of financial assets. Money and 
deposits are the principal financial assets (Samez, 1972, p. 197). 
In the mid-1960s this financial ratio ranged from around 8 percent to 
close to 24 percent in tropical Africa. The equivalent ratio (total 
financial assets to gross domestic product) in highly developed countries 
in Western Europe and North America is in excess of 100 percent . One 
should expect a positive correlation between levels of economic and 
financial development as well as between the rates of growth in real income 
and in financial assets, and several empirical studies have confirmed these 
relationships for both industrialized and developing countries. One would 
expect a smaller amount of currency in the countries with some variety of 
financial intermediaries and markets than in countries where banks are few 
and far apart and where even relatively large transactions are executed in 
currency. Not, too, that time and savings deposits are large relative to 
demand deposits in those countries which are ranked highest according to 
the ratio of money and near-money to gross domestic product, while time and 
savings deposits are negligible in the countries ranked lowest. 
Another ratio that could help us understand importance of financial 
development is the currency deposit ratio. Let us remember that the money 
supply consists of currency (CU) and checking deposits (D) that individuals 
and firms hold at banks. The currency deposit ratio measures how much 
currency people want to hold as ratio of their deposits. 
Currency is related to bank deposits , and c is the currency deposit ratio. 
Rarely do households save money in savings institutions in rural areas, 
despite the number of COOPECs and commercial banks described above. 
Crawford Young and Thomas Turner (1985, p.322), reported that a 
singular anti-inflation action was undertaken at the end of 1979, when the 
regime suddenly announced demonetization measures. The banknotes for 5 and 
10 zaires the largest denominations then in circulation, were nullified and 
had to be exchanged for new currency with up to a fixed maximum of 3,000 
zaires. Many merchants as well as ordinary citizens held much of theirs 
savings in cash, either because of the distance from banks or lack of 
confidence in financial institutions; many of those who lacked access to 
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the centers of power or who were distant from banks lost all their cash 
savings . 
As we know, starting 1991, more than 5 million carats of GEM diamonds 
are sold annually in Zaire in US dollars at an average price of $1,000 per 
carat in Tshikapa, Mbuji Mayi Kahemba, and now in Kisangani areas. Total 
revenue equals us $5 billion . Because households do not trust financial 
institutions, and because of riots undertaken by soldiers during these four 
years, we can assume that much of the us $5 billion have been held every 
year in the Tshikapa, Mbuji Mayi and Kahemba areas where diamonds are 
produced and marketed. 
Savings Structure in Zaire 
Referring to some statistical sources, observation of savings and 
investment in Zaire reveal forms in which savings are placed either for 
direct investment or with intermediaries: 
(I) Savings used by an economic unit to finance its own investment. This 
form of savings never directly enters the financial markets. 
(ii) Savings directly placed by one economic unit with another . This type 
of transaction is made in a financial market but does not require 
intermediary. 
(iii) savings placed by an economic unit with a financial intermediary 
which in turn may place the funds with an investing unit. Both of 
these transactions are made in financial markets and financial 
i ntermediary is relied upon. 
We can summarize categories of placement of savings in Zaire as follows: 
1. Self-financed investment 
a. Government sector recurrent budget surplus 
b. Corporate retained earnings and depreciation allowances 
c. Household reinvestment of savings 
2. Direct obligations 
a. Government securities 
b. Corporate securities, and stocks 
c. Directly placed personal mortgages and loans 
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3. Obligations of financial intermediaries 
a. Currency 
b. Demand deposits: banks 
c. Interest-earning deposit s: banks and other savings institutions. 
d. Paper of nonbank intermediaries (mainly short-term) 
e. Insurance 
f. Mutual funds 
g. Compulsory deposits 
Let us remember that financial savings need not finance investment. 
They can be used to finance consumer purchases. Corporate self-finance can 
be used to finance an increase in the value of inventories that does not 
represent the accumulation of additional stocks but rather the increasing 
cost of inventories with inflation. 
In 1994, while working on this research, we know that conunercial 
banks and savings institutions are not trusted, SOFIDE does no longer 
receive external financial supports from the World Bank, BCA became 
bankrupt in 1991, and CADEZA with most COOPECs as well. There is an urgent 
need to reorganize the Zairian financial market, and to give new hope t o 
households and make them trust financial institutions whether or not the 
corrupt ruling elite is still in power protected by hunter soldiers ready 
to burglarize everyone especially in rural areas. The creation of new 
private financial development enterprises owned by Zairians and Americans 
together become increasingly a necessary condition for taking off economic 
rehabilitation of Zaire. Why American business should join Zairians in the 
organization of this institution; Why should this institution get 
established in Tshikapa, Mbuji Mayi, Kahemba, and Kisangani? 
How should it be organized? Finally what mission should be given to it? 
New Private Financial Institution 
Status of the Zaire-US Diamond Bank 
We would like "ZAIRE-USA DIAMOND BANK" as denomination given to the 
financial development institution, because it will deal mainly with 
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diamonds. Most diamonds produced privately in Zaire will be marketed in the 
us, in order to get more US dollars needed to finance growth. The choice of 
the US is inspired by the fact that advanced technologies needed for the 
Zair ian economic growth are provided by the US . Thus, the Zairian diamond 
industry should be linked to American banks, and to American Associations 
and corporations dealing with diamonds . 
In order to get the attention of the US government, for its political 
support to the ZAIRE-US DIAMOND BANK, a corporation should be created. 
However, in its i n ception, the institution may be created as a non 
governmental organization, in the case where the US government does not 
want to get involved immediately . Any skepticism in the chief of the US 
government would be a political mistake. 
Role of Zaire- US Diamond Bank 
As a financial institution, ZUDB will be an intermediary that will be 
channeling the savings of individuals, businesses and government into loans 
and investments. At the beginning, ZUDB, created by the researcher with its 
personal savings, and maybe with the support of some partners, will be 
given the following objectives: 
alluvial exploitation of diamonds with a S" triple sluice Keene 
Engineering dredge in the Tshikapa area; 
marketing of diamonds in Tshikapa and in the US; 
purchase of diamonds from other individual miners and their 
marketing in Zaire and in the US; 
investment in the building of the financial institution; 
sophisticated military organization for the protection of ZUDB, with 
the support of all diamond miners, and traditional chiefs; and with 
the help of American lobbies inv olved in diamonds businesses; 
collection in kind (di amonds) of rights for damaging and polluting 
the environment that diamond miners have to pay to the government; 
collection of savings of diamond miners willing to get in touch with 
American firms; intermediary role in imports of American goods, and 
export of diamonds; 
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organization of an office for tourism and trips throughout the US; 
delivery of travelers' checks and passports; an arrangement with the 
Zairian State Department of Foreign Affairs will allow ZUDB to 
provide passengers with passports; 
credit allocation to people organized in a "LIKELEMBA"; in order to 
stimulate these kind of mutuality; 
credit allocation to willing to work in diamond activities , 
regardless of age, sex, religion and tribes; 
credit allocation to individuals willing to invest in other 
activities; 
credit allocation to pupils, students, teachers, college a nd 
university professors, willing to learn, invest in any applied 
researches; 
credit allocation to individual willing to organize a school or any 
training programs involving the learning of appropriated 
technologies; 
credit allocation to individuals willing to invest in churches, 
social activities and community agencies; 
credit allocation to individuals willing to get married, for 
graduation ceremonies, for baptism; 
social support in cash or in kind {coffin) g iven to individuals who 
had lost a family member; 
credit organization to individuals willing to o rganize musical 
activities {for dance or religious music); 
credit allocation to individuals willing to organize sportive 
activities 
participation in investment projects in small hydroelectric power 
plants, in drilling drinking water wells in the villages of all 
traditional chiefs, and latter in other large villages; 
participation in the building of main rural roads, linking villages 
of traditional chiefs; These roads must be paved; - credit 
allocation to individuals willing to organize telecommunication 
systems, and other communications systems between villages; 
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provision of public television in villages for the promotion and 
rehabilitation of spiritual and moral education; 
credit allocation to individuals willing to keep tracks of important 
event in the history of families and clans (photo albums, video 
films); 
participation in social investments such as hospital and health care 
centers. 
social support to people who suffer from AIDS and to all handicapped 
persons as well; 
Loan and interest rates 
Because of abundant foreign exchange earned within Zaire from the 
sale of diamonds in foreign currencies, and captured by ZUDB , we expect to 
fund investment projects and other activities at interest determined by the 
supply and demand schedule, that is the real market interest rate. We 
expected it to be situated at low levels . 
Savings and interest rates 
Credit authorization will be directed to individuals with ZUDB, and 
who have savings, checking accounts, and those who have medium and long 
term bank deposits. Required initial amount, a necessary condition to 
qualify for loans, would vary with different categories of memberships, 
from $10 for low income groups, to $1,000 for middle class income group, up 
to $10,000 for private firms. Interest rates will also vary within groups. 
But for firms, savings interest rate and interest on medium and long term 
deposits will tend to close to real market interest rates. 
Computerized bank cards 
All clients of ZUDB, will have computerized bank cards and will use 
them in food groceries and other stores built by ZUDB. They may also 
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benefit from discount rates on their bills. Other customers will not and 
will be required to buy goods in foreign exchange in our stores. 
Reimbursement of capital and interest 
With computerized bank cards, transactions will be made without 
carrying cash. Limited amounts of cash will be allowed to be drawn at 
teller machines. Such a funds will always be available for reimbursement of 
credit and interest payments. As we found in 1971, most Congolese debtors 
(now Zairians) rarely reimbursed credit allocated to them by the financial 
institution known called "the Societe de credit aux classes moyennes et a 
l 'industrie", which used to give loans to middle classes. 
Findings 
Because capital market in diamond producing areas does not exist, the 
process of mobilizing private savings may consist of the creation of the 
Zaire-US bank in Tshikapa . This private bank will not only collect savings 
but also lend funds to investors in the diamond industry, in irrigated 
agriculture and in other economic and cultural activities. 
Investing in Smal l Scale Irrigation System in Zaire 
Most African governments have seen irrigation as a means towards food 
self- sufficiency, or as a source of foreign exchange earnings from export 
crops. Tenants on major schemes are, therefore, usually required to 
concentrate on commercial production of the crops given priority by the 
government and to sell them to the state. High food crop yields are needed 
to pay for costly irrigation investments. By contrast, traditional 
irrigation is more often used only to provide subsistence food. It is 
normally less costly, and often integrated with rainfed and livestock 
farming as a means of reducing climatic risks. 
The cost of modern irrigation works for full water control ranged 
from US $4,000 to over US $8,000/ha, excluding roads and s ocial 
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infrastructure (Underhill, 1990). Over half the African countries have some 
of their territory in drought-risk zones where small-scale irrigation based 
mainly on small dams and groundwater~and probably, of necessity, grant-
funded--could do much to reduce rural hardship and the need for costly 
disaster relief . 
There are at present many constraints to these developments . 
Social, institutional and economic factors appear more important than 
technical limitations. To improve the future performance of irrigation in 
Africa governments would have to make difficult policy and institutional 
changes. Planners must recognize that, to become established, modern 
irrigation requires long periods of social change and adaptation, in a 
consistently favorable policy and budgetary environment . Financial returns 
from irrigation need to be raised to improve the commitment of irrigators, 
and to encourage the emergence of private sector agricultural services. 
Inefficient government irrigation agencies need to shed excess staff, and 
abandon unprofitable activities and wasteful methods. Manpower development 
is needed at all levels, especially for managers. This will only be 
possible with substantial foreign exchange and foreign technical assistance 
programs. 
Justification for Irrigation in Zaire 
In Zaire, the population is rising at an estimated 3 . 2 per annum. 
Total food production is rising at about 2 .3%. During the last decade, i n 
some areas of the Bas Zaire province, South of the Bandundu province, Kasai 
provinces and Shaba province, food production had been affected by a series 
of periodic droughts. Unlike other African countries such as Zambia and 
Zimbabwe which faced these alarming trends, and turned t o irrigation as a 
possible means of feeding their growing population, the government of Zaire 
did not think about planning irrigation actions. It would also be possible 
for it to promote agric ulture where there is a water surplus. Some people 
may consider promoting agricultural activities in the Zaire Basin. 
Zaire can be divided into four major biogeographical regions: 
l) the Central Basin (equatorial zone); 
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2) the transitional woodlands to the north and south of the Central Basin 
(tropical humid zone); 
3) the tropical humid mountain region of eastern Zaire; and 
4) the forested savanna region along the southern border with Angola and 
Zambia. 
The central basin 
The Central Basin is a depression of about 750 to 1 million km2 with 
an altitude above sea level ranging from 340 to 750 meters. It includes 
Zaire's closed canopy rainforest, of which a third is periodically flooded. 
The region is sparsely populated by indigenous farming and hunting and 
gathering cultures, and support a very limited conunercial timber industry. 
The forest receives between two to three thousand nun of rainfall per year 
and is supported by soils generally classified as Oxisols. Owing to the 
highly leached and residual mineral nature of the soil, the forest biomas 
is the reservoir for most of the biologically essential nutrients. 
The Zaire basin which occupies 16 percent of the surf ace of Sub-
Saharan Africa has 55 percent of the mean annual discharge. The forested 
area not subject to flooding is generally suitable for perennial tree crop 
production. This is an area for coffee beans, rubber, palm oil trees, 
cocoa, banana plantain, and tea. This region possesses a largely untapped 
reserve of exotic and commercial grade l umber. Annual crop production, 
especially for food crops, is less suited to the region due to loss of 
mineral elements upon forest clearing resulting in a loss of organic matter 
and nutrient leaching. 
The humid tropical zone 
North and south of the rainforest are transitional woodland forests 
characterized by an open canopy covering at least 40 percent of the land 
surface. These regions have less rainfall (l,200-2,000 nun) than the 
Central Basin, but in a bimodal distribution that permits two cropping 
seasons per year . In this humid tropical zone, rain is fairly well 
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distributed , seldom with more than four dry months. The growing period for 
annual crops usually exceeds 280 days/year . Irrigation is seldom 
economically justified except for dry season supplementals of some 
pere nnial crops. 
These regions support a large proport ion of the country 's human 
popula tion owing to the availability of forested, relatively fertile soils 
for cropping. Within these regions are the agricultural production areas 
that provide food (maize, cassava, rice, groundnuts, and cattle meat) for 
Kinshasa and the mining regions in Kasai and southern Shaba. 
The agricultural production technology is based primarily on shifting 
cultivation that involves forest clearing and burning followed by cropping 
for two to three year before abandonment due to decreasing soil fertility. 
Complete regeneration of forest cover requires 15 to 20 years, although 
fallow periods of seven to eight years are reportedly minimal to 
reestablish soil fertility. 
Uncontrolled burning of the interforest savanna prevents the 
accumulation of organic matter in those soils and limits their agricultural 
value . In areas of high population density, cropping and wood harvesting 
pressures have caused considerable loss of original forest, and in some 
case have reduced fallow periods between cropping cycles to as little as 
three years . Reduced fallow result in lower yields (per land area) and 
encourage farmers to increase crop production area to maintain total crop 
production. 
The t ro p ical mountain r egion 
The tropical mountain region lies eastern of the central rainforest 
along the eastern border with Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda and a c ross Lake 
Tanganyika. This high altitude region supports a dense humid upland forest 
and is the most densely populated rural area on the country's most fertile 
soils (volcanic origin). Rainfall is plentiful (2,000 mm/yr) and falls in a 
bimodal distribution patter. This area is suited to cultivation of a wide 
variety of crops. It is the center of production for arabica coffee and 
cinchona (quinine) and also produces a large proportion of the country's 
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b a nanas, beans, potatoes, and groundnuts. This high human population 
densities have put con siderable pressure on the land resources for both 
agricu ltur al crops and f u elwood . Overcutting of the forest, short fallow, 
a nd steep hillside farming have caused severe degradation o f both soil and 
f o r est resources. 
The tropical forested savanna 
The tropical forested savanna region south of the fore sted transition 
zone extends along the sou thern border with Angola and Zambia. This region 
receives 800 to 1,500 mm of rain per year in a monomodal rainfall 
distribution pattern, pe rmitting only one planting season. Within- season 
rainfall patterns as well as seasonal totals may be erratic, with a s much 
a s a tenth of t he seasonal total falling in one day . The g r owing period 
for annual crops ranges from 240 days down to 120 days . Below about 200 
days of the year t here is likely to be increasing risks of crop failure 
due to drought . Supplementary irrigation may give worthwhile benefits even 
in average rainy seasons , by compensating for within-season dry spells. 
Irrigation is essential for dry-season annual cropping and for many 
per ennial crops . 
This zone consists of open woodlands of drought tolerant trees that 
can withstand the four to seven month dry seasons . The higher plateaus 
have isolated gallery forests dispersed throughout a grassy savanna. Areas 
of swamp land are found in the Upemba depression south of Lake Moero. 
Thie region is sparsely populated except around the urban areas which 
support the extensive mining interest with labor and services . The region 
is a net importer of food from the transition forest to the north and from 
Zambia to the south. Maize is the primary agricultural crop and is produced 
on both relatively large modern sector farms and smaller traditional 
shifting cultivation farms. Increasing population pressures in the 
traditional sector (similar to the other food crop producing areas of the 
country) and the generally poor acid sandy s oils of this region in 
particular, have resulted in similar practices of shorter fallow periods 
between cropping campaigns and the utilization of ever increasing areas for 
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cultivation. The gallery forests are being cut to supply the demand for 
fuelwood and more fertile agricultural soils. Less fertile soils in the 
transitional woodland forests and in the gallery savanna regions, irregular 
rainfall distribution over the year, temporary droughts mixed with a longer 
dry season of about six month as you move south, are natural binding 
constraints to increase agricultural productivity in traditional 
agriculture. As said above, in that case, water irrigation seems to be a 
necessary condition to increase soil fertility . 
Existing irrigation and potentialities 
Irrigation is considered in the widest sense not only as any human 
action which can influence the natural flow of water to or from the 
farmer's crop, but also as those forms of agriculture which take advantage 
of naturally rising or falling water levels for production. 
Apart the Zaire Basin, moat of Zaire is geologically ancient and 
highly weathered, and is often based on crystalline rocks. Soils tend to be 
leached and deficient in major mineral nutrients, as well as lacking 
organic matter due to high temperatures. Often they have only limited 
potential for arable agriculture. There are, however, patches of more 
fertile alluvium along the present and past courses of ma jor rivers, as 
well as inherently fertile vertisols deposited in old lake beds. Both 
riversides alluvium and vertisols have attracted small scale irrigated 
agriculture. Irrigators have also been drawn to soils formed under swampy 
conditions where paddy (rice) is cultivated. In most cases, however, 
potentially irrigable soils are in scattered patches rather than large 
blocks, and often at some distance from a potential water source. 
Irrigation types 
Unlike other African countries where large, medium and advanced small 
scale irrigation schemes are practiced, Zaire is still at a stage where 
small scale irrigation is based upon water harvesting or spreading 
collected from streams or from wells. Buckets are often used to collect 
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water. The use of shallow groundwater for small scale irrigation arises 
sponta neously as part of the process of intensification of traditional 
agriculture in response to rising population pressure particularly in 
Kinshasa, the capital and in other urban areas. For small scale vegetable 
production, in particular, it is a response to market access or 
opportunities (urban areas markets). In Kinshasa, some vegetable growers 
use dirty water from polluted streams across the town. 
Table 12 gives for three Sub-saharan Africa countries, estimates of 
irrigated areas, in 1982, in relation to irrigation potential. 
Table 12. 
Country 
Zaire 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Area developed 1982 ('000 ha) 
Irrigation 
potential 
('000 ha) 
4,000 
3 , 500 
280 
Modern 
4 
10 
127 
Small-scale 
or traditional 
20 
6 
3 
Total developed 
as % of potential 
24 1 
16 < 1 
130 46 
Sources: Study team estimates of areas developed; irrigation potentials 
from FAO Land and Water Division, 1985 (provisional estimates) (Underhill , 
1990 , p. 90). 
Major unused reserves remain in Zaire, Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique, 
Sudan, Nigeria and Chad, each with over one million hectares. However in 
practice it is necessary to exclude from this potential the wetter areas 
where irrigation is unlikely to be necessary, (e.g. the Central Zaire 
Basin). As said before, irrigation is justified in other parts of Zaire and 
within-seasons. In the Shaba province, in the Fungurume areas, we have 
observed since 1967 that small scale irrigated tomatoes fields yield large 
quantities of tomatoes during the dry season. Beans and vegetables are 
grown during the dry season along riverbanks. Small fields are watered with 
water river and have high productivity per unit of land. 
167 
Opportuni t i es and constraints for t he f ut ure 
Improved base data on soils, topography, climate, hydrology and crop 
water requirements are likely to be needed if large scale, medium schemes, 
and advanced small scale i rrigation systems are to be successfully 
introduced in Zaire. 
Ot her technical needs include: 
• simple designs of hand a nd electric pumps and other items of small-scale 
equipment, suitable for local manufacture and capable of being repaired 
and maintained by the farmer or village mechanics; For the use of 
electric pumps , small hydroelectric plants across streams and rivers are 
feasible, and cost very cheap. Some of these small hydroelectric 
stations exist in the Bandundu province in the Idiofa zone. 
• further progress with the challenging problem of lowering the cost of 
solar-powered pumps, so as to make small-scale irrigation independent of 
outside fuel supplies; 
• low-cost irrigation systems or methods which can give acceptable returns 
when u sed only for supplementary watering of traditional crops. 
More groundwater surveys could: 
• accelerate the spread of small-scale subsistence irrigation to semi-arid 
areas where it can provide a lifeline for populations at risk; 
• facilitate the expansion of small-scale vegetable production and other 
high return activities; 
• facilitate the introduction of conjunctive use of surface and 
groundwater on irrigation schemes; 
• if groundwater recharge is limited, warn of over-exploitation of 
aquifers. 
In areas where water irrigation is justified, groundwater aquifers 
are located at about 40 m in southern Shaba province; whereas in the 
Tshikapa area waterbeds are situated at more than 100 meters depth. Where 
water is too deep for irrigation to be viable, aquifers may be exploited 
for livestock watering and domestic use. 
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More systematic attempts could be made to adapt some of the low-cost 
small-scale systems of Asia and North Africa to local conditions and 
materials, to arrive at irrigation methods which are more readily accepted 
by individuals or communities as components of rural development projects. 
Economic considerations 
In African countries practicing medium and large scale irrigation, 
the economic viability of further government investment in modern 
irrigation schemes is constrained by the high current costs of 
construction, operation and maintenance, and the low import parity prices 
of most of the crops for which there is an adequate market. 
A FAO study (Table 13) shows that for an irrigation scheme 
constructed over eight years and reaching full production in year 12, a 
scenario fairly representative of past results - it is necessary to 
generate a net annual benefit at full development of about US $150 on each 
US $1,000 invested in irrigation works to give a return of 12%. If a return 
of only 7% is regarded as acceptable the net annual benefit must still be 
around us $100 . Taking rice as a representative crop and assuming that, 
under relatively efficient production, government and on-farm operating 
costs absorb only 30% of the gross value of output, it is possible to 
calculate the incremental annual production needed to justify some typical 
costs of irrigation works. These figures are shown below. Two import parity 
prices are given for rice. The figure of US $180/t represents a project 
located near to a major port and supplying its urban population as an 
alternative to food imports. US $300/t is taken to represent the price 
which would be incurred by the state to supply food to people living in the 
distant interior of the Sahel. 
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Table 13. Incremental paddy output to justify typical investment costs of 
irrigation (assuming 68% milling efficiency and operating costs 
equal 30% of gross output value) (FAO, 1986, p. 42) 
Desired Rate of Return 
12% 7% 
Rice price (US $/t) 180 300 180 300 
New Irr igation t paddy/ha/yr 
- p a rtial control 
(US $4,000/ ha) 7.1 4 . 3 4.7 2 . 8 
- full control 
(US $8,000/ha) 14.2 8.5 9 . 4 5.7 
Rehabilitation* 
- Major repair 
(US $1 , 500/ha) 2.7 1. 6 1.8 1.1 
- Mi nor repair 
(US $ 750/ha) 1. 3 a.a 0.9 0.5 
Traditional Systems 
- Rising flood 
(US $1,500/ha) 2.7 1. 6 1.8 1.1 
-Swamp 
(US $ 500/ha) 0 . 9 0.5 0.6 0.3 
*This case assumes works over three years and full benefits in year s i x. 
The figures show clearly the combination of high yields and cropping 
intensities which would be necessary to justify new investments in fully-
controlled irrigation. Even the most successful of the six projects could 
reach only the lower of the two rates of return at the higher of the two 
ric e prices . This implies that while new , fully-controlle d irrigation 
costing US $8,000/ ha might perhaps be j ustified in, say Chad, it is 
unlikely to be economically viable in the lower Senegal Va l ley nor in many 
other parts of Sub-Saharan Afric a. Bearing in mind that with incomplete 
water control only one crop is likely to be possible per year , the figures 
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for new partially controlled irrigation are almost as unfavorable despite 
the lower capital cost. On the other hand the figures suggest that there is 
a much better economic c ase for more limited capital investments in 
rehabilitation, and in developing traditional forms of rice cultivation on 
the rising flood or in swamps. 
In Zaire, with the use of groundwater irrigation systems these 
figures will be even more different from what FAO found in the Sahel case. 
With a dry season lasting from 4 to 7 months, opportunities to grow 
tomatoes, beans, vegetables, soya, and rice during that season. We may use 
Deep Rock drilling equipment for drilling water wells at very cheap costs 
(less than US $2 per 400 gallons of water) per hour . With the low cost of 
groundwater internal rate of returns may be high and justify investment in 
irrigation systems. 
A typical example of a modern irrigation system was built by the 
Chinese agricultural mission in Lubumbashi in the 1980s. About two 
irrigated hectares of vegetables were grown in the area along Lake 
Lubumbashi and the International Karavia Hotel. Water was pumped from the 
lake to the field. Impressive quantities of vegetables were harvested at 
any season. Because of lack of managerial skill this remarkable field has 
been completely destroyed. 
Social factors 
Much could be done in theory to make participation in major 
irrigation projects more attractive to farmers. Perhaps the most important 
change would be to minimize the dependence of the proposed farming system 
on external factors or agencies, particularly imported machinery and 
materials, as well as on state support and marketing services which the 
irrigation distrust. This is one of the reason that call for import 
substitution heavy manufacturing industries that can assemble or fabric 
dredging and drilling equipment. 
Being a free market economy, the new financial institution may 
stimulate small scale irrigation systems by providing financial support to 
farmers. In the Shaba province, some farmers interviewed were willing to 
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use DeepRock Hydra drill taken by the researcher in order to dr i ll water 
wells in their farms. With 2. 2 68 thousand km2 of land area of which 4 
million are appropriate for irrigation, Zaire only irrigated 24,000 ha in 
1992 (Table 14, 15 and 16). 
Table 14. 
Country 
Zaire 
Zambia 
Zimbambwe 
Surface area, population (1982) and estimated length of rainfed 
growing period for the countries covered by the study 
Land area 
thousand (km2) 
2,268 
740 
386 
Population 1982 
(million) 
30.3 
6 . 1 
7.9 
Range of length 
Growing period (days) 
210-365 
120-210 
150-210 
Source: FAO Production Yearbook (FAO, 1986, p . 108) 
Table 15. Irrigation potential, estimated irrigated areas and irrigated 
in relation to population 
Country Irrigation Potential Estimated Irrigated No. people 
'000 ha percent 65 74 82 area as per ha 
of land percent irrigated 
area total (1982) 
cropped 
(1982) 
Zaire 4,000 1.8 2.5 4.2 24 0.4 721 
Zambia 3,500 4 . 7 2.0 17 . 5 16 0.3 381 
Zi mbabwe 280 0.7 36.0 65.4 130 4 . 6 61 
Sources: Irrigation potential (Underhill, 1990, p. 20) 
Table 16. 
Country 
Zaire 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Findings 
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Inventory of existing irrigated agriculture in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (FAO, 1986, p. 108) 
Population 
1982 
(millions) 
30.7 
6.0 
7.5 
Irrigated 
area (ha) 
1965 1974 1982 
2,530 4,200 24 ,000 
2,000 17,500 16,000 
36,000 65,800 130,000 
Other information 
Small-scale. Inland 
swamp and flood 
irrigation for rice . 
One large sugar 
estate: irrigation by 
flood and sprinkler. 
Other small- scale 
irrigation . 
3,000 ha of very 
large and large 
private commercial 
estates producing 
cotton, sugarcane 
and citrus. Method 
of irrigation is 
both sprinkler plus 
flooding. 
Because Zaire does not have any medium or large scale irrigation 
systems, except a large number of small irrigation systems, a results of 
the Chinese agricultural mission in irrigation showed that introducing 
irrigation in traditional agriculture in areas where the dry season lasts 
about 6 months, may be much more profitable. However, it should be funded 
by savings on sales of diamonds in foreign currency. The reason is that 
irrigation systems require imported inputs such as fertilizers, pesticides, 
and agricultural equipment. 
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CHAPTER 6. DI SCUSSI ON, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Di scussi on 
Institutionali zed corruption 
Zaire highlights the difficulties and complicated nature of external 
attempts to implement a development policy package in the midst of dome stic 
and international constraints. In Zaire, the World Bank faces what might 
be described as a hostile domestic environment. We can add to the list of 
policy distortions, what we call political distortion. The lack of a 
de mocratic regime has been of great impact on socioeconomic deterioration 
in Zaire. Because of political interests, western governments have 
supported a dictatorship regime which could not promote economic growth and 
human deve lopment. 
Zaire is characterized by a centralized institutional structure 
juxtaposed with traditional pre-colonial notions of authority, based on 
important clan and kinship ties and rooted in informal economic networks, 
or in the economy of affection. The nature of the regime enables the ruling 
elite to maintain power and consolidate its economic base . So, it sees 
development assistance as yet another means to accumulate personal wealth. 
A highly personalized , authoritarian form of rule, in which Mobutu 
has been able to frustrate internal opposition and manipulat e external 
Western allies by taking advantage of their competing interests. The power 
of the Zairian state is centralized in the Office of the President. All 
decisions relating to domestic or foreign policy are made by Mobutu 
himself. Individuals in public office are totally dependent on him for 
selection and maintenance in power. By frequently rotating government 
posts, Mobutu manages to maintain uncertainty and vulnerability. It this 
uncertainty, coupled with the relative scarcity of economic resources 
(i . e . , foreign exchange) which results in grabbing and corruption. Mobutu 
engages his officials to pursue such corruptive practices as a means of 
control, thereby assuring their continuing support. He plays the role of 
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big chief, rather reminiscent of the pre-colonial order, bestowing favors 
on his subjects based on personal discretion. 
What is considered to be simply bureaucratic disorganization and 
economic mismanagement by external actors is to Zaire ' s rul i ng elite a 
rational policy of organized disorganization designated to maintain the 
status quo. The ruling elite has engaged in systematic i l legal extraction 
of the state's resources . Gould (1982), Leslie (1987), Mokoli (1992), Nguza 
(1982), Nzongola-Ntalaja (1986), Shapiro and Tollens (1992), and Young and 
Turner (1985) have reported the same observation. 
Why restructure the Zairian economy? 
After 34 years of independence, the economic picture in Zaire is 
bleak. Paradoxically, in terms of natural resources, it is one of the 
richest countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. The economic and debt crisis has 
been prolonged in spite of IMF Stabilization Programs, Paris Club 
rescheduling, formal rescheduling by Western banks in the London Club, and 
frequent major devaluation of the nation's currenc y the zaire. 
Expansionary monetary and fiscal policies have contributed to the 
depreciation of the Zairian currency. A weakened currency does no l onger 
attract foreign investors to operate in Zaire except for the purchase of 
diamonds, gold, and coffee. Strategic economi c sectors do not receive 
enough resources for their development. 
Over the period 1970-90, SOFIDE, with the support of t he World Bank 
mainly distributed loans in foreign exchange to existing foreign 
enterprises engaged in import substitution industries and in traditional 
exports. The World Bank support was mainly directed to the state-owned 
copper mining company. No more than 1,000 km of paved roads were 
constructed during the period. The existing railway systems suffer from a 
lack of maintenance and the availability of wagons and locomotives. The 
construction of new railways is far away in the mind o f decis i on makers. 
Though increases in maiz e production, ov eral l food crop productio n 
does receive too much attention from the gov ernment of Zaire. Not onl y less 
than 7 percent of the government budget i s allocated to the agricul tural 
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sector, but also the diversion of funds for feeder roads maintenance by 
government employees and officials contributed to the decline of 
agricultural output. In addition, because Zaire does have any plant 
producing fertilizers, pesticides, improvement in productivity per unit of 
land is not achieved. 
For the revised model scarce available resource should first be 
allocated to the diamond private mining which quickly generates foreign 
exchange within the country. Then, increased profits may be allocated to 
other sectors of the economy. 
Private sector and economic growth 
Since the 1983 liberalization measures, signs of economic growth came 
from the private sector. However, foreign owners do not fully repatriate 
profits (exports earnings) into the Bank of Zaire. With the 1991 measures 
allowing the sale of diamonds in foreign currencies, Zairian private 
diamond producers can sell on average from 1 to 4 million carats of 
diamonds, which represent billion of us dollars. 
The public sector is inefficient in Zaire because of mismanagement, 
corruption and diversion of public resources. The privatization of 
parastatals is a good idea if new owners are dynamic and nationalists. On 
contrary, we have seen that in Zaire instead of privatizing state-owned 
firms, the government had decided their suppression. This constitutes a 
smart practice of stealing public resources. The national office for 
housing, the Fond de convention de development (FDC), in 1971 the Societe 
de credit aux classes moyennes et a l'industrie, the Fond de promotion de 
la petite et moyenne industrie (FPMI), the Caisse nationale d'epargne et de 
credit immobilier (CNECI), all these financial institutions had been 
suppressed, without requiring debtors to reimburse what they owed them. 
Since 1991, a new style of suppression of state-owned companies has 
appeared. It consists of the destruction during riots of targeted firms. 
It is hard to believe that economic growth may come from the public sector. 
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Micro reforms 
From the the point of view of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank, microeconomic reforms aim to promote agriculture for 
smallholders, encourage increase in producer prices, introduce new 
cultivation techniques, use of high yield varieties, and allocate credit to 
the private sector. This would lead to efficiency in production. In the 
context of Zaire, credit to smallholders was organized with the financial 
support of the International Development Agency (IDA) and the FIDA. 
However, this finanacil support was provided for small size farms of the 
area of just half an hectare. 
Structural transformation 
The World Bank 's current strategy for economic development seeks to 
incorporate the twin objectives of growth and poverty alleviation. The 
following are three approaches to development assistance: 
1. The project approach 
2. An approach based on gap theory 
3. An approach directly related to income distribution/social welfare 
theory. 
The project approach 
The project approach is based upon the finding of the correlation 
between underdevelopment and the lack of infrastructure, productive 
facilities, and technical expertise in developing countries. The purpose of 
multilateral aid is to finance sound economic projects to correct these 
imbalances. This, in turn, will attract foreign private investment to lay 
the foundation for growth. 
According to the Gap theory between the amount of economic resources 
required by developing countries and those locally available, growth can 
occur only if this shortfall is eliminated: a lack of skills; and 
inadequate level of savings that limits the domestic investment needed for 
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significant growth; an a foreign exchange gap, the difference between 
foreign exchange earnings and the foreign exchange requirements for 
continued growth. Progress toward self-sustaining development is 
constrained by one of these resources gaps at various stages of the growth 
process. External sources of finance encourage growth by compensating for 
these shortfalls, thereby facilitating more efficient use of other 
resources such as labor. Developing countries development is inhibited by 
inadequacies in the structure of production (structural disequilibrium) 
which prevent adaptation to changing patterns of internal and external 
demand. 
Income distribution and social welfare theory 
Economists seem to fall into two camps. There are those who stress 
redistribution e ven at the cost of a decline in growth in the short-term, 
advocating government intervention t o facilitate transfers of income and 
productive assets (particularly land) and a growth strategy based on labor-
intensive production. Others try to reconcile redistribution with growth 
via a strategy of investment reallocation, thereby raising the income of 
the poor through their contribution to the productive process. Increased 
i ncomes would enhance development by stimulating aggregate demand, 
expanding employment, and changing the composition of production to more 
efficiently produced goods. Development assistance would alter the plight 
of the poor by concentrating on investment programs to increase their 
income and make them more productive, and by providing technical assistance 
to the traditional sector. The basic needs approach to aid underlines the 
provision of public services such as education, health , and nutrition to 
the economically disadvantaged groups. 
In addition to these concerns, the structural adjustment approach is 
seen as a means of stimulating development. Some important structural 
constraints have hampered the development process. For example, consumption 
patterns as well as the technologies adopted in productive sectors such as 
industry, agriculture, and energy are highly import-intensive, while the 
Developing countries' foreign exchange earning capacity is limited. High 
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import bills in the face of poor export earnings create persistent balance 
of payments difficulties. Growth can only occur via structural 
transformation, in which domestic constraints are addressed and attempts 
are made to mitigate the effects of external factors. 
The agenda advances an agricultural-based export-led development 
strategy, founded on Africa's comparative advantage in the production of 
primary products for the world market and characterized by efficiency in 
resource use and economic management as well as "restrained" public sector. 
This will lay the foundations for long-term economic transformation and 
industrialization. Policy reform in the productive sectors and economic 
planning are of central importance in the Agenda. Reforms in the key sector 
of agriculture aim at improving both export and food production and include 
a comprehensive rural program focusing on smallholder production, 
liberalization of pricing and marketing strategies to provide production 
incentives, and finally, renewed efforts in agricultural research 
extension. 
Industrialization is seen as a vital part of any long-term 
development effort. However, over the short term it must play a secondary 
supportive role vis-a-vis agriculture. The industrial sector as well, must 
emphasize efficiency via measures such as phasing out direct government 
controls, improving the performance of state-owned enterprises, and using 
tax incentives to promote industrial investment and stimulate exports. 
Structural changes in other productive sectors such as mining, energy, and 
transport stress rehabilitation of existing facilities, production 
efficiency, and better economic planning. Finally, the development of human 
resources (education and training), population control, and an urban 
strategy that highlights the provision of basic needs, are seen as 
essential to any long-term development strategy. 
We have seen that in the case of Zaire, the World Bank had tried but 
without great success these strategies because over the period, the World 
Bank policy consisted of lending to inegalitarian, corrupt governments who 
have little concern for welfare, but who can maintain a stable but not 
democratic political environment. Because of noncompliance by the 
government of Zaire, the IMF and the World Bank have been playing the game 
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of giving on one hand while threatening the government on the other hand. 
Knowing the game, the ruling elite used to agree on any arrangement , but as 
soon as assistance falls in the Bank of Zaire, it takes the direction of 
private pockets . The Bank will react late and suspend next tranches. After 
a while the gover nment of Zaire will show a nice face in order to make the 
Bank feel sorry . The Bank will come again hoping that serious engagements 
will not be broken . Late in 1991 , the IMF and the World Bank understood 
that with t hat kind of reg ime stabilization and structural adjustment 
progr ams c a n not r e ach targeted objectives. As a result the financial 
support ha s been suspended . The attitude adopted by these institutions is 
wait and see . 
Failure of macroeconomic polic i e s 
Over the period under examination, macroeconomic policies were 
inadequate because they were characterized by: 
• expansionary monetary and fiscal policies (accelerated money supply 
growth, increased government budget deficit), 
• frequent massive devaluation with adverse effects on the agricultural 
sector (scarce available resources shifted from agriculture to diamond 
and gold mining, from export crops (palm oil, cotton) to coffee 
plantation, to food production (maize, rice)), 
• increased nominal rate of protection due to the overvaluation of the 
national currency (in terms of zaires imports of raw materials and 
intermediate goods needed by imports substitution industries and of 
goods consumed in urban areas cost cheap), and due to taxes on 
agricultural products, 
However, liberalization measures did neither increase export crop 
production of palm oil, or cotton nor augmented food crop production. With 
negative interest rates, credit had been allocated to investment projects 
of low productivity, while the treasury bill system introduced by the Bank 
of Zaire made positive interest rate but at prohibitive nominal interest. 
Failure to pay interests on foreign loans had led to increasing 
foreign debt burden amounted in 1994 over US 10 billion. Finally, 
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macroeconomic policies were inadequate because they did not give incentives 
to domestic savings and did not increase investment levels. 
Revised macroeconomic model 
Figures 11 through 14 describe the failure of the macroeconomic 
policies during 1973-1990. A Human Development Report published by UNDP in 
1990 , gave the following situation about Zaire. The Zairian population has 
increased from 16.4 million in 1960 to 34.0 million in 1988. Estimate of 
the population in year 2000 is 49 million inhabitants. Annual population 
growth rate has increased from 2.7 in 1960 to 3 . 2 in 1988. We have seen 
that GDP growth rate has decreased annually by -1.5, while both savings and 
investment have respectively decreased by 27% and 51% from 1980 to 1989. In 
a graph showing investment, savings and output per worker, the investme nt 
schedule per worker would shift back to the left, output and savings per 
worker curves will shift down to the right. One would conclude that 
macroeconomic policies over the period 1975-90 were not efficient. 
We have seen that current account and government budget deficits have 
been increasing over time, that private savings and investment have been 
d e creasing as well. At a given world interest rate schedules for savings 
would show a tendency to shift upward back to the left while investment 
schedule would be shifting down to the left. One would conclude that there 
was no improvement in the process of reducing Zairian twin deficits . 
We have seen that inflation rate has been increasing without bound 
over the period under examination, that current account deficits have 
worsen during the period under examination. On a IMF graph plotting the 
balance of payments (or just current accounts) on the Y-axis, and the rates 
of inflation for different years, the curve balance of payment and domestic 
credit expansion schedule have always intersected in the second quadrant 
with negative current account. The balance of payment schedule has been 
shifting back to the left , while the domestic credit expansion line has 
been shifting down to the right. One would conclude that macroeconomic 
policies during the period were ineffective. 
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We have seen that GDP has been decreas i ng by -1.5 per year over the 
period 1973-89, that investment ha been decreasing as well. On a World Bank 
graph plotting investment against GDP, the Zairian situation will be 
located below initial equilibrium. One would conclude that macroeconomic 
policies were not appropriate for the Zairian case . 
We conclude that savings mobilization did not operate well under 
these macroeconomic policies, that new mobilization techniques should be 
set up even if the political situation remains unchanged. New instrument 
variables will give positive results because (1) by allowing the sale of 
diamonds within Zaire in foreign currencies, the Zairian government wanted 
to escape from assets arrested outside and which are saved in Western 
countries. However, at the same time, the measure gives the chance to 
peasants to earn directly foreign exchange from the sale of diamonds and 
gold; (2) The new private financial institution will be supported by the 
government because it will increase the sale of passports in diamond 
producing areas . People living in the Kasai, the Bandundu and the Haut 
Zaire Provinces, will cheer any policy allowing them to travel abroad 
because right now for misunderstanding, an unpopular government tried in 
1993 to forbid planes to fly from Mbuji Mayi airport to Europe and South 
Africa, without landing first in Kinshasa. Constructing small hydroelectric 
plants in diamond producing rural areas, drilling drinking water wells, 
allocating credit to different types of activities, and organizing 
intermediation between the new bank and diamond miners will be supported by 
most Zairian people living in diamond producing areas. Gradual 
dollarization of the Zairian economy, and the building within Zaire of 
small diamond cutting plants by Americans and Zairian will i ncrease the 
availability of f oreign exchange. 
The revised macroeconomic mode l suggests the best macro and 
microeconomic reforms. They should (i) promote tourism in diamond 
producing areas, increase the sale of passports and encourage diamond 
miners to travel abroad, (ii) create a private financial institution in 
diamond producing areas, (ii i ) organize the market of rights for polluting 
and damaging the environment, (iv) appreciate the exchange rate of the 
national currency by suppressing parallel exchange market organized in 
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diamond producing areas, (v) reestablish market interest rates needed to 
promote investment demands and to encourage bank deposits, (vi) stimulate 
domestic savings, (vii) provision by the new private financial institution 
of some public goods such as rural electricity, paving rural roads, and 
improves waters services in rural areas, (viii) organize loans to irrigated 
agriculture with funds from sale of diamonds. Being a surplus land country, 
credit should be allocated for the cultivation of 5 hectares of field per 
household in Zaire. 
Diamond activities as a leading industry 
In order to improve efficiency in private diamond production and in 
irrigated agriculture, the revised model would like to link investment to 
market interest rate such as investment in diamond mining will expand until 
marginal efficiency of investment equals to the market interest rate. The 
complete liberalization of imported capital goods, the promotion of diamond 
cutting , and manufacturing will lead to efficiency in production. In 
addition, the financial institution should allocated credit to advanced 
geological studies, to research on new extracting techniques , and to the 
fabrication or assembling of imported equipment such as diamond dredges. 
This means activating backward linkages. Forward linkages would include the 
cutting of diamonds within Zaire, and the organization of the jewelry 
industry and other manufactured industries using rough diamonds. 
Conclusion 
Overall, investment demand in Zaire have not been matched by domestic 
savings. Investment decreased by 3 percent from 1973 to 1989, while 
domestic savings only increased by 0.12 percent per year. 
The period 1967-74, was characterized by massive foreign investments 
amounted to more than 4 billion US dollars . Foreign investors were 
attracted by the zaire currency worth two US dollars for one zaire . The 
Zaire currency was aligned on the US dollar. However, these investments 
have been directed to reinforce the traditional export sector and to 
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promote light import substitution industries, without any backward or 
forward linkages, and relying on foreign inputs. 
Investment projects with long gestation period absorbed a large 
portion of foreigner loans, such as the construction of the hydroelectric 
dam at Inga, and the construction of 1,800 km power transmission line Inga-
Shaba, and the construction of the steel mill at Maluku, which was to treat 
imported scraps from Italy. 
Due to external (terms of trade deterioration, elimination of 
export/import route through Angola due to the civilian war, oil price shock 
increasing imports costs, nonrepatriation of most export earnings by 
foreign investors and Zairian exporters) and internal shocks (weaknesses in 
savings mobilization, government of Zaire inappropriate macroeconomic 
policies offsetting the IMF and World Bank stabil izing and structural 
adjusting measures, mismanagement of public enterprises, inappropriate 
reallocation of export earnings between private diamond producers and 
licensed exporters), the zaire exchange rate depreciated by 44 percent from 
1973 to 1989. Although the presence of the liberal 1969 investment code, 
foreign investors were no longer attracted by a weak Zairian currency whose 
the exchange rate was 9 million zaires for us $1 at the end of 1993. 
Inappropriate savings mobilization techniques contributed to the 
deterioration of the Zairian currency, namely the inflatory finance 
measures (expansion of money supply in order to expand the amount of 
investment which can be undertaken, massive devaluation imposed by the IMF 
and the World Bank, contraction of private and domestic public credit 
imposed by the IMF and the World Bank without any crowding in effects, 
increasing nominal interest rates on bank loans), low level of interest 
rate paid on savings, checking accounts and on medium and long term 
deposits . In addit i on, because private diamond exploitation was prohibited 
activities from 1960 to 1982, diamond miners and sellers used to keep their 
savings home . Diamond smuggling was indirectly encouraged, and incentives 
to bank deposits were absent. Exports earnings from sale of diamonds by 
official and unofficial buying offices were mostly saved in western banks. 
After the 1982 diamond and gold digging liberalization measures, diamond 
production which was decreasing during the period before liberalization (-
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6.5 percent), has increased thereafter. With increasing depreciation of the 
national currency, diamond prices have been rising, making diamond the most 
attractive product in diamonds producing areas, increasing the purchase of 
diamonds by foreigners and buying offices, and unofficial Zairian diamond 
dealers, draining large proportions of money supplied by the Bank of Zaire, 
in the rural diamond producing areas {Tshikapa, Mbuji Mayi, Kahernba, and 
Kisangani). With financial institutions becoming bankrupt, increasing 
institutionalized corruption and depreciation of the national currency, 
households have been pushed to not trust any savings and financial 
institution, keeping home their savings. As a consequence , the level of 
investment not only was very low compared with other African countries, but 
also has been decreasing over time . In addition, only about 10 percent of 
investment was financed by domestic savings. 
Recommendations 
The worsening of the socioeconomic and political situation and 
insecurity between 1990 and 1994 led the researcher to inspire Zairian 
authorities by already applying some measures of the revised stabilizing 
and structural adjusting macroeconomic policy model: 
1. The 1991 measure allowing the sale of diamond and other precious 
stones in foreign currencies has given strong incentives to diamond 
miners. This measure allows an equitable distribution of foreign 
exchange between diamond producers and licensed exporters. 
2. Following policy instrument variables will act on other variables and 
push the economy to targeted levels of real GDP and investment needed 
by the Zarian economy to take off its development and sustain long run 
economic growth. These measures will give strong incentives to 
domestic savings mobilization. The creation of a private multinational 
diamond bank aims to collect domestic savings, allocate credits, and 
promote imports of the US goods by diamond miners and dealers. The 
promotion of tourism allowing diamond miners and othe r Zairians to 
visit the US aims to give a strong learning effect by seeing what the 
strong American people has done in its country. As the research 
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believes now in the power of the US capitalism system, unskilled rich 
Zairian people who deal with diamonds will learn more in the US and 
will become dynamic partners with the US business society. The 
organization of rights to pollute and damage the environment instead 
of single taxes on diamond digging, and their payment in kind will 
allow the Zaire-USA Diamond Bank to increase government revenues in 
foreign exchange. This institution will also participate in the 
provision of public goods such as paving rural roads, building micro 
hydroelectric power plants in villages, and drilling water wells and 
constructing impr oved drinking water services in rural areas. 
With the provision of new imported technologies by the new financial 
institution, diamond miners and farmers will increased their productivity. 
By providing irrigation systems to farmers in rural areas where the dry 
season last too long, internal rate of returns in irrigated agriculture 
will compete with those in diamond activities. With increase foreign 
exchange within Zaire and intermediation role of the new bank, the zaire 
exchange rate will appreciate, the parallel exchange market will disappear, 
interest rates on bank loans will decrease, stimulating investment demand. 
Finally, computerized stores and range of credits to social, cultural 
and spiritual activities will give strong incentives to bank deposits, 
increasing private domestic savings, and finally increasing the level of 
productive investments. 
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APPENDIX: SUPPLEMENTARY DATA 
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GDP = Gross domestic product. 
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 1987 
GDP and GDP GDP 
Net Mate rial DEFLATORS 
Product (1980 = 100) 
(in million us $) (in billion IFS / 1986 p . 36 
us $ ) 
1 967 l. 44 3.6 
1 968 1.44 5.2 
196 9 l. 76 5 . 9 
1970 1,904 1. 88 5 . 7 
1971 2 . 10 6.0 
1972 2.31 6.6 
1973 3,003.6 2.95 7 . 8 
1974 3,674 3.60 9.2 
1975 3,785 3 .84 10.4 
1976 3,580 3.61 16.3 
1 977 4,520 4.62 22.4 
1978 6,556 6 . 56 32.7 
1979 6,423 6.42 66.2 
1 980 6,145 6.15 100.0 
1981 5,424 5.38 134.5 
1982 5,410 5.44 181.5 
1983 4,588 340.5 
1984 2,760 558.1 
1985 2,953 
1986 3,412 
1987 2,909 
1988 3,329 
1989 3,385 
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Production of major food crops 
( thousands of tons) 
Year Maize Paddy Cassava Sweet Beans Ground- Plantain 
(rice ) Potato Peas nuts banana 
1 963 252 60 130 
1964 237 55 122 
1965 232 49 137 
1966 270 9 1 149 
196 7 297 1 00 163 
1968 3 26 117 181 
196 9 350 130 200 
1970 428 179 267 
1971 436 184 278 
1972 45 2 196 282 
1973 45 9 199 299 
1974 47 7 201 303 
197 5 495 207 308 
1976 504 212 315 
197 7 51 0 218 319 
1978 500 225 306 
1979 536 223 12,566 324 138 318 1,496 
198 0 56 2 240 13,087 333 151 337 1,563 
1981 639 245 13 I 172 343 155 348 1,608 
1982 687 251 14,185 353 159 349 1,654 
1983 668 258 14,601 363 164 367 1,703 
1984 704 286 15,038 373 169 376 1,749 
198 5 726 297 15,493 381 174 386 1,795 
1986 756 307 15,900 375 175 392 1,797 
1987 786 319 16, 40 0 372 166 410 1,798 
1988 816 329 17,000 368 178 420 1,799 
1989 846 341 17,400 373 179 425 1,800 
Source: Shapiro and Tollens, 1992 p. 10 
The conversion rate from paddy to rice is approximately 60 per cent. 
Groundnuts are unshelled. 
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Production of export and industrial crops, 1959-89 
(thousands of tons) 
Year Sugar Coffee Cocoa Tea Tobac- Seed Rubber Palm Quinine 
co cotton oil 
1959 62 4.5 4.2 40 245 
1962 26 7.0 4.0 40 190 
1963 49 43 18 5 
1964 44 40 171 
1965 27 4.6 4.2 19 24 120 
1966 37 20 124 
1967 37 24 149 
1968 63 5.1 5.7 45 41 242 
1969 68 60 245 
1970 59 49 170 
1971 65 6.1 7.5 58 42 178 
1972 68 51 166 
1973 57 68 153 
1 97 4 69 4.8 6.9 47 31 1 4 6 
1975 51 27 145 
1976 89 24 129 
1977 56 33 105 
1978 77 15 99 
1979 48 60 5.7 6.0 7.2 19 17 99 3 . 5 
1980 48 74 5.9 6.1 7.4 19 18 93 3 . 6 
1981 47 71 4.5 4.8 7.7 21 18 1 06 3 . 7 
198 2 52 68 4 . 3 4 .5 7.8 23 17 94 3 . 8 
1983 52 6 3 4.3 4 . 7 8.1 27 16 85 3.9 
1984 61 93 4.4 4.9 8.2 21 15 93 4.0 
1985 56 92 4.3 4.7 8.2 20 1 5 89 4.0 
1986 61 95 6.3 4. 7 3.2 19 13 86 7.2 
1987 68 97 5.4 3.4 2.9 17 12 8 4 7.0 
1988 70 99 6.2 3.1 2 . 8 10 12 91 6.5 
1989 74 107 7 . 1 3.1 2.9 12 12 90 6.4 
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Diamond production 
{thousands carats) 
Year Total Industrial GEM 
1971 12,744 12,004 660 
1972 13, 390 12.181 1 ,2 09 
1973 12,939 12,004 935 
1974 13,597 12,991 606 
1975 12,801 12,415 386 
1976 11,821 11,323 498 
1977 11,214 10,681 (1, 031) 
533 
1978 11, 243 10,603 640 
1979 8,734 8,440 294 
1980 10,235 8,001 2,234 
1981 6,758 5,754 1,004 
1982 6,079 5,656 423 
1983 11,982 8,663 3,319 
1984 18,459 13,349 8,239 
1985 20,159 16,127 4,032 
1986 23,304 18,643 4,661 
1987 20,210 15 ,540 4,670 
Source: Statistics of the African economy p. 50.9 
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Government Consumption of goods and services 
(thousands of zaires ) 
Year Current Current Investment Balance 
Returns Expenses Expenses 
1966 63) (-10.1) 
1967 88) ( -5 . 7) 
1968 {140) (-18.2) 
1979 (197) . 9) 
1970 315.3 264.6 62.4 -13 . 0 (-20.3) 
1971 288 . 8 279.4 68.8 -60.0 (-76 .2) 
1072 298.8 284.l 72.2 -84 .0 (-81.5) 
1973 376.7 345 .1 104.5 -138.0 (-142 .0) 
1974 588.6 545.5 199.8 -212.5 (-324.4 ) 
1975 477.2 510.4 121.4 -228 . 2 (-214 .6) 
1976 (555.0) (-421. 0) 
1977 (772. 0) (-450 .4 ) 
1978 (893. 0) (-595.5) 
1979 (1,857 . 0) ( -533.9) 
1980 (3,391.0) (-237.5) 
1981 (4,190 .0 ) (- 1 ,332 .2) 
Bureucratic Corruption and underdevelopment in the Third World. The case 
of Zaire, p. 106, and Tshibaka (p. 44) 
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GDP and total revenue 
Total Revenue GDP Total Revenue 
as percent of 
GDP 
1971 28.23 1,867 . 4 527.167 
1972 26.47 1,876 496.577 
1973 26.11 3,003.6 784.239 
1974 29.69 3,674 1,090.810 
1975 22.67 3,784.8 858.01 
1976 17.15 3,580 613.97 
1977 17.39 4,520 786.028 
1978 13.48 6,556 883.748 
1979 17.83 6,423 1,145.22 
1980 22.10 6,145 1,358.045 
1981 19.95 5,424 1,082.088 
1982 19.86 5,410 1,074.426 
1983 19.38 4,588 889.15 
1984 2,760 
1985 2,953 
1986 3,412 
1987 2,909 
1988 3,329 
1989 385 
YearBook 1980-89 
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CONSOLIDATED CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
Million of zaires Year ending December 31 
Year Total Total Tax Non tax Grants 
Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue 
& grants 
1971 328.8 296.2 285.9 13 . 8 32.6 
1972 344.3 306.3 297.1 11.4 38.0 
1973 439.6 385 . 3 379.1 14.5 54.3 
1974 588.1 534.l 515.6 18 . 5 54 . 0 
1975 490.5 435.l 422 .1 13 . 0 55.4 
1976 572 . 8 490 . 5 479.1 11. 5 82.2 
1977 829.6 688 .l 676.0 12 . 1 141.5 
1978 910.1 739.0 723.3 15.7 171.1 
1979 2,456 . 0 1 ,980.3 1,909.l 71. 2 475.7 
1980 4,650 . 0 3,798.1 3,345.0 453.1 851.9 
1981 5,905.l 4 ,744 . 3 4 , 149.7 594 .6 1,160 . 8 
1982 7, 18 3.1 6,179.2 5,584 .6 594 . 6 1,003.9 
198 3 1 3,883 . 6 11,461.4 10,124.1 1,337.3 2,422 . 2 
Source YearBook 1988 (p.161) 
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CONSOLIDATED CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
Year Total Total Current Capital 
Expenditures Expendit. Expendit . Expendit . 
& lending rep. 
1971 405.4 396.9 312 . 9 84.0 
1972 426.3 424.7 320.0 104.7 
1973 580.6 578.2 386.6 191.6 
1974 912.4 856.2 518.1 338.l 
1975 706.6 707.8 552.8 155.0 
1976 1,199.8 1,206.l 953.1 253.0 
1977 1,279 . 2 1,278.3 1,002.8 275.5 
1978 1 , 505.5 1,506 .2 1,238.6 267.6 
1979 3,004.6 3,000.8 2,516.8 484.0 
1980 4,981.6 4,979.9 4,004.2 975.7 
1981 8,062.9 8.062.9 5,783 . 4 2,279.5 
1982 10,688 . 0 10,666.6 8,263 . 3 2,403.3 
1983 15,564.6 15,564.6 12,419.4 3,145.2 
Source IFS (p.161) 
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CONSOLIDATED CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
Year Lending Overall Financing Domestic D.Financing 
minus Deficit Abroad Financing From Mon.Auth. 
repay'ts Surplus & Dep.Mon.Banks 
1971 8.5 -76.6 44.8 31.8 31. 9 
1972 1. 6 -82.0 54.2 27 . 8 29.2 
19 73 2.4 -151. 0 109.1 31.9 30.4 
1974 56.2 -324.3 118. 5 205.8 206.9 
1975 -1.2 -216.1 103 . 8 112.3 115.9 
1976 -6.3 -627.0 105.9 521.l 521.8 
1977 .9 -449.6 157.2 292 . 4 295.9 
1978 -.7 -595.4 69.8 525.6 528.2 
1979 3.8 -548.6 63.7 484.9 484 . 9 
1980 1. 7 -331 .6 126.1 205.5 238.3 
1981 -2,157.8 722.3 1,435.5 1,458.3 
1982 21. 4 -3 ,504.9 276.3 3,228.6 3,267.6 
1983 -1,681.0 -867.2 2,548.2 2,589.5 
SourceA: IFS (p. 161 ) 
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Imports 
Year Total Import Food Import 
Bill Bill 
Cereal Other Total 
(current US $ million) c. i. f 
IFS / 85 Tshibaka 
1966 1,020.0 17.2 19.5 36.7 
1967 331.8 10.6 18.3 28.9 
1968 292. 0 14.9 16.l 31. 0 
1969 370.0 12.2 17 . l 29.3 
1970 535.6 524 . 0 17.6 22.7 40.3 
1971 619.0 666 . 0 20.0 22.l 42 . 1 
1972 625.4 522.0 20.3 35.3 55 . 6 
1973 754.4 691.8 35.5 38.4 73.9 
1974 1,051.0 954.0 60 .0 49.0 109 . 0 
1975 904.8 946.2 4 0. 8 37.8 78 . 6 
1976 673 . 5 784.5 95.9 77 . 7 173 . 6 
1977 609 . 3 807.5 67.0 30.4 97.4 
1978 589.0 759.6 83.0 52.3 135 . 3 
1979 597 . 5 885.4 59.2 53.1 112.3 
E.O . AFR 
p . 349 
1980 835.5 1,015.2 1,472 84.9 82.1 167.0 
1981 668 .2 832.2 1,421 156 . 9 84 .1 241.0 
1982 479.6 1,297 
YB/92 p.1020 
1983 470.0 1,213 
1984 675.8 1,176 
1985 791. 0 1,247 
1986 875.0 1,283 
1987 756.0 1, 391 
1988 771 .0 1,705 
1989 849.0 1, 771 
Source: Year Book 1992, p. 864 
Year 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
Exports 
Value of Export 
Crops 
(current US $ million) 
62.0 
73 .9 
80.2 
81.5 
96. 0 
34 . 8 
106 . 3 
126.7 
179.8 
100.4 
323.5 
293.2 
270.7 
190.9 
238 . 2 
182.6 
Source: YearBook 1980-89 
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Total value 
of all Exports 
424.2 
308. 8 
570.2 
680.2 
781 .2 
687.0 
737.6 
1,012.8 
1,381.0 
864.8 
867 . 9 
1,019.1 
772. 8 
1,169 . 6 
2,476.2 
1,889 .3 
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Xa = Agricultural exports 
Evolution of eight export crops (in thousands of tons) 
Pro duct s 1 930 1945 1954 1971 1972 1973 1974 
Palm oil 37.0 78 .0 184.0 202 .11 14 7. 93 139.55 124.86 
export 111. 88 86.97 69.68 62.43 
Palm 
coconut 66.0 43.0 72. 0 48.51 37.83 33.44 34.56 
export 44.78 37.25 32.86 33.98 
Coffee 
robusta 7.0 20.0 46.0 65.00 67.51 56.81 69.34 
export 62.03 61. 52 56.25 68.65 
Coffee 1.0 10 . 0 
arabica 
export 9.58 12.53 10.66 9.07 
Tea 7.50 8.00 7.65 6 . 90 
export 6.53 6.38 6.65 5.58 
Cotton 9 . 9 37.0 63.2 18.14 16 .11 1 9.89 16. 4 7 
export 6.03 4 . 29 6.63 1. 62 
Rubber 42.11 40.45 44 . 72 30. 91 
export 39.88 37.71 30.18 26.62 
Timber 288.30 263.22 323 . 29 293.97 
export 12.56 30.80 50.04 29 . 89 
Source: 
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Xna = Nonagricultural exports 
( XD = Diamonds exports ) 
DIAMOND PRODUCTI ON AND EXPORTS (thousands metric carats) 
YearBook 1982 p . 605 + YearBook 1987 p . 446 
Year 
1970 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1 978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
The data 
Yearbook 1982 
Industrial GEM 
12, 438 1,649 
12,991 606 
12,415 386 
ll, 323 498 
10,681 533 
10,603 640 
8,440 294 
9,890 345 
8,550 450 
8,550 450 
8,266 3,172 
relate to mine 
cover GEM and Industrial 
Yearbook 1987 
Industrial GEM Tshikapa 
10,603 640 
8,440 29 4 
8,001 2,234 
5,754 1,004 
5 , 656 423 
8,627 3,355 
13,290 5,169 
16,127 4,032 
18,643 4,661 
15,540 4,670 
Exports 
and alluvial production of uncut diamonds and 
stones. 
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MS = Money Supply 
(mil lion zaires) 
Year Money Reserve 
Supply Money 
1966 77 . 7 
1967 111.0 
1968 136.2 
1969 154.4 
1970 188.3 144 
1971 190.5 
1972 235.8 157 
1973 294.7 185 
1974 394.6 225 
1975 462.8 316 
1976 680.2 576 
1977 1,058.9 743 
1978 1,651.4 1,160 
1979 1,651.9 949 
1980 2,884 .9 2,030 
1981 4,395.6 3,241 
1982 7,347.2 6,207 
1983 14,366 10,507 
1984 17,869 15,660 
1985 22,485 19,999 
1986 35,889 32, 110 
1987 68,487 64,491 
1988 150,110 139,866 
Source: 
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International Reserve excluding gold (in million US $) 
Special drawing rights (SRD) + Reserve position in IMF + 
Foreign Exchange 
Zaire SDR Position 
in IMF 
Foreign 
Exchange 
1979 207 0 0 207 
1980 204 0 0 204 
1981 152 1 27 124 
1982 39 0 0 39 
1983 102 22 0 80 
1984 137 0 0 137 
1985 190 0 0 190 
1986 269 0 0 269 
1987 181 0 0 181 
1988 187 0 0 187 
Source: 
211 
MONETARY AUTHORITIES 
(Billion s of SD Rs : End of Period) 
Year Total Total Total Deposit Banking Banking 
Foreign Foreign Foreign banks System System 
Assets Liabil. Assets Total Total Total 
Foreign Foreign Foreign 
Liabil. Assets Liabil. 
1971 .130 .033 .005 . 163 .005 
1972 .161 .029 .035 .011 .196 .040 
1973 .185 .029 . 042 .01 2 .227 .041 
1 974 .111 . 045 .059 .014 .171 .059 
1975 .049 .098 .090 .128 .139 .226 
1976 .090 .197 .098 . 042 .188 .239 
1977 .119 .267 .123 .047 . 242 .314 
1 978 .142 .284 .125 . 032 .266 . 316 
1 979 .227 .308 .100 .036 . 327 .344 
1980 . 280 .397 . 135 .034 .415 .432 
1981 .248 .460 . 126 .034 . 374 . 494 
1982 .256 .587 . 100 . 046 .357 . 633 
Source: YearBook 1980-90 
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e = exchange rate 
EXTERNAL TRADE CONVERSION FACTORS 
us $ per Zaire 
Yea r I MPORTS EXPORTS 
1 967 2 2 
196 8 2 2 
1969 2 2 
1970 2 2 
1971 2 2 
1972 2 2 
1973 2 2 
1974 2 2 
1975 2 2 
1976 1 . 23277 1.24421 
1977 1 .16 577 1.15876 
1 978 1 . 20564 1. 22179 
1979 0. 5 7008 0.56523 
1980 0. 361 50 0 . 35993 
1 981 0 .2 27 78 0 . 23351 
1 982 0 .1 74 44 0.17429 
1983 0 .07299 0.08146 
1984 0 . 02728 0.02764 
Source: Du Co ngo au Zaire, p .203, YearBook 1980-1990 
Source : 
Inflation 
(1975 = 100) 
Tshibaka p.44 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 8.7 % 
1972 6.6 % 
1973 9.3 % 
wa Bilenga p . 129 
19 74 30.4 % 
197 5 59.3 % 
1976 63.3 % 
1977 58.0 % 
1978 80.0 % 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
13 . 3 
18.7 
35.1 
38.2 
45.4 
47.6 
55 .4 
64.6 
77.8 
100.0 
188. 2 
307.0 
486 .3 
961.2 
1,420.4 
1,977.5 
2,727.4 
4 ,688.5 
7,437.4 
9,209.3 
13,511 .l 
25 , 72 4 .4 
42,689. 5 
67,662.9 
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From 1975 to 1983, inflation averaged 60 percent annually 
wa Bilenga Tshishimbi , p 9 
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TGs = Taxes on goods and services. 
Taxes on goods Total Taxes on 
& services Revenue goods & 
as percent of 
Total revenue 
1971 ll.82 527.16 62.31 
1972 12.67 496.58 62.916 
1973 10 . 74 784 . 24 84.227 
1974 9.01 980. 59 88.35 
1975 12.55 858.01 107 .68 
1976 13.43 613,97 82.456 
1977 14.71 786.03 115. 625 
1978 17.55 883.75 155,09 
1979 12.86 1,145.22 147.275 
1980 12.40 1,358 . 05 168.39 
1981 15 .63 1,082.09 169 .13 
1982 22.94 1,074.43 246.47 
1983 24.43 889.15 217.219 
Source: YearBook 1980- 89 
All ma jor crops were taxed during 1971-82 except rice and palm oil. 
Rates of taxation were, in decreasing order, highest for cotton, coffee, 
groundnuts, and maize. Overall, export crops were discriminated against 
more than food crops. 
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Taxes on international transactions ( imports and 
exports taxes ) . 
Taxes on 
international 
trade and 
transactions as 
percent of To tal 
Revenue 
1971 57.39 
1 972 57. 85 
1973 64.99 
1974 61.17 
1975 48.08 
1976 45. 15 
1977 36 .97 
1978 27.90 
1979 42.86 
1980 38. 43 
1981 30.77 
1982 25.70 
1983 28.83 
Total 
Revenue 
527.16 
496.58 
784.24 
980.59 
858.01 
613.97 
786.03 
883.75 
1,145.22 
1 ,358.05 
1,082.09 
1,074.43 
889.15 
Source: Yea rBook 1980-89 
The averag e annual share of 
Taxes on Intern. 
Trade & 
Transactions 
302 . 537 
287.271 
509.677 
599.826 
412.53 
277.207 
290.595 
246.566 
490.84 
521.898 
332.959 
276.128 
256.34 
taxes on imports and exports was about 
52.6 percent o f the total government budgetary revenue during the 1970 -
78 period against 63.9 percent in 1970. In 1978 the average share of 
taxes d ropped to about 28.5 percent. The drop was due to a growing 
weakness in tax administration (tax collection) and an increase in tax 
evasion. 
The ratio of import taxes to import value declined from 25 percent to 20 
percent and that of export taxes to export value from 34 percent to 14 
percent during 1970-77. 
The fall in the share of export taxes was more pronounced, largely 
because of GECAMINES' financial problems and the tax rebate the company 
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received. The ration of export taxes t o export value dropped from 32 
percent in 1 974 to 14 per cent in 1997. 
Table 35. Taxes on Income and property. 
Taxes on Income 
& Profits as % 
of Total Revenue 
1971 22.92 
1972 22.17 
1973 18.56 
1 974 21.12 
1975 26.02 
1976 32.21 
1 977 37.4 8 
1978 40.83 
1979 30.72 
1980 30. 37 
1981 35.67 
1982 33.39 
1983 30.56 
Total Revenue 
527 . 16 
496.58 
784.24 
980.59 
858.01 
613. 97 
786 . 03 
883.75 
1 , 145.22 
1 ,358.05 
1,082.09 
1 ,074.43 
889.15 
Source: YearBook 1980-89 
Taxes on Income 
& Property 
120.825 
110. 09 
145.55 
207.10 
223.25 
197.759 
294.60 
360.835 
351,81 
412.439 
385.98 
358.75 
271. 72 
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Social security 
Social Security Total Tevenue Social 
Contribution as Security 
percent o f Total (INSS ) 
Revenue 
1971 2 .19 527. 16 115. 448 
1972 2 .19 496.58 108.75 
1973 2 .02 786.24 158.416 
1974 1.87 980.59 183 . 37 
1975 2 .67 858.01 229.088 
1976 2.79 613.97 171 . 29 
1977 2.56 786.03 201. 22 
1978 2.77 883.75 244.798 
1979 1. 48 1,145.22 169.49 
1980 1.98 1,358.05 268.89 
1981 1. 70 1,082.09 183.955 
1982 1 .68 1,074.43 180.50 
1983 1.10 889.15 97.806 
Source: YearBook 1980-89 
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Private consumption, GDP and taxes on goods and services 
Year Cp GDP yD 
(marginal propensi ty to consume) 
(miilion us $ ) 
1973 1,351.62 3,003.6 84.23 
1974 1,543.08 3,674 88.35 
1975 1,665.31 3,784 107.68 
1976 1,646.8 3,580 82.47 
1978 1,943.6 4,520 115. 63 
1979 4,589.2 6,556 155.09 
1980 3,853 6,423 147 . 28 
1981 3,748 .45 6,145 168 . 39 
1982 3,471.36 5,424 169.13 
1983 2,975.5 5,410 246.40 
1984 2,844.56 4,588 2 1 7.22 
1985 966 2,760 
1986 1,417.44 2,953 
1987 1,637.76 3,412 
1988 2,239.93 2,909 
1989 1,331.6 3,329 
1990 265.65 385 
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All Taxes and GDP 
Taxes GDP 
1973 739.45 3,003.6 
1974 895.27 3,674 
1975 743.46 3,784 
1976 557 . 42 3 ,580 
1977 700 . 82 4,520 
1978 762 . 49 6,556 
1979 989.925 6,423 
1980 1,102.73 6,445 
1981 888.07 5,424 
1982 745.28 5,410 
1983 4,588 
1984 2,760 
1985 2,953 
1986 3, 412 
1987 2,909 
1988 3,329 
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INVESTMENT - GDP 
Investment GDP 
1973 901.08 3,003.6 
1974 1 , 124.24 3,674 
1975 1,207.09 3,784 
1976 927.22 3,580 
1977 1,740.20 4,520 
1978 1,206.30 6,556 
1979 1,258.91 6,423 
1980 1,604.81 6,44 5 
1981 1,361.42 5,424 
1982 1,303 .81 5,41 0 
1983 890.07 4,588 
1984 800 . 40 2,760 
1985 856.37 2,953 
1986 1,057.72 3, 412 
1987 756 .34 2, 909 
1988 765.67 3,329 
1989 65.45 
Source: YearBook 1 980 -90 
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GDP, consumption (private and government), imports, exports, 
taxes 
Year GDP Cp CG I x z T 
in current 
prices 
million 
zaires 
1966 304 195 63 42 74 69 
1967 479 269 88 95 201 173 
1968 722 306 140 140 292 15 7 
1969 879 423 197 217 364 321 
National Account Statistics 1990 p . 2107 
1970 938 413 266 245 415 401 
1971 1,049 512 285 345 374 467 
1972 1,157 650 265 386 378 522 
1973 1,475 805 312 442 562 646 
1974 1,799 941 428 551 817 937 
1975 1,919 1,220 452 613 520 885 
1976 2,860 2,089 555 742 927 1,453 
1977 3,956 2,849 772 1,524 1 ,117 2,305 
1978 5,481 3,812 893 1,007 1,216 1,448 
1979 11,105 6,686 1,857 2,179 2,742 2,359 
1980 17,183 10,426 2,756 4,277 6,102 6,379 
1981 23,781 15,275 4,190 5,967 8,349 10,000 
1982 31, 110 17,094 5,948 7,493 10, 013 9,437 
1983 59,134 36,794 8,676 11,492 23,387 21,214 
1984 99,723 34,363 14,999 29,322 76,783 55,883 
1985 147,263 70,360 17,134 43,364 106,269 89,911 
1986 203,416 97,841 38,567 63,585 124,847 121 ,26 8 
1987 326,946 251,916 73,147 83,764 206,485 288,365 
1988 622,822 249,986 231,979 140,857 504,615 
1989 2,146,811 1,480,976 309,686 356,149 498,106 
Source: YearBook 1980-90 
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Current account, imports, and exchange rates 
Current Account - Imports - Exports - Exchange Rates 
million million us $ / zaires 
us $ us $ 
YB / 92 YB/92 
p . 864 p.875 
c. i. f f.o.b . 
1973 -244.9 782 1, 013 2.00000 
1 9 74 -372.3 1,051 1,381 2.00000 
1975 -592.7 927 865 2.00000 
1976 -832 . 8 674 930 1.24421 
1977 - 1,451 . 2 609 981 1.15876 
1 978 294.3 592 951 l. 22179 
1979 146.0 597 1 ,324 0.56523 
1980 -153.6 842 1,639 0.35993 
1 981 - 424.0 672 662 0.23357 
1982 -433.0 480 569 0 . 17429 
1983 -309.7 498 1,134 0.08146 
1984 -325.0 675 1,003 0.02764 
1985 - 290.0 791 954 0.02010 
1986 -400.0 875 1,097 0. 01672 
1 98 7 -655.0 756 970 0.0088 5 
1988 - 762.0 771 1,108 0.00529 
1989 - 640.0 849 1,249 0.00261 
So urc e: YeaarBook 1980-90 
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Imports I official and uniofficial exchange rates 
Year Imports Imports official parallel GDP 
us $ us $ Exchange market 
(current million rate rate 
million) c.i . f (Z I us $) 
YB / 92 
p. 864 
1966 1,020.0 0.165 0 . 647 
1967 331.8 0 . 333 0.587 
1968 292.0 0.500 0.650 
1969 370.0 0.500 0.626 
1970 524.0 835,0 0 . 500 0. 724 1,742.6 
1971 666.0 917.2 0.500 0.775 1,867.4 
1972 522 . 0 939.8 0.500 0.780 1 ,876.0 
1973 691.8 782 . 0 0.500 0.837 3,003.6 
1974 954.0 1,051.0 0.500 0.967 3,674.0 
1975 946.2 927.0 0 .500 1.040 3,784 . 8 
1976 784 . 5 674.0 0.807 2.423 3 ,58 0 . 0 
1977 807 .5 609 . 0 0.857 3.267 4,520.0 
1978 7 5 9.6 592.0 0.836 5 . 146 6,556.0 
1979 885.4 597 . 0 1 . 729 6,424.0 
1980 1,015.2 842.0 2.800 6,145.0 
1981 832.2 672 . 0 5.465 5,424.0 
1982 480 . 0 5 . 750 5,410 . 0 
1983 498.0 30.120 4,588.0 
1984 675.0 40 . 450 2,760.0 
1985 791.0 55.793 2 , 953 . 0 
1 9 86 875.0 71.100 3,412.0 
1 98 7 756 . 0 131 . 500 2,909.0 
1988 771. 0 274.000 3,329.0 
1989 849.0 454.620 385.0 
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Imports, GDP and external conversion factors 
Year Imports GDP Eternal 
c.i . f. conversion factor 
1973 782 3,003.6 2 
1974 1 ,051 3,674 2 
1975 927 3,784 2 
1976 6 74 3,580 1.23277 
1977 609 4,520 1 . 16577 
1 978 592 6,556 1.20564 
1079 597 6,423 0.57008 
1 980 842 6,145 0.36150 
1 981 672 5,424 0.22778 
1982 480 5,410 0.17444 
1 983 498 4,588 0. 07299 
1984 675 2,760 0,02728 
1985 791 2,953 0.02003 
1986 875 3,412 0.01676 
1987 765 2,909 0.00889 
1988 771 3,329 0.0054 
1989 849 385 0.00262 
Source: YearBook 1980-90 
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Current account, imports, exports and exchange rates 
Year CA Current Imports Exports Official Parallel 
(US $ Account Tshibaka current Exchange Exchange 
million) million million Rate Rate 
Tshibaka us $ us $ 
p.43 p.41 p.42 
1966 3.9 3.9 1,020.0 424.2 0.165 0.647 
1967 14.4 14.4 331.8 308.8 0.333 0 .58 7 
1968 50.3 50.3 292.0 570 . 2 0.500 0.650 
1969 47.0 47.0 370.0 680 . 2 0.500 0.626 
1970 -63. 7 -63. 7 524.0 781. 2 0.500 0. 724 
1971 -124.7 -102.0 666.0 687.0 0.500 0.775 
1972 -365 . 5 -329.0 522.0 737.6 0.500 0.780 
1973 -279 .3 -244 .9 691.8 1,012.8 0.500 0 . 837 
1974 -471 .1 - 372.3 954 .0 1,381. 0 0.500 0.967 
1975 - 592.7 -592 . 7 946.2 864 .8 0.500 1 .040 
1976 -830.2 -832.8 784.5 867.9 0.807 2.423 
1977 -1,451.3 -1, 451. 2 807.5 1,019.1 0 . 857 3.267 
1979 -82.9 294.3 759.6 772 . 8 0.836 5.146 
1979 -14.9 146.0 885.4 1,169.6 1. 729 
1980 -1 . 5 -153.6 1,015 .2 2,476.2 2.800 
1981 -424.0 832.2 1,889.3 5. 4 65 
----------- -- --------------
1992 -433.0 5.750 
1983 -309.7 30.120 
1984 -325.0 40 . 450 
1985 -290.0 55.793 
1986 -400.0 71.100 
1987 -655.0 131.500 
1988 -762.0 274.000 
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Diamond production in Kasai Occidental and Kasai Oriental 
(thousands carats) 
Year Total Kasai Kasai 
production Oriental Kasai Occidental 
(state -owned quantity bought by 
company: MIBA) Official buying 
off ices in Tshikapa 
and Mbuji Mayi 
1967 13,154 13,154 
1968 11,904 11,353 551 
1969 14,116 11,616 2,500 
1970 14 ,063 12, 408 1 ,033 
1971 12,742 12,002 743 
1972 13,390 12,181 1,209 
1973 12,939 12,004 935 
1974 13,597 12,991 606 
1975 12,801 12, 415 386 
1976 11 ,821 11,516 305 
1977 11,215 10,795 420 
1978 11 ,24 5 10,5 99 646 
1979 8,734 8,063 671 
1980 10,335 8,001 2,334 
1981 6,758 5,754 1,004 
1982 6,079 5,656 423 
1983 11,982 5 , 807 6,175 
1984 18,459 6,896 11 , 563 
1985 19,975 6,977 12,998 
1986 23,205 8,664 14,541 
Source: Vingt ans du MPR, p. 346. 
